



This publication is an output of a collaborative research project co-led by Sami Atallah, former director at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS); Mona Harb and Mona Fawaz, research directors at the Beirut Urban Lab (BUL, American University of Beirut); and Rabie Nasr, director at the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR). The project is titled: 'Lebanese Municipalities and Syrian Refugees: Building Capacity and Promoting Agency'. This work was carried out with support from the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), Ottawa, Canada. The views expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of IDRC or its Board of Governors.

Bridging the Education Gap: How to Avoid a Lost Generation of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon

Daniel Garrote Sánchez

Executive Summary

Education is vital in providing individuals with skills and experiences that will afford them access to better and more secure work. The Lebanese government and international bodies have made efforts to bring more Syrian refugee children into the educational system. Despite these efforts, about 54% of school-aged children (between the ages of 3 and 18) are still out of school. This policy brief uses econometric techniques to elicit the main drivers of educational enrollment, distinguishing between different supply, financial, and demand factors. In order to determine the main factors—alongside econometric techniques—we use the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL) in three mid-sized cities in Lebanon: Saida, Zahle, and Halba. We find strong evidence that education enrollment rates of Syrian refugees in Lebanon are appallingly low due to the lack of affordability and monetary means of the impoverished refugee population, and not primarily due to supply constraints. This brief ends with policy recommendations on how to bridge the gap and bring more Syrian refugee children into the local education system.

- 1 UNHCR registered Syrian refugees, November 2015.
- 2 Government of Lebanon and the United Nations. 2019. 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 (2019 update)'. Beirut.
- 3 Lebanese Crisis Response Plan (LCRP) of 2017-2020.
- 4 From an estimated annual cost of \$2,000 per children attending public schools, international donors are currently financing \$363 for children attending the first shift and \$600 for those attending the second shift.
- 5 This survey is run annually by UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP to a nationally representative sample of Syrian refugees in Lebanon. See: UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP. 2019. 'The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR)'. <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/73118.pdf>
- 6 See the UNESCO Institute of Statistics (UIS) Database: <http://data.uis.unesco.org/>
- 7 Lucas, R. E. 1988. 'On the Mechanics of Economic Development'. *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 22(3); Barro, R. J. 1991. 'Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 106(2): 407-443; and Mankiw, N. G., D. Romer, and D. Weil. 1990. 'A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth'. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 107 (2): 407-437.
- 8 Psacharopoulos, G. 1985. 'Returns to Education: A Further International Update and Implications'. *The Journal of Human Resources*, 20(4): 583; Psacharopoulos, G. 1994. 'Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update'. *World Development*, 22: 1,325-1,344; and Duflo, E. 2001. 'Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment'. *American Economic Review*, 91(4): 795-814.

Introduction

The arrival of about 1.5 million Syrian refugees into Lebanon over the last 10 years has created numerous challenges to an already weak economy. One of the key sectors suffering visible strain is the educational system. Among the Syrian population residing in Lebanon, there are close to half a million school-age children (between 3 and 18 years old).¹ Given their dwindling disposable income, most Syrian families rely on free schooling—either public schools or subsidized private schools—to provide the necessary educational investments for their children. In comparison, the population of Lebanese children enrolled in public or subsidized schools stood at only 392,000 students in 2018.² The arrival of refugees therefore more than doubled the potential demand for free schooling.

In order to accommodate the massive increase in school-age children, the Lebanese government took bold steps by progressively introducing a 'second shift' of afternoon classes in public schools targeting refugee children. The number of schools providing the two shifts was progressively scaled up from 88 in 2014 to 360 throughout the country in the 2019-20 school year, following the patterns of refugee inflows coming from Syria.³ While international donors have provided financial help to mitigate these additional costs, the bulk of the expenses are still covered by the government.⁴ Non-formal education programs have also been increased to bridge the gap between the supply of formal education and the demand.

Despite these efforts, education outcomes for Syrian children are alarming. The latest figures from the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASyR) survey in 2019⁵ show that about 54% of school-aged children (between the ages of 3 and 18) are still out of school, a challenge that is particularly acute for teenagers (15-17 years old). This is a large step backward for a population that had only 18% of out-of-school children in 2010 back in Syria,⁶ putting a whole generation at risk of losing access to necessary skills.

Education is one of the cornerstones of sustainable economic growth, as highlighted by many economic studies.⁷ Education provides the necessary skills to increase the productivity of future workers. As a result, it also enhances labor earnings of individuals at a rate that is even higher in developing countries.⁸ Beyond these economic gains, education is central to the empowerment of citizens and the strengthening of governance and democratic institutions. Given its importance, education is included as one of the key components for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). According to the SDGs' target number 4.1, the aim is to ensure that all girls and boys complete free, equitable, and quality primary and secondary education, leading to relevant and effective learning outcomes by 2030.

In this context, the objective of this policy brief is to take a deep dive

into formal education among Syrian refugees and to understand the reasons behind the large gaps in enrollment rates between locals and refugees.⁹ While several studies have attempted to unpack the drivers of school enrollment,¹⁰ they mostly rely on direct, and limited, questions to respondents on their main barriers, which can suffer from response biases. This brief uses econometric techniques to elicit the main drivers of educational enrollment, distinguishing between different supply, financial, and demand factors. In order to do so, we use the Living Condition Survey of Refugees and Host Communities in Lebanon (LCSRHCL), an extensive survey conducted by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS) and the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) in 2018 which covered 1,556 households and 7,208 individuals (2,882 Lebanese and 4,326 Syrians) representative of the population in three Lebanese municipalities: Saida, Zahle, and Halba.¹¹ These municipalities were selected because they all host a large number of refugees, but also because they each have quite different characteristics in terms of location, level of development, religious composition, institutional structure, and stance vis-à-vis refugees.

A Snapshot of the Challenges in Bringing Syrian Refugees Back to School

Over the last seven years, the number of school-age refugees arriving in Lebanon has skyrocketed, from below 50,000 in 2013 to close to half a million in 2015-2018 (figure 1.a). At the same time, boosted by the government's efforts in expanding the supply of second shift schools, school enrollment of Syrians has progressively improved. According to the annual VASyR survey—which was jointly implemented by UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP—only 52% of children in the compulsory school-age (6 to 15) were in fact enrolled in 2015, let alone attending classes, a rate that rose to 69% in 2019. Similarly, teenagers between 15 and 17 years old increased their registration rate from 11% to 22% in the same timeframe. However, these rates are still very low compared to the Lebanese population or among Syrians before the start of the war.¹²

Consistent with the national figures, the LCSRHCL (2018) provides two key additional nuances. Firstly, there is a large variation in enrollment rates of Syrians across Lebanon (figure 1.b). We find that, while about four in five children in the cities of Halba and Saida aged 6 to 14 were registered in school, only 38% were registered in Zahle, which is an alarmingly low figure.

9
Non-formal education programs are beyond the scope of this policy brief and the survey its results are based on.

10
See, for example, the Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon 2017 to 2019.

The objective of this policy brief is to take a deep dive into formal education among Syrian refugees and to understand the reasons behind the large gaps in enrollment rates between locals and refugees

11
We limited the scope to three municipalities in order to be able to cover a representative sample of the population in each municipality and provide meaningful results at the local level, thus prioritizing depth at the expense of breadth.

12
Based on UNESCO statistics, enrollment rates of Syrians in 2010 were 93% of children 6 to 14 and 41% for teenagers 15 to 17.

13
UNESCO Institute of Statistics
(UIS) Database:
<http://data.uis.unesco.org/>


Only 52% of children in the compulsory school age (6 to 15) were in fact enrolled in 2015, let alone attending classes, a rate that rose to 69% in 2019

Niger, the country with the poorest educational outcomes in the world, still shows enrollment rates of compulsory school-aged children of 52%, and the average for the Sub-Saharan African region is about 75%.¹³ These patterns are also observed among teenagers between 15 and 17 years old, with enrollment rates varying between 44% in Saida to barely 4% in Zahle. Secondly, Syrian refugees constantly lag behind Lebanese citizens in school attendance, as the latter almost reach universal enrollment among children 6 to 14 and about 90-95% for those 15 to 17. However, there is no clear correlation between education outcomes of Syrians and outcomes of Lebanese, as Zahle, which has good performance for Lebanese children, has abysmal results for Syrians.


Figure 1

Evolution of enrollment rates of Syrian refugees in Lebanon

a Evolution of enrollment rates of school-aged Syrian refugees



b Enrollment rates for Syrian and Lebanese students in Saida, Zahle, and Halba





Source [Different rounds of VASyR survey, LRCP \(2019\), and LCSRHCL \(2018\)](#).

Note 95% confidence intervals are included for comparability between groups.

While enrollment of Syrian refugees does not seem to be driven by the capacity of the school system in each municipality to attract Lebanese students, it is correlated with the type of school prevalent in the area. In Halba and Saida, about half of Lebanese students go to public or free-private schools (figure 2.a), in stark contrast to students in Zahle, who are mostly enrolled in private schools (85%). In any of the three municipalities, Syrians tend to rely more on public schooling than Lebanese, but still, a sizable 30% are enrolled in private schools in Zahle. Looking at the distance to the nearest school, we find that, despite being consistently longer for Syrians than for Lebanese, it is not very far for either group (about a 12-15 minute drive) and are very similar across municipalities. As the mere availability of schools does not seem to be an issue, low enrollment rates might be more related to the challenge of affordability.

Figure 2

Type of school and distance to the closest center**a Children registration per type of school****b Distance to school by car**

Source [LCSRHCL \(2018\)](#).

Understanding the Main Drivers of Access to Education Among Syrian Refugees

In a context of increasingly limited government and donor funding of education programs, it is essential to understand what the Syrian refugees' binding constraints to education exactly are, so that those funds can be efficiently used. We cluster the different reasons behind the lack of student enrollment into three main categories: supply, financial, and demand. Supply factors are related to the availability of schools near where school-aged children live, including the physical distance to the closest school, if they have available spaces, or if they allow a particular child to enroll in that school. Financial constraints focus on the affordability of these schools, including the costs of tuition, transportation, and the overall financial situation of families—which can incentivize parents to push their children to work in order to help sustain


the household income. Finally, demand factors are associated with families' or children's preferences over the amount of investment in education, which are affected by cultural factors (e.g. the role of women after getting married) or economic conditions (e.g. the higher the demand of skills in the labor market, the more incentives individuals have to attain formal education).

In order to tease out the relative prevalence of the different types of constraints, we use both direct questions in the LCSRHCL (2018) about the reasons for children not to be enrolled and a multivariate econometric analysis. Figure 3 shows the main results based on responses of Syrian families in the three municipalities. The first finding is that reasons greatly vary across age, gender, and locality. Among compulsory school-aged children, supply constraints are more prevalent than among teenagers, although still within the minority. In a majority of cases, the most frequently cited reasons were related to financial constraints, in particular among teenagers, both due to the direct cost of education and the indirect consequence of many under-age children needing to work. These reasons are more recurrent in Zahle, in line with suggestive evidence of a larger problem of education affordability in that city given the higher prevalence of private schools. The large emphasis of children needing to work as a main driver of absenteeism from school is concerning and speaks to the dire financial situation of many Syrian families in Lebanon. While it is more common among teenagers, we still find a significant number of children aged 6 to 14 missing school in order to work. This factor is also more frequent among males than females, in line with traditional gender roles. In turn, females, in particular teenagers, tend to drop out of school due to family preferences, a factor associated with domestic household obligations and the prevalence of early marriage (25% of girls aged 15 to 17).


Figure 3

Respondents' main reason behind the lack of enrollment of their children

a For children aged 6-14



b For teenagers aged 15-17



Source **LCSRHCL (2018)**.

14
Randall, D. M. and M. F. Fernandes. 1991. 'The Social Desirability Response Bias in Ethics Research.' *Journal of Business Ethics*, 10(11): 805-817.

Direct responses might suffer from biases for a variety of reasons such as social desirability.¹⁴ Furthermore, the array of responses tend to be limited. In order to overcome these limitations, we use indirect information elicited through the LCSRHCL (2018). As affordability was widely mentioned as a key constraint, we corroborate this finding by dividing enrollment rates by income decile (figure 4). While only 45% of Syrian children aged 6 to 14 from the



Only 10% of Syrian teenagers (15-17) of the poorest income decile go to school, compared to more than 40% of those in the third decile

poorest income decile of the total population in the three municipalities were enrolled in school, more than 80% among those in the third decile were enrolled. In a

similar vein, only 10% of Syrian teenagers (15-17) of the poorest income decile go to school, compared to more than 40% of those in the third decile. The strong correlations between income and school enrollment might be due to different purchasing power capacity to afford education costs or to forego potential child labor earnings, but could also be due to different preferences in educational investment.¹⁵

15
Even in the case of free public schools, families incur costs related to transportation, books, and other materials and supplies.

Figure 4

Enrollment rates by income decile and nationality**a For children aged 6-14****b For teenagers aged 15-17**

Source **LCSRHCL (2018)**.

Note **95% confidence intervals are included for comparability between groups.**

Multivariate regression analysis helps us shed further light into the variety of motivations that households have in keeping their children out of school. We include at the same time different potential explanatory variables that can be categorized as: (a) Demographic characteristics (age, gender, marital status); (b) socio-economic conditions (parents' education, household income decile, employment status of the parents, access to humanitarian assistance); (c) migration trajectory and legal status (year of arrival to Lebanon, registration with UNHCR, residency permits in the municipality, intentions to return to

Syria); and (d) supply and mobility constraints (distance to the nearest school, mobility restrictions). The results are shown in table 1 in the annex, where the first three models assess the drivers of enrollment rates while the other three assess the relative importance of supply, financial, and demand factors among those children and youth out of school.

Regarding demographic characteristics, older children are more likely to drop out of school, as expected, to join the labor market. Controlling for all other variables, for every additional year, a Syrian child is 4% more likely to be out-of-school. Age not only affects the likelihood of being enrolled, but also the reasons behind dropouts: Older students tend to cite financial reasons—in particular the need to work—and demand motivations—such as having reached the desired level of education—while supply constraints are less common. By gender, although males are slightly more likely to be out of school, the differences with female children are not statistically significant. The gender differences appear in combination with other cleavages such as marital status. At any given age, female minors that are engaged or married are 17% to 25% less likely to be enrolled in school compared to those that are single, while marital status does not affect male students. Therefore, we find that early marriage of female Syrian refugees is an important factor that

Given the dire financial situation of most Syrian families, 37% of Syrian teenagers (15-17) are employed in the three municipalities, which drastically reduces the enrollment rates

pushes them out of school. Married females are also more likely to cite demand reasons (e.g. family not wanting them to study more) and married males instead drop out for financial constraints (e.g. the

need to work) as they become, in some instances, the main financial providers.

The household financial situation is perhaps the strongest driver of school enrollment. For every higher decile in the income distribution in Lebanon, children are more than 7% more likely to attend school. When they are out-of-school, more well-off children are less likely to cite financial constraints as the main reason compared to those coming from poorer families. Other variables, such as the need to resort to lower quality of food to cope with financial constraints, are also associated with lower enrollment rates. Given the dire financial situation of most Syrian families, 37% of Syrian teenagers (15-17) are employed in the three municipalities, which drastically reduces the enrollment rates (model 2 in table 1). Importantly, we find that receiving humanitarian assistance—53% of Syrian families do—has a strong positive effect of keeping refugee children in school, highlighting the binding financial constraints their families face and the role of international donors in reducing them.

As expected, the parents' educational attainments affect the probability of Syrian refugee children being enrolled, even after controlling for differences in income, which shows that this effect is not driven by financial constraints. In particular, we find that the number of years of education a mother has strongly shapes the educational outcomes of her children (of both genders), while the father's education does not have a significant impact. This might be due to the work/home division of responsibilities by which Syrian mothers spend more time with their school-aged children, as only 13% of them work compared to 61% of fathers.

Conversely, supply constraints, although present, do not seem to be binding in most instances. Results from the regression analysis show that distance to the nearest school is not correlated with the probabilities of being enrolled. Furthermore, Syrian families with mobility restrictions send their children to school with similar frequency. The regional differences that we observe highlight the negative situation in Zahle, which is in line with the higher ratio of private to free schools. This trend holds even after controlling for all other individual factors. Therefore, the barriers are more an issue of affordability than availability of schooling.

Finally, the migration trajectory and legality in the country shapes educational outcomes of refugee children. First, while school-age children from families with valid legal status are not more likely to be enrolled in school, we find that they are less likely to cite supply and financial constraints as the main barriers. In particular, having residency permits reduces the supply constraints, which could be related to qualitative evidence of some schools requesting more documentation or an overall fear of leaving without documents.¹⁶ Also, being registered with UNHCR mitigates financial constraints given that this group is more likely to receive humanitarian assistance.¹⁷ The time of arrival also has an impact—refugee families that have stayed longer in the country are more likely to send their children to school. Another important point that has not been studied in the Lebanese context is how the intentions to return to Syria affect the human capital decisions of Syrian refugee families' children. A growing literature in migration has found that the longer the time horizon migrants have in mind of staying in the host country, the more incentives they have in investing in education, in particular if it is country specific, as these investments might have lower economic returns back home.¹⁸ This can be the case for Syrian refugees in Lebanon's educational system where, aside from Arabic, English and French are also widely used.

In line with the existing literature, we find that families that do not have intentions to return—about one in four—are significantly more likely to send their children to school

16

Durable Solutions Platform and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. 2021. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium-Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities,' *Forthcoming Research Report*.

17

According to the LCSRHCL (2018), about 71% of Syrian refugees registered with the UNHCR reported receiving humanitarian assistance compared to 47% of those that were not registered.

18

Dustmann, C. 1999. 'Temporary Migration, Human Capital, and Language Fluency of Migrants,' *Scandinavian Journal of Economics*, 101(2): 297-314; Cortes, K. E. 2004. 'Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States,' *Review of Economics and Statistics*, 86(2): 465-480; and Hanushek, E. A. et al. 2011. 'Chapter 4: Migration and Education,' in *Handbook of the Economics of Education (Amsterdam: North-Holland)*: 327-439.

The LCSRHCL (2018) asks refugees about their expectations of returning to Syria. In line with the existing literature, we find that families that do not have intentions to return—about one in four—are significantly more likely to send their children to school.

Conclusion and Policy Recommendations

Over the last decade, both the government and international donors have concentrated large efforts on increasing the supply of education in Lebanon to accommodate the rapid influx of refugees. However, this policy brief provides strong evidence that enrollment rates in Lebanon are appalling due to the lack of affordability and monetary means of the impoverished refugee population, and not primarily due to supply constraints. Other demand factors that affect education enrollment are the value households and individuals place on education, given social norms, economic prospects in Lebanon, and their plans to return to Syria.

As a result, programs aiming at improving education outcomes should focus on increasing household disposable income and enhancing its economic value by providing future job opportunities in the labor market. Cash transfers to refugee families are an effective way to alleviate their financial constraints. In Lebanon, Lehmann and Masterson (2014) provided the first rigorous evaluation of a cash transfer program by UNHCR and found that, among other improvements, the handout of \$575 to refugees led to an increase of enrollment rates from 33% to 39%.¹⁹

As other demand constraints are still present, conditioning cash transfers on educational attainments can further improve enrollment rates of the Syrian population. The economic literature has provided strong evidence on the effectiveness of conditional cash transfers for education programs (CCTEs) in developing countries in reducing poverty and increasing school enrollment.²⁰ In the Syrian refugee context, Turkey recently introduced a CCTE in 2017.²¹ Given the restricted financial capacity of humanitarian programs, the current evidence suggests that cash transfers—in particular those programs conditioning the funds on certain targets of school attendance—can yield better results in the goal of achieving further progress toward universal enrollment and completion of mandatory schooling among Syrian refugees in Lebanon.

19

Lehmann, C. and D. Masterson. 2014. 'Emergency Economies: The Impact of Cash Assistance in Lebanon.' *International Rescue Committee Report*.

20

Schultz, T. P. 2004. 'School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Program.' *Journal of Development Economics*, 74(1): 199-250; and Morley, S. A. and Coady, D. 2003. *From Social Assistance to Social Development: Targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries* (Washington: Center for Global Development).

21

UNICEF. 2017. 'More than 230,000 Refugee Children in Turkey to Benefit from the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education Programme.'

Annex 1

Drivers of enrollment rates among Syrian school-age children:

A multivariate analysis

Variables	(1) Enrollment baseline	(2) Baseline + child labor	(3) Baseline + dist. to school	(4) % Supply constraints	(5) % Financial constraints	(6) % demand constraints
Age	-0.045*** (0.005)	-0.038*** (0.005)	-0.051*** (0.006)	-0.050*** (0.008)	0.031*** (0.009)	0.020*** (0.006)
Male	-0.088 (0.061)	-0.094 (0.061)	0.009 (0.076)	-0.092 (0.094)	0.046 (0.115)	0.046 (0.080)
Married/engaged male	0.258 (0.228)	0.299 (0.195)	0.284 (0.398)	-0.015 (0.119)	0.337** (0.147)	-0.323*** (0.104)
Married/engaged female	-0.175*** (0.059)	-0.243*** (0.062)	-0.169** (0.080)	-0.033 (0.066)	-0.204 (0.141)	0.238* (0.122)
Long-term sickness	-0.009 (0.052)	-0.014 (0.053)	-0.071 (0.059)	0.058 (0.119)	0.044 (0.118)	-0.102 (0.061)
Income decile	0.071*** (0.023)	0.073*** (0.023)	0.065** (0.029)	0.038 (0.043)	-0.111*** (0.042)	0.072 (0.044)
Education mother on male child	0.024*** (0.007)	0.024*** (0.007)	0.012 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.013)	0.019 (0.015)	-0.007 (0.010)
Education mother on female child	0.026*** (0.008)	0.026*** (0.008)	0.021** (0.008)	-0.004 (0.015)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.011 (0.015)
Education father on male child	0.009 (0.006)	0.009 (0.006)	0.015* (0.008)	0.006 (0.012)	-0.010 (0.013)	0.004 (0.008)
Education father on female child	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.012 (0.013)	-0.011 (0.016)	0.023* (0.013)
Child employed		-0.226*** (0.039)				
Distance to school			-0.001 (0.002)			
Mobility restrictions	-0.017 (0.019)	-0.019 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.021)	0.003 (0.033)	0.011 (0.037)	-0.014 (0.026)
Time in Lebanon	0.043*** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.010)	0.047*** (0.013)	-0.010 (0.015)	0.011 (0.019)	-0.001 (0.012)
Registered with UNHCR	-0.003 (0.063)	-0.083 (0.056)	0.115 (0.086)	0.098 (0.070)	-0.272* (0.141)	0.175* (0.101)
Residency permits	0.064 (0.089)	0.054 (0.089)	0.025 (0.096)	-0.384*** (0.129)	0.059 (0.167)	0.325** (0.148)
No plan to return	0.283*** (0.069)	0.272*** (0.067)	0.170** (0.077)	0.006 (0.116)	0.046 (0.154)	-0.052 (0.122)
Receive humanitarian aid	0.110** (0.044)	0.114*** (0.044)	0.119** (0.051)	0.219** (0.090)	-0.084 (0.119)	-0.135* (0.078)
Halba	0.006 (0.074)	-0.008 (0.073)	0.011 (0.079)	-0.226 (0.142)	0.236 (0.170)	-0.010 (0.138)
Zahle	-0.292*** (0.073)	-0.292*** (0.073)	-0.237*** (0.083)	-0.424*** (0.130)	0.380** (0.150)	0.044 (0.110)

Variables	(1) Enrollment baseline	(2) Baseline + child labor	(3) Baseline + dist. to school	(4) % Supply constraints	(5) % Financial constraints	(6) % demand constraints
Region of origin FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	962	962	742	340	340	340
R-squared	0.364	0.373	0.349	0.270	0.185	0.243

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Biibliography

Barro, Robert J. 'Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106, no. 2 (1991): 407-43.

Cortes, Kalena E. 'Are Refugees Different from Economic Immigrants? Some Empirical Evidence on the Heterogeneity of Immigrant Groups in the United States.' *Review of Economics and Statistics* 86, no. 2 (2004): 465-80.

Duflo, Esther. 'Schooling and Labor Market Consequences of School Construction in Indonesia: Evidence from an Unusual Policy Experiment.' *American Economic Review* 91, no. 4 (2001): 795-814.

Durable Solutions Platform and Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. 'Addressing Protracted Displacement in Lebanon: A Medium-Term Outlook for Syrian Refugees and Lebanese Host Communities.' *Forthcoming research report*, 2021.

Dustmann, Christian. 'Temporary Migration, Human Capital, and Language Fluency of Migrants.' *Scandinavian Journal of Economics* 101, no. 2 (1999): 297-314.

Government of Lebanon and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 2019. 'Lebanon Crisis Response Plan 2017-2020 (2019 update)'; Beirut. <https://www.unhcr.org/lb/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/2019/04/LCRP-EN-2019.pdf>

Hanushek, Eric A., Finis Welch, Stephen Machin, and Ludger Woessmann. 'Chapter 4: Migration and Education.' In *Handbook of the Economics of Education*, 327-439. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 2011.

Lehmann, Christian, and Daniel Masterson. 'Emergency Economies: The Impact of Cash Assistance in Lebanon.' *International Rescue Committee report*, 2014.

Lucas, Robert E. 'On the Mechanics of Economic Development.' *Journal of Monetary Economics*, 42, 22, no. 3 (1988).

Mankiw, N. Gregory, David Romer, and David Weil. 'A Contribution to the Empirics of Economic Growth.' *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107, no. 2 (1990): 407-37.

Morley, Samuel A., and David Coady. *From Social Assistance to Social Development: Targeted Education Subsidies in Developing Countries*. Washington: Center for Global Development, 2003.

Psacharopoulos, George. 'Returns to Education: A Further International Update and Implications.' *The Journal of Human Resources* 20, no. 4 (1985): 583.

Psacharopoulos, George. 'Returns to Investment in Education: A Global Update.' *World Development* 22 (1994): 1325-44.

Randall, Donna M., and Maria F. Fernandes. 'The Social Desirability Response Bias in Ethics Research.' *Journal of Business Ethics* 10, no. 11 (1991): 805-17.

Schultz, T. Paul. 'School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Program.' *Journal of Development Economics* 74, no. 1 (2004): 199-250.

UNHCR, UNICEF, and WFP. 2019. 'The Vulnerability Assessment for Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (VASyR).'

<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/73118.pdf>

UNICEF. 2017. 'More than 230,000 Refugee Children in Turkey to Benefit from the Conditional Cash Transfer for Education Programme.'

<https://www.unicef.org/eca/press-releases/more-230000-refugee-children-turkey-benefit-conditional-cash-transfer-education>

About the author

Daniel Garrote Sánchez contributed to this project while being a senior researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. He currently works as a labor market consultant at the World Bank. His areas of work include economic migration, labor markets and the task content of jobs, conflict and forced displacement, and development of lagging regions. Prior to joining LCPS, he served as a labor migration consultant for the World Bank and the Ministry of Labor of Saudi Arabia. He also worked for six years as an economic researcher at the Central Bank of Spain covering a range of macroeconomic topics such as fiscal policy, labor markets, and deleveraging. Garrote Sánchez holds a master's degree in Public Administration and International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School of Government.

LCPS

About the Policy Brief

A Policy Brief is a short piece regularly published by LCPS that analyzes key political, economic, and social issues and provides policy recommendations to a wide audience of decision makers and the public at large.

About LCPS

Founded in 1989, the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies is a Beirut-based independent, non-partisan think-tank whose mission is to produce and advocate policies that improve good governance in fields such as oil and gas, economic development, public finance, and decentralization.

Contact Information Lebanese Center for Policy Studies

Sadat Tower, Tenth floor
P.O.B 55-215, Leon Street,
Ras Beirut, Lebanon
T: + 961 1 799301
F: + 961 1 799302
info@lcps-lebanon.org
www.lcps-lebanon.org