Report

The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections:
What Do the Numbers Say?

Mount Lebanon 1 Electoral District: Keserwan and Jbeil

Georgia Dagher

Jbeil

Keserwan

Sadat Tower, Tenth Floor
P.O.B 55-215, Leon Street,
Ras Beirut, Lebanon

T: + 961 1 79 93 01
F: + 961 1 79 93 02
info@lcps-lebanon.org
www.lcps-lebanon.org

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Georgia Dagher is a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. Her research focuses on parliamentary representation, namely electoral behavior and electoral reform. She has also previously contributed to LCPS's work on international donors conferences and reform programs. She holds a degree in Politics and Quantitative Methods from the University of Edinburgh.

Executive Summary

In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2018, the electoral district of Mount Lebanon 1—which combined Keserwan and Jbeil—saw a competitive race, with candidates from three electoral lists making it to parliament. Constituents were highly mobilized, as Mount Lebanon 1 was the electoral district that saw the highest turnout rate across the country. There were some variations across confessional groups, with voters who had a stake in the elections results—Maronites and Shias—having much higher participation rates. The proportional representation electoral system created high levels of competition, as the Free Patriotic Movement and its affiliated candidates, which had won all the district's seats in the previous election, experienced a drop in support. Although the party's list won the plurality of the votes and seats, it lost two seats to the Lebanese Forces list, and two others to a list which included independent candidates and a candidate from the Kataeb. There were variations in support for the winning lists and candidates across confessional groups: The three winning lists received nearly all of the Maronite votes in both Keserwan and Jbeil, while Shia voters voted much more for a list which included a Hezbollah candidate. Maronite voters also voted much more for the winning candidates, while an overwhelming majority of Shia voters in Jbeil cast their preferential vote for the Hezbollah candidate, with a very low number voting for the Shia winner. Six women ran for elections in Mount Lebanon 1, five of them in Keserwan and one in Jbeil, and received a very low number of votes. While the share of votes they received did not significantly vary across voters' gender, among those who voted for a list, women voters cast their preferential vote for a woman more often than men voters did. The fourth list that ran in Mount Lebanon 1 was Kulluna Watani, the coalition between emerging political actors. It won a low number of votes, and there were only minor variations in the support it received across confessional groups and genders. In Jbeil, Kulluna Watani voters had a high confessional bias: Nearly all Maronite voters who voted for a candidate in the list chose a Maronite candidate, and nearly all Shia voters chose the Shia candidate. Finally, the results in Mount Lebanon 1 suggest potential irregularities that benefited candidates on the Free Patriotic Movement and Lebanese Forces lists—particularly in Jbeil, although there also were some irregular patterns in the votes for the latter list in Keserwan. In Jbeil, both lists received better results in some of the smallest polling stations, and in polling stations that recorded very high turnouts, which could suggest voter or vote rigging. In addition, the share of votes obtained by each of the two lists tended to decrease as the share of null votes in a polling station increased, which could also suggest vote rigging.

Introduction

After passing a new electoral law in 2017, the Lebanese parliament finally agreed to hold elections in 2018—nine years after the previous ones, and two mandate extensions later. The new electoral law established a proportional representation system for the first time in the country's history, paving the way for increased competition. This new system, however, led to little changes in political representation, with voters in 2018 reiterating their support for the main established political parties. Nevertheless, these results must not be taken at face value and require a closer analysis, as voting patterns across and within electoral districts, as well as across voters' demographic characteristics, still showed variations.

As part of a larger study on the 2018 elections, LCPS has analyzed voter behavior at the national and the electoral district levels. Using the official elections results from polling stations published by the Ministry of Interior,[1] the analysis unpacks the elections results and examines differing patterns in voting behavior across demographic characteristics and geographical areas. The results at the polling station level were merged with a series of potential explanatory factors at the individual and cadastral levels. First, based on the ministry's list of registered voters by confession and gender in each of the polling stations,[2] we identified the demographic characteristics of registered voters in each of the polling stations. The results at the polling station level were also merged with a series of factors that may have affected voters' choices at the cadastral level in each electoral district. These factors include the level of economic development in a cadaster, approximated by the night-time light intensity;[3] the poverty rate in a cadaster, approximated by the ratio of beneficiaries of the National Poverty Targeting Program over the population in the cadaster;[4] the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, constructed by LCPS and based on the distribution of voters by confession in each cadaster;[5] and, finally, the share of refugees over the number of registered voters in a cadaster.[6] Through the use of multivariate regression analyses, the explanatory significance of each of these factors on voter behavior is identified.

Apart from voters' preferences, the study also examines incidents of electoral fraud. We seek to identify evidence of voter rigging, such as vote buying, and vote rigging, such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations.

This report unpacks the results in the electoral district of Mount Lebanon 1, which consists of Keserwan and Jbeil and is allocated eight parliamentary seats—five Maronite seats in Keserwan, and two Maronite seats and one Shia seat in Jbeil. The report is divided into seven sections. First, we present the demographic distribution of

1
Available at: http://elections.gov.lb.

2
Note that some polling stations had voters from multiple confessional groups registered to vote. Similarly, some had both men and women registered to vote.

3
Obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

4
Data on National Poverty Targeting Program beneficiaries was obtained from the Ministry of Social Affairs.

5
Based on electoral data on the sect of voters per polling station, we constructed an index of homogeneity (IH) = $\sum_{l=1}^{n} Sij^2$, where S_{ij}^2 is the sum of the square root of the share of each sectarian group in the total number of registered voters in a cadaster. The index ranges between 0 (when the cadaster is fully heterogeneous) and 1 (when the cadaster is fully homogeneous, or only one sectarian group is present).

6
Data on the refugee population is collected from UNHCR.

registered voters in Mount Lebanon 1. The second section analyzes voter turnout, which varied across confessional groups and genders. The third section of this report delves into voters' preferences for political parties and candidates. Going beyond the results at the aggregate level, we shed light on the varying preferences for parties and candidates across voters' sect and across geographical areas in each of the Mount Lebanon 1 districts. In the fourth section, we examine voters' sectarian behavior in Jbeil, i.e. their preferences for candidates of their same sectarian group. The fifth section looks at the performance of women candidates. The sixth section looks at the performance of the Kulluna Watani list that ran for elections in Mount Lebanon 1. The seventh and final section of this report identifies incidents of electoral fraud. Using a number of statistical methods—which include analyzing the distribution of results at the polling station level, such as turnouts, votes for each list and party, and the share of invalid ballots—we test for voter and vote rigging, such as pressure to vote through vote buying, or manipulations in the vote counting process.

I   Who are the voters?

In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of May 2018, over 180,000 voters were registered to vote in the electoral district of Mount Lebanon 1, composed of Keserwan and Jbeil. Among the registered voters, 176,291 were registered in Lebanon[7] and 3,912 registered from abroad.[8] Out of the total 128 parliamentary seats, there were eight seats at stake in the district. Keserwan has five Maronite seats, and Jbeil has two Maronite and one Shia seat.

Mount Lebanon 1 has a low degree of confessional fragmentation, with Maronites constituting an overwhelming majority of registered voters. Overall, 82% of registered voters in Mount Lebanon 1 were Maronite, while 10% were Shia. In Keserwan, 91% of registered voters were Maronite and in Jbeil, 71% were Maronite and 20% were Shia. In both districts, the remaining constituents were mostly split between Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Christian minorities, Sunnis, and a very small number of Alawite and Druze voters.[9]

7
In Keserwan, 93,958 voters, including 138 public employees, were registered in Lebanon, and in Jbeil, 82,333, including 284 public employees were registered in Lebanon.

8
2,014 in Keserwan and 1,898 in Jbeil.

9
We calculate the number of registered voters by confession using the official election results published by the Ministry of Interior, as well as the ministry's list of registered voters by confession in each of the polling station. Our approximation of the confessional composition of each district excludes public employees and diaspora voters, whose confessions were not specified.

Figure 1 **Registered voters and allocated seats by confessional group in Mount Lebanon 1**

■ Maronite ■ Shia ■ Greek Orthodox ■ Greek Catholic ■ Sunni ■ Christian minorities ■ Others

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Given the assigned quotas of seats per confessional group, representation is not equal for each voter, but rather depends on the confession to which they belong. In Jbeil, where seats are allocated to more than one confessional group, Shia voters benefit significantly more from the quota compared to Maronite voters. While each Maronite seat represents about 29,000 voters, the Shia seat represents around 16,500 voters.

Table 1   **Confessional composition of Mount Lebanon 1 and allocated seats by confessional group**

	Keserwan				Jbeil			
	Number of voters	Percentage	Number of seats	Voters per seat	Number of voters	Percentage	Number of seats	Voters per seat
Maronite	85,508	91%	5	17,102	58,367	71%	2	29,184
Shia	1,403	1%			16,559	20%	1	16,559
Greek Orthodox	713	1%			2,398	3%		
Greek Catholic	1,672	2%			848	1%		
Armenian Orthodox	1,332	1%			972	1%		
Sunni	161	0%			2,127	3%		
Christian minorities	1,883	2%			235	0%		
Armenian Catholic	1,118	1%			525	1%		
Alawite	8	0%			18	0%		
Druze	22	0%						
Total	93,820	100%			82,049	100%		
Public employees	138				284			
Diaspora	2,014				1,898			
Total	95,972				84,231			

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Registered voters tend to be divided into electoral centers depending on their confession and gender. Thirty-five percent of polling stations in Mount Lebanon 1, however, had constituents from more than one group registered to vote, thus inhibiting the complete analysis of voter behavior by confessional group. Overall, almost 61,000 voters were registered in these mixed stations. In Keserwan, 61% of stations were reserved for Maronites, while most of the remaining ones were mixed. In Jbeil, 54% were reserved for Maronites, 12% for Shias, and most of the remaining stations were mixed. A few stations in each of the districts were reserved for the minority groups (less than 10 in total, 3% of voters).

Figure 2 **Confessional composition of polling stations in Mount Lebanon 1**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

The majority of represented voters, however, were registered in their own polling stations. In Keserwan, about 65% of Maronite voters were registered in Maronite polling stations. There was also one Shia and one Greek Catholic station, which overall hosted about 30% of voters from each of the confessional groups. Regarding the confessional composition of mixed stations, which had about 35,000 voters, the largest share of voters registered in these were Maronite (80%), with the remaining being mostly split between Christian minority groups (5%), Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholics, and Shias (between 2% and 3% each).

Similarly, in Jbeil, about 75% of Maronites and 60% of Shias were registered in their own polling stations. The few other stations reserved for single groups hosted about 90% of Sunnis and 50% of Armenian Orthodox, but only 5% of Greek Orthodox voters registered in Jbeil. Among the nearly 25,000 voters registered in mixed stations, about 55% were Maronite, 25% were Shia, 10% were Greek Orthodox, and the remainder was split between Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Armenian Catholics, Sunnis, and Christian minority groups (between 1% and 3% each).[10]

10
This is calculated by comparing the total number of registered voters by confessional group to the number of voters registered in their own stations. On the same basis, it is also possible to calculate the confessional composition of mixed stations, by looking at the share of each group that was registered in those stations.

II Who voted?

Turnout in the Mount Lebanon 1 district was the highest across the country, and much higher than the national average: 65%, compared to 49%. Among the 180,203 Lebanese registered in the district with the legal age to vote, 117,603 cast a vote while the remaining 62,600 did not. Turnout in Keserwan was also slightly higher than it was in

Jbeil—66% compared to 65%. Keserwan saw a drop in turnout compared to the 2009 elections, as 68% of registered voters voted in the previous elections, while turnout in Jbeil was the same.

Similar to trends in other districts, constituents in the diaspora— who were given the opportunity to vote for the first time in 2018— had higher participation rates. Among the 3,912 Lebanese emigrants who registered to vote, 69% cast a ballot. The difference was larger in Jbeil (70% turnout among the diaspora, compared to 64% among residents) than it was in Keserwan (68% compared to 66%).

Figure 3 **Turnout by residency in Mount Lebanon 1**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Voters who had a stake in the elections results—Maronites and Shias—were the most mobilized

In both Keserwan and Jbeil, turnout differed across confessional groups, and were highest among Maronite and Shia voters.

In Keserwan, where all parliamentary seats are allocated to Maronite voters, the few Shia voters registered had the highest turnout (79%). They were followed by Maronites, who had a 68% turnout. Greek Catholic voters had a significantly lower participation rate (49%), while mixed-confession polling stations saw a 62% turnout. All these variations across confessional groups are statistically significant even after controlling for voters' gender, as well as certain characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered, such as level of confessional homogeneity and economic development.

There were minor variations in turnouts across genders. Men voted slightly more than women (68% compared to 67%), while voters in gender-mixed stations voted much less (61%). However, turnout rates in gender-mixed stations that had Maronite voters registered were much higher (72%), while those that had multiple confessional groups registered were lower (59%).

Figure 4 **Turnout by confessional group and gender in Keserwan**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

In Jbeil, Shia and Maronite voters were the most likely to vote, with 68% of Shia voters and 66% of Maronite voters casting a ballot. Among the few registered voters who are not represented by a seat in Jbeil, turnout was highest among Greek Orthodox voters (61%), and much lower among Sunnis (45%) and Armenian Orthodox (26%). These variations are statistically significant. In mixed-confession polling stations, turnout was one of the highest (62%).

Similar to Keserwan, there were no significant variations in turnout across genders. Male voters voted slightly less than women (nearly 65% compared to 66%) and similarly, those in gender-mixed stations voted less (less than 63%). These lower turnouts in gender-mixed stations reflect those in confession-mixed stations, as the majority of gender-mixed stations also had multiple confessional groups registered to vote. In fact, turnout in gender-mixed stations that had multiple confessional groups registered were lower (59%), while turnouts in gender-mixed stations that were reserved for Maronite and Shia voters were much higher (69% in each).

Figure 5 **Turnout by confessional group and gender in Jbeil**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Turnouts varied across cadasters, but were high in all cases

There were large variations in turnout across cadasters in both Keserwan and Jbeil, although, in contrast to other districts, turnout was below 50% in only a few cadasters.

In Keserwan, where the total turnout was 66%, 29 cadasters saw turnouts above 70%, while only two had turnouts below 50%. The cadasters with the lowest turnouts were the neighboring ones of Bzoummar (43%), Chnanaair (49%), and Dlebta (51%). These turnouts, however, are still relatively high. The significantly lower turnout in Bzoummar could be explained by the higher presence of Armenian Catholic voters registered in this cadaster (over 60% of registered voters), who tended to have low turnouts across the country. Turnout rates were below 55% in three other cadasters—those were the neighboring ones of Ghazir, Zouk Mkayel, and Harissa (between 51% and 53%). While all of these were majority Maronite, the lower turnouts could be partly explained by the higher share of Armenian Orthodox and Armenian Catholics in Ghazir, Christian minorities in Harissa, and both Christian minorities and Greek Orthodox voters in Zouk Mkayel.

Turnouts were significantly high in the cadasters of Nahr El-Dahab (83%), Hrajel (81%), the neighboring cadasters of Beqaata Aachqout and Hayata, as well as the neighboring ones of Zaitoun and Ghadras (80% each). In all of these high-turnout cadasters, all or nearly all registered voters were Maronite, with the exception of Zaitoun where about one third of registered voters were Shia, who had the highest turnout rates in Keserwan.

Geographical variations in turnout could be partly driven by the confessional composition of each cadaster. In 55 out of the 67

Keserwan cadasters voters were registered in, over 90% of registered voters were Maronite, meaning that some cadasters with lower than average turnouts were mostly Maronite. However, most of the low-turnout cadasters had a higher share of minority groups.

Focusing on each type of polling station—or comparing exclusively Maronite stations to mixed-confession stations, where all minority groups were registered—reveals that Maronite polling stations recorded higher turnouts in all cases. Even in other cadasters that did not see particularly low turnouts but had a high share of minority groups, Zouk Mosbeh for example, turnouts in Maronite stations were significantly higher than those in mixed stations (over 20% higher).

Beyond the prevalence of any specific confessional group in a cadaster, turnout may have been affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster—that is whether many different groups cohabit or if there is a high predominance of one, regardless of which.[11] In Keserwan, average turnout rates increased from 63% in the most heterogeneous cadasters to 70% in the most homogeneous ones. This relationship is statistically significant even after controlling for voters' gender, confession, and other characteristics of the cadasters they were registered in, such as level of economic development and poverty rates. This result can point toward the higher interest and capacity of sectarian parties to mobilize voters in the most homogeneous areas, where the confessional composition—in this case Maronite—can guarantee receiving a higher share of votes. Less homogeneous cadasters also had a higher share of minority groups, which, as mentioned above, were less mobilized.

11
We use an index of confessional homogeneity (IH) = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} Sij^2$, where S_{ij}^2 is the sum of the square root of the share of each confessional group in the number of registered voters in a cadaster. The index goes from 0.3 (most heterogeneous) to 1 (fully homogenous - only one group is present in the cadaster).

Figure 6 **Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and turnout rate in Keserwan**

In Jbeil, where the total turnout was 65%, turnout was above 70% in 24 cadasters, while it was below 50% in seven

The cadaster with the lowest turnout was Hbaline (40%), followed by the neighboring cadasters of Berbara (41%), Gharzouz (43%), and Mounsef (45%), as well as Laqlouq, Aabeidat, and Gharfine (47% each). The lower turnouts in Berbara, Mounsef, and Gharzouz could be explained by the fact that all of them were nearly fully Greek Orthodox and the lower turnout in Laqlouq by the fact that this cadaster was fully Sunni. However, the other low-turnout cadasters, Hbaline, Aabeidat, and Gharfine, were fully or nearly fully Maronite.

Regarding the high-turnout cadasters, surprisingly, two neighboring cadasters made up of one small polling station each saw 100% turnouts—Beit Habbaq and Saqiet El-Khayt, both fully Maronite. This could point toward irregularities, such as vote buying or ballot stuffing, although it could be due to parties' success in mobilizing voters in those small cadasters. Another neighboring cadaster, Kfoun, saw a high turnout (82%). Turnout was also high in Nahr Ibrahim (88%). In line with the higher turnouts among Maronite voters, all of these cadasters were fully Maronite, with the exception of Nahr Ibrahim which was nearly so.

Geographical variations in turnouts are partly driven by inter-sect variations. A higher prevalence of Maronite and/or Shia registered voters tended to be associated with higher turnout rates in a cadaster. In all cadasters where turnouts were above 70%, over 90% of registered voters were Maronite and/or Shia, except Rihanet Jbayl (where turnout was 74%, and 60% of voters were Maronite and 40% were Greek Orthodox), and Blat Jbeil (78% turnout, 82% of voters were Maronite). Generally, cadasters that had a neither Maronite nor Shia-majority population had an average turnout rate of 47%. In comparison, those that were either at least 95% Maronite or 95% Shia had an average turnout rate of 67%.

Cadasters with a higher prevalence of Sunni or Greek Orthodox constituents saw lower turnouts. In cadasters where at least 80% of registered voters were Greek Orthodox or Sunni, average turnout rates were 62%. In cadasters where less than 20% of voters were Greek Orthodox or Sunni, average turnouts were 65% and 64%, respectively.

In contrast to Keserwan, geographical variations in turnouts in Jbeil were not affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster.

**What are the main drivers of turnout in Mount Lebanon 1?**

In both Keserwan and Jbeil, voters in polling stations that had more than one sect registered to vote were significantly less likely to vote. This may be because parties focus less on stations where a specific confessional group cannot be targeted. In Keserwan, voters in more homogeneous cadasters were significantly more likely to vote. This factor is statistically significant even after controlling for other

characteristics of the cadaster, such as the level of economic development and poverty rates, as well as voters' gender and sect. This again might be due to sectarian parties' higher interest and capacity in mobilizing voters in homogeneous localities, where their main constituents can be targeted more easily.

Regarding voters' confession, Shias were the most likely to vote in Keserwan. Maronite voters followed, while Greek Catholics were the least likely to vote. In Jbeil, there was no significant difference between Maronite and Shia voters, who were the most likely to vote. Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to vote, while Sunnis stood in between.

Figure 7   **Drivers of turnout in Mount Lebanon 1**

a   **Drivers of turnout in Keserwan**

b   **Drivers of turnout in Jbeil**

III Who voted for whom?

Five lists competed in Mount Lebanon 1, with a total of 38 candidates. Twenty-three candidates competed for the five Maronite seats in Keserwan, 10 candidates competed for the two Maronite seats in Jbeil, and five candidates competed for the Shia seat in Jbeil.

The race was competitive and three lists won seats

Three of the five competing lists managed to win seats in Mount Lebanon 1. Compared to the 2009 elections, Keserwan and Jbeil saw a high level of competitiveness.

The first winning list, 'Strong Lebanon', formed by the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM) and affiliated candidates won four seats with 47% of the votes (54,544 votes). The list obtained three of the five Maronite seats in Keserwan, which went to party-member Roger Azar (6,793 votes) and affiliated candidates Neemat Frem (10,717 votes) and Chamel Roukoz (7,300 votes). The list also won a Maronite seat in Jbeil, obtained by party-member Simon Abi Ramia (9,729 votes). Although the FPM list still won the highest share of votes in 2018, its support dropped compared to 2009. Under the previous 2009 majoritarian electoral system, a list could win all seats with a simple majority of the votes, which led to the FPM-backed list winning all seats with 53% of the votes in Keserwan and 57% in Jbeil.

The second winning list, 'Definitive Change', was formed by the Lebanese Forces (LF) and won two seats with 23% of the votes (26,980 votes). The list won one seat in Keserwan, obtained by Chawki Daccache (10,032 votes), and the second Maronite seat in Jbeil, which went to Ziad Hawat (14,424 votes).

Finally, the 'Decision is Ours' list, which included a candidate from the Kataeb and independent candidates, won the two remaining seats in the district with 16% of votes (18,553 votes). The list won the remaining Maronite seat in Keserwan, obtained by independent candidate Farid El Khazen (9,081 votes), and the Shia seat in Jbeil, obtained by independent candidate Mustafa El-Husseini (256 votes).

The two other lists that competed were 'National Solidarity', formed by Hezbollah and independent candidates, which won 11% of the votes (12,551 votes), and Kulluna Watani, the coalition between independent and emerging groups, which obtained 2% of the votes (2,526 votes). Neither of them managed to win a seat—falling below the 12.5% threshold required for winning a seat in Mount Lebanon 1.[12]

Most of the winners were well known figures who had previous experience in public office or large networks on the ground in Keserwan and Jbeil.

Among the winners in the FPM list, Roger Azar is the former head of the Aaramoun municipal council in Keserwan, Neemat Frem is the

12
This threshold is equal to the total number of valid votes divided by the number of seats in a district—or 1 divided by the number of seats. In the case of Mount Lebanon 1, the threshold was slightly lower than 14,500 votes, or 12.5%.

president of INDEVCO Group, a Lebanese-owned and based multinational manufacturing group, Chamel Roukoz is the son in law of current president Michel Aoun and a former brigadier general in the Lebanese army who served until 2015, and Simon Abi Ramia was the incumbent MP in Jbeil.

In the LF list, winner Chawki Daccache is a former coordinator of the party in Keserwan, and the second winner, Ziad Hawat, is the former head of the municipality of Jbeil.

Finally, in the Kataeb-independents list, Farid El Khazen served as an MP in the 2000-2005 parliament and was the Minister of Tourism between 2004-2005. While he ran in both the 2005 and 2009 elections, he failed to win either time. The Shia winner Mustafa El-Husseini is the son of former MP Ali El-Husseini, and brother of former speaker of parliament Hussein El-Husseini. He also ran in the 2000, 2005, and 2009 elections, but failed to win each time.

Figure 8 **Percentage of votes for each list in Mount Lebanon 1**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

There were variations in the performance of each list across the minor districts. The FPM list performed better in Keserwan (58% of votes) than it did in Jbeil (35%). The Kataeb-independents list also received a higher share of votes in Keserwan (20%) than it did in Jbeil (12%). The LF list, however, was more successful in Jbeil (30%) than it was in Keserwan (18%). The list formed by Hezbollah and independents barely received any votes in Keserwan (3%), while it won 21% in Jbeil. Kulluna Watani's performance was similar in both districts (2% of votes in each).

Figure 9 **Percentage of votes for each list in Keserwan and Jbeil**

	FPM	LF	Kataeb-independents	Hezbollah-independents	Kulluna Watani
Keserwan	58%	18%	20%	3%	2%
Jbeil	35%	30%	12%	21%	2%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Apart from the winners, very few candidates won over 1,000 votes, and all of them also had experience in public office or previous political connections.

In Keserwan, eight of the 23 candidates managed to win over 1,000 votes, out of the total 60,758 preferential votes cast. The most successful ones were the winners. Neemat Frem ranked first (18%), followed by Chawki Daccache (17%), and Farid El Khazen (15%). The fourth and fifth candidates were the two other winners from the FPM list, Chamel Roukoz (12%) and Roger Azar (11%). The two other candidates on the FPM list in Keserwan were highly successful: Former MP Mansour El Bon ranked sixth in the district (6,589 votes, 11%), and former Minister of Interior and Municipalities (2008-2011) Ziad Baroud came in seventh (3,893 votes, 6%). Finally, the last candidate who was able to obtain over 1,000 votes in Keserwan was the single Kataeb candidate, Chaker Salameh (2,239 votes, 4%).

The other 15 candidates in the district won 7% of preferential votes combined.

Table 2 **Most successful candidates in Keserwan**

List	Candidate	Individual affiliation	Number of votes	Percentage of preferential votes
FPM	Neemat Frem	Independent	10,717	18%
	Chamel Roukoz	Independent	7,300	12%
	Roger Azar	FPM	6,793	11%
	Mansour El Bon	Independent	6,589	11%
	Ziad Baroud	Independent	3,893	6%
LF	Chawki Daccache	LF	10,032	17%
Kataeb-independents	Farid El Khazen	Independent	9,081	15%
	Chaker Salameh	Kataeb	2,239	4%
Others (15 candidates)			4,114	7%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

In Jbeil, only six of the 15 candidates managed to win more than 1,000 votes, out of the total 52,133 preferential votes cast. In contrast to Keserwan, not all of the top candidates made it to parliament. Over a quarter of the votes were cast for the first winner, Ziad Hawat (28%), and the candidate who followed was the second winner, Simon Abi Ramia (19%). The third candidate was Hussein Zeaiter from Hezbollah (9,369 votes 18%), who did not win despite performing much better than the Shia winner, Mustafa El-Husseini. Zeaitar is an important figure in his party, explaining his success. He is one of the founding members of Hezbollah, and, while not from Jbeil, he has been running Hezbollah's political affairs in the Mount Lebanon and North regions since 2001. Moreover, among all the Hezbollah candidates who ran in the elections, Zeaitar was the only losing one. The three other candidates who won over 1,000 votes in Jbeil were also politicians. Walid El Khoury, the incumbent MP affiliated with FPM, won 15% (7,782 votes). He was followed by independent candidate Fares Souaid, former MP (2000-2005) who ran on the same list as El Khazen and Kataeb, and won 11% (5,617 votes). Finally, former mayor of Jbeil and head of the Union of Municipalities of Jbeil (elected in 1998), as well as former Minister of Telecommunications (2000-2005), Jean Louis Cardahi (independent on the Hezbollah-independents list), won 2% (1,209 votes).

The nine other candidates in Jbeil won a combined 8% of preferential votes. Winner of the Shia seat in Jbeil, Mustafa El-Husseini, obtained only 0.5% of preferential votes.

Table 3 **Most successful candidates in Jbeil**

List	Candidate	Individual affiliation	Number of votes	Percentage of preferential votes
FPM	Simon Abi Ramia	FPM	9,729	19%
	Walid El Khoury	FPM affiliated	7,782	15%
LF	Ziad Hawat	LF	14,424	28%
Kataeb-independents	Fares Souaid	Independent	5,617	11%
Hezbollah-independents	Hussein Zeaiter	Hezbollah	9,369	18%
	Jean Louis Cardahi	Independent	1,209	2%
Others (9 candidates)			4,003	8%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Overall, most of the votes received by each list tended to be driven by support for specific candidates. In Mount Lebanon 1, nearly all of the 26,980 votes received by the LF list were cast for both LF candidates Ziad Hawat (14,424 votes) and Chawki Daccache (10,032 votes). The six other candidates in the list—five independents and one member of Ahrar (National Liberal Party)—received only 2,118 votes.

Regarding the Kataeb-independents list, nearly the majority of the 18,553 votes it received in Mount Lebanon 1 were obtained by Farid El Khazen (9,081 votes), Fares Souaid (5,617 votes), and Chaker Salameh (2,239 votes). The other five candidates in the list won 1,255 votes, combined.

An overwhelming majority of the votes cast for the Hezbollah-independents list were for the Hezbollah candidate Hussein Zeaiter in Jbeil. Out of the total 12,551 votes received by the list, 9,369 were cast for Zeaiter. The other seven candidates in the list—all independents—won 2,735 preferential votes with 1,209 cast for Jean Louis Cardahi.

In contrast to other lists, the success of the FPM list was not driven by that of specific candidates: Most candidates in the list were highly successful. Six of the eight candidates won between 6,500 and 10,700 votes: Neemat Frem, Chamel Roukoz, Roger Azar, and Mansour El Bon in Keserwan; Simon Abi Ramia and Walid El Khoury in Jbeil. The seventh candidate in the list, Ziad Baroud in Keserwan, won almost 3,900 votes. Only one candidate, Rabih Awad (independent), was unsuccessful and won less than 900 votes in Jbeil.

Regarding the final list in Mount Lebanon 1, Kulluna Watani, about one third of the 2,526 votes it received were cast for Josephine Zgheib (Keserwan, 728 votes) and one quarter for Nadim Souhaid (Jbeil, 590 votes). The four other candidates in the list received 1,009 votes combined.

The diaspora's vote diverged from that of residents

The diaspora's vote largely diverged from that of non-emigrants in Mount Lebanon 1.[13] Most striking was the far larger support for the LF and Kulluna Watani lists and the much lower support for the Hezbollah-independents and Kataeb-independents lists. The LF list won 33% of emigrants' votes, compared to 23% of residents', and Kulluna Watani won 5% of emigrants' votes, compared to 2% of residents'.

Emigrants voted significantly more for the LF candidates in both Keserwan and Jbeil. The votes for Chawki Daccache were 9% higher among emigrants and those for Ziad Hawat were 11% higher than they were among residents. Emigrants voted over twice as much for the Kulluna Watani list in both minor districts, in particular for Josephine Zgheib, Nadim Souhaid, and Rania Bassil.

Conversely, the Hezbollah-independents list received 6% of emigrants' votes, compared to 11% of residents'—this discrepancy was driven by the much lower support for Hussein Zeaiter in Jbeil (9% less). The Kataeb-independents list was also less successful among emigrants (9% compared to 17%), driven by lower support for both Farid El Khazen (8% less) and Fares Souaid (4% less).

While overall support for the FPM list did not significantly vary

across residencies, support for specific candidates did. Chamel Roukoz, Ziad Baroud, and Simon Abi Ramia were much more successful among emigrants (between 5% and 6% more each), while Mansour El Bon, Neemat Frem, and Walid El Khoury were much less successful (between 4% and 8% less, each).

Figure 10 **Percentage of votes for lists by residency in Mount Lebanon 1**

Legend: FPM | LF | Kataeb-independents | Hezbollah-independents | Kulluna Watani

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

The process of seat allocation—after ballots were counted—determined who made it to parliament

Under the proportional representation system, combined with the option to cast a preferential vote, the sectarian allocation of seats, and the introduction of high electoral thresholds, candidates who receive the highest number of preferential votes do not necessarily win. Were seats obtained by the most successful candidates representing each sectarian group, Hussein Zeaiter from Hezbollah would have won the Shia seat in Jbeil instead of Mustafa El-Husseini. While El-Husseini won with 256 preferential votes, Zeaiter lost despite receiving 9,369 votes. With the electoral threshold or quotient—i.e. the minimum number of votes a list must receive in order to win a seat—in Mount Lebanon 1 set at 12.5% of votes, Zeaiter's list fell short of 1,900 votes to win a seat.[14]

While these results are based on who would win under a non-list system, even the process of seat allocation under the proportional representation system—i.e. the selection of candidates from each winning list that would make it to parliament—created competition across and within lists: Candidates were competing not just against those on opposing lists, but also against candidates on their own lists. This means that significant weight was given to the preferential vote, rather than the list or party vote.

The process of seat allocation in the 2018 elections followed a 'vertical' distribution. Once the results were counted and the number of seats obtained by each list determined, all candidates from the

14
The electoral quotient is calculated by dividing the total number of valid votes by the number of seats in a district. In Mount Lebanon 1, where the total number of valid votes was 115,619, the quotient was equal to slightly less than 14,500 votes.

winning lists in the district were ranked from highest to lowest, regardless of list. The most voted for candidate would then win their seat, regardless of the list to which they belonged. Accordingly, the list to which this candidate belonged would then have one less seat left to win. In addition, with the sectarian allocation of seats, one of the sectarian seats would then be filled. In Mount Lebanon 1, Ziad Hawat (Jbeil, LF list, Maronite) ranked first, thus winning his seat. This means that the LF list, which won two seats in Mount Lebanon 1, now had one remaining seat to obtain. In addition, as Hawat is Maronite and won in Jbeil, only one of the Maronite seats in Jbeil would be left to fill. All seats are allocated following the same method, i.e. based on rank, but constrained by the number of seats allocated to each sect, the number of seats in each sub-district (Keserwan and Jbeil), and the number of seats won by each list. This process of distributing seats was not specified in the electoral law: It was actively selected and an alternative one could have been used. The vertical distribution of seats prioritized the preferential vote—the candidate— over the proportional vote, which would be the support for a party or list. Indeed, in Mount Lebanon 1, the LF list won less votes than the FPM one, but was the first one to win a seat.

Another process of seat allocation that could have been followed under the same electoral system is a 'horizontal' distribution of seats. Under such a distribution, candidates within each list—rather than across all lists—are ranked, with seats being won by the most successful candidates in each winning list, but again constrained by the sectarian quota and the number of seats in each sub-district. The first seat would then go to the most successful candidate from the first winning list. In Mount Lebanon 1, that would be Neemat Frem (Keserwan, FPM list). The second winner would be the most successful candidate from the second winning list—Ziad Hawat (Jbeil, LF list); and the third would be the most successful candidate from the third winning list— or Farid El Khazen (Keserwan, Kataeb-independents list). The fourth seat would then go to the second-ranking candidate in the FPM list; with the remaining seats being distributed following the same method. While all of these three candidates won, the results would change further down the lists.

Had seats been allocated this way in the 2018 elections, two of the winners would change. First, Roger Azar (FPM list), who won a seat in Keserwan, would lose to Chaker Salameh (Kataeb). While Azar ranked fifth in his list, Salameh ranked third.[15] Second, Mustafa El-Husseini would lose the Shia seat in Jbeil to Rabih Awad (FPM list).

15
The second-ranking candidate in Chaker Salameh's list was Fares Souaid (Maronite, Jbeil). He failed to win as all Maronite seats in Jbeil had been filled by candidates in the LF and FPM lists before selecting the second winner from the Kataeb-independents list.

There were minor variations across genders, but large ones across confessional groups

Preferences for lists slightly varied across genders. Compared to male voters, women voted more for the FPM list (3% more) and the Hezbollah-independents list (1% more), while they voted less for the Kataeb-independents (3% less) and LF lists (1% less). The votes given to Kulluna Watani were similar.

There was some varying support for certain candidates: In Keserwan, in the FPM list, women voted particularly more for Neemat Frem (4% more), followed by Chamel Roukoz and Ziad Baroud (2% and 1% more), while they voted less for Mansour El Bon (2% less). Regarding the LF and Kataeb-independents lists, women voted less for Chawki Daccache and Farid El Khazen (2% less each). There were no varying preferences for the Hezbollah-independents list and Kulluna Watani across genders in Keserwan.

In Jbeil, women voted slightly more for Walid El Khoury in the FPM list (1% more), as well as for Hezbollah's Hussein Zeaiter (3% more), while they voted less for Fares Souaid (independent on Kataeb-independents list) and Ziad Hawat (2% less each). Support for Kulluna Watani did not vary across genders in Jbeil.

Figure 11 **Percentage of votes for each list by gender in Mount Lebanon 1**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Preferences for lists largely varied across confessional groups

Political parties have different constituents depending on their sect. Accordingly, lists backed by certain sectarian parties tended to be more successful among the groups they represent. An overwhelming majority of Christian voters voted for a list backed by a Chistian party, while the majority of Shia voters voted for the Hezbollah-independents list.

Preferences for lists across confessional groups varied across districts. In Keserwan, the FPM list received well over the majority of the Maronite (59%) and Greek Catholic vote (67%). The rest of the Maronite vote was split between the Kataeb-independents (21%) and LF lists (17%). These two lists also followed among Greek Catholics (13% for the Kataeb-independents and 10% for the LF list), although the Hezbollah-independents list captured some of their votes (8%). A majority of Shia voters cast their ballot for the Hezbollah-independents list (64%), with nearly all of the remainder choosing the FPM list (32%).

Figure 12 **Percentage of votes for each list by confessional group in Keserwan**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Seven of the 23 candidates in Keserwan managed to win over 5% of Maronite voters' preferential votes, and two others won over 1%. Those who won the highest share of the Maronite vote were Neemat Frem, Farid El Khazen, and Chawki Daccache (between 16% and 18% each). Chamel Roukoz, Mansour El Bon, and Roger Azar received a considerable share of the votes (between 10% and 13% each). Ziad Baroud was the seventh candidate to win over 5% of the Maronite preferential vote (6%). Overall, all candidates on the FPM list were highly successful among Maronites. Farid El Khazen captured most of the Maronite vote for the Kataeb-independents list and Chaker Salameh (Kataeb) won 4%. Similarly, almost all of the Maronite votes cast for the LF list went to Chawki Daccache. The final candidate who won 1% of Maronite voters' preferential vote was Josephine Zgheib (Kulluna Watani).

The few Greek Catholic voters who were registered in their own station voted similarly to Maronites: They gave the majority of their votes to the FPM list (67%), followed by the Kataeb-independents (13%) and the LF lists (10%).[15] Although Greek Catholics voted mostly for the same candidates, some were more successful than they were among Maronite voters. Neemat Frem, Chamel Roukoz, and Ziad Baroud were the preferred candidates (between 17% and 18% of the community's vote), while the other main candidates—Farid El Khazen, Chawki Daccache, Mansour El Bon, and Roger Azar—received between 7% and 11% each. One other candidate, Carlos Abi Nader (independent on the Hezbollah list), was able to win a significant share of the Greek Catholic vote too (7%).

Regarding the few Shia voters in Keserwan, the majority (64%) voted for the Hezbollah-independents list, while most of the remainder of their vote went to the FPM list (32%).[17] The candidate who received the highest share of the Shia vote was Mansour El Bon (30%), followed by Zeina Kallab (independent on the Hezbollah list, 25%). Other successful candidates were Neemat Frem, Michel Keyrouz, and Carlos Abi Nader (about 10% each). Kallab, Keyrouz, and Abi Nader all ran as independents on the Hezbollah list and only won a high share of votes among Shias.

Voters registered in mixed stations voted similarly to those in Maronite stations—likely due to the fact that about 80% of voters in mixed stations were Maronite.

16
Note that only 271 voters registered in Greek Catholic polling stations voted for a list, and only 267 cast a preferential vote. This means that, for example, the 67% who voted for the FPM list only translated into 182 votes, and the 18% who voted for Chamel Roukoz only translated into 49 votes.

17
Note that only 322 voters registered in Shia polling stations voted for a list, and only 235 cast a preferential vote. This means that, for example, the 64% who voted for the Hezbollah list only translated into 206 votes; and the 30% of votes they gave to Mansour El Bon meant that he obtained 71 votes from the community.

Figure 13 **Main candidates by confessional group in Keserwan**

	Neemat Frem	Farid El Khazen	Chawki Daccache	Chamel Roukoz	Mansour El Bon	Roger Azar	Ziad Baroud	Zeina Kallab	Michel Keyrouz	Carlos Abi Nader	Others
Maronite	19%	16%	16%	13%	11%	11%	6%				9%
Shia	10%				30%			25%	11%	10%	14%
Greek Catholic	17%	11%	10%	18%	7%	7%	18%			7%	4%
Mixed confession	16%	14%	18%	11%	11%	12%	6%				12%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

In Jbeil, the Maronite vote was much more contested between the FPM and LF lists, although the former was slightly more successful than the latter. The FPM list obtained 43% of the Maronite vote compared to 36% for the LF list. The Kataeb-independents list obtained most of the remaining Maronite votes (14%). Shia voters overwhelmingly cast their ballots for the Hezbollah-independents list (78%). Among Sunnis, the LF list received a near majority (47%), with the Hezbollah-independents list coming in second (31%). Greek Orthodox voters mostly chose the FPM list (71%), with most of the remaining of their votes being split between the LF and Kataeb-independents lists (12% each). The majority of Armenian Orthodox voted for the LF list (51%), followed by the FPM list (37%).

Figure 14 **Percentage of votes for each list by confessional group in Jbeil**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Only four candidates in Jbeil managed to win over 5% of the Maronite preferential vote. Ziad Hawat was by far the most successful among Maronite voters, receiving 35% of their vote—most of the votes Maronite voters cast for the LF list went to him alone. He was followed by Simon Abi Ramia (23%), Walid El Khoury (19%), and Fares Souaid (independent on the Kataeb-independents list, 13%). A few other candidates managed to win over 1% of the Maronite preferential vote: Jean Louis Cardahi (independent on the Hezbollah-independents list) won almost 3%, while Nadim Souhaid (Kulluna Watani) and Fadi Rouhana Sakr (independent on the LF list) won about 1% each. This means that the eight other candidates in the district only won a combined 3% of the Maronite preferential vote.

Regarding Shia voters, 78% voted for the Hezbollah-independents list and the remaining votes were primarily divided between the LF (10%) and FPM lists (8%). Hezbollah candidate Hussein Zeaiter alone received 77% of the Shia preferential vote. Only two other candidates in the district managed to win over 5% of their preferential vote: Mahmoud Awwad (independent on the LF list, 9%) and Rabih Awad (independent on the FPM list, 6%). Three other candidates also won between 1% and 2% of the Shia preferential vote: Walid El Khoury, Mustafa El-Husseini, and Mohamad Mokdad (Kulluna Watani). The nine remaining candidates in Jbeil won a combined 3.5% of the Shia preferential vote.

Among the minority groups, almost half of Sunni voters voted for the LF list (47%) and most of the remaining votes went to the Hezbollah-independents list (31%). Almost all of these votes went to Ziad Hawat (44%) and Hussein Zeaiter (30%). Other relatively successful candidates were Fares Souaid and Walid El Khoury (9% and 7%, respectively).[18]

Half of the Armenian Orthodox constituents voted for the LF list (51%), with these votes going exclusively to Ziad Hawat.[19] The second most popular list among Armenian Orthodox voters was the FPM list (36%), with Simon Abi Ramia receiving the highest share (24%), followed by Walid El Khoury (12%). Jean Louis Cardahi also won a significant share of the Armenian Orthodox vote (10%).

Finally, Greek Orthodox voters primarily voted for the same candidates as Maronite voters.[20] However, they gave an overwhelming majority of their vote to the FPM list (71%)—Simon Abi Ramia received almost half of their vote (49%). Walid El Khoury won the second highest share (22%), while Fares Souaid and Ziad Hawat were also successful (12% and 11%, respectively). One last candidate, Rania Bassil (Kulluna Watani), was able to win over 5% of the Greek Orthodox preferential vote.

18
816 voters registered in Sunni stations voted for a list, and 785 cast a preferential vote.

19
Only 115 voters in the Armenian Orthodox stations voted for a list and a candidate.

20
Only 75 voters in the Greek Orthodox station voted for a list, and 73 cast a preferential vote. All of these percentages therefore translate into very low numbers.

Figure 15 **Main candidates by confessional group in Jbeil**

| | Ziad Hawat | Simon Abi Ramia | Walid El Khoury | Fares Souaid | Hussein Zeaiter | Mahmoud Awwad | Rabih Awad | Jean Louis Cardahi | Rania Bassil | Others |

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Apart from this, there were large variations in the percentage of votes given to winners. In Keserwan, the winning candidates received an overwhelming majority of the votes, as well as the majority of the Maronite vote (73%), thus resulting in fair representation of voters' preferences. In Jbeil, however, winners received a much lower share of the votes—slightly less than the majority in total. The majority of Maronite voters voted for the winners—in particular, the Maronite ones—while the Shia winner barely received any of their votes. However, Shia voters in Jbeil, where they are represented by a seat, were unfairly represented and the three winners only received 3% of the community's preferential vote. The proportional representation system harmed Shia voters' representation to some extent. As mentioned above, had the Shia winner been the candidate to receive the higher share of the Shia vote, Hussein Zeaiter would have obtained the Shia seat instead of Mustafa El-Husseini.

Table 4   **Number of votes for the winning candidates by confessional group in Mount Lebanon 1**

		Confessional group						
		Maronite	Shia	Greek Catholic	Sunni	Armenian Orthodox	Greek Orthodox	Mixed confession
Keserwan	Neemat Frem	6,921	24	46				3,535
	Chamel Roukoz	4,755	4	49				2,256
	Roger Azar	3,944	4	20				2,652
	Chawki Daccache	5,883	1	27				3,779
	Farid El Khazen	5,979	9	29				2,966
	Total preferential votes	37,391	235	267				21,430
Jbeil	Simon Abi Ramia	6,572	51		25	28	36	2,663
	Ziad Hawat	9,940	61		343	59	8	3,467
	Mustafa El-Husseini	11	78		1	0	0	157
	Total preferential votes	28,060	6,686		785	115	73	14,889

Geographically, political parties had different strongholds

In line with the varying levels of support each list, party, and candidate obtained from each confessional group, all of the Christian candidates and parties were most successful in Christian cadasters, while Shia candidates were more successful in Shia ones. Many of the candidates, in particular the less successful ones who won only a few hundred votes, tended to receive a significantly high share of their votes from voters in only a few cadasters.

In Keserwan, the FPM list won over half of votes and was accordingly the most successful in the highest number of cadasters. It won over 70% of votes in eight cadasters. Its highest share was in Jouret Bedrane (89%), and Zaaitreh (77%), while it won between 70% and 75% in Chahtoul, Rayfoun, Chouen, Jounieh Ghadir, Jounieh Haret Sakhr, and Safra Keserwan.

Among the candidates in the list, Neemat Frem, despite winning a much higher share of votes than other candidates, did not obtain more than 800 votes in any cadaster. The highest number of votes he won was in the area of Jounieh: Over 700 votes in Jounieh Sarba and Jounieh Haret Sakhr (781 and 741 votes), as well as nearly 600 votes in Jounieh Ghadir (575 votes). He was also able to win over 600 votes in the neighboring cadasters of Hrajel (733 votes) and Kfardebian (607 votes). The support he received was more widespread across Keserwan, rather than receiving most of his votes from one specific area. The second candidate in the list, Chamel Roukoz, was also successful in these cadasters, but much less than Frem. Roukoz was only able to win

over 400 votes in Kfardebian (486 votes) and Hrajel (463 votes), and over 300 votes in Zouk Mkayel (357 votes)—where he was more successful than Frem—and Jounieh Ghadir and Jounieh Sarba (about 310 votes in each). Roger Azar won his highest share of votes in Hrajel (321 votes). He managed to win over 250 votes only in Kfardebian, Aaqaibeh—where he received a higher number of votes than Frem and Roukoz—and Jounieh Ghadir (308, 295, and 255 votes, respectively). He also won a significantly higher share of votes than Frem and Roukoz in Aaramoun, the municipality he was the mayor of (204 votes, compared to only 18 for Frem and 36 for Roukoz). Mansour El Bon was more successful than all these candidates in Jounieh Ghadir—winning 887 votes, over 100 more votes than Frem. Similar to the other candidates, El Bon won a significant number of his votes from voters in Jounieh Sarba (392 votes), while also winning over 300 in Ghbaleh (346 votes). He also obtained most of the votes won by his list in Jouret Bedrane (199 votes, out of the 222 votes obtained by the list). The list's last candidate, Ziad Baroud, won over 200 votes in only three cadasters. His highest number of votes came from Zouk Mkayel (304 votes), followed by Jeita (240 votes), and Jounieh Ghadir (208 votes).

In Jbeil, the FPM list was less successful than it was in Keserwan, but still managed to win over 60% of votes in a number of cadasters. It was most successful in Rihanet Jbayl (85%) and Fghal (82%), while it also won over 70% of votes in Bekhaaz (71%).

Among the candidates in the list, Simon Abi Ramia won 1,047 votes in Ehmej (representing 61% of votes in the cadaster), as well as over 900 votes in the city of Jbeil (942 votes, 17%). He won less than 500 votes in all other cadasters, winning only over 400 in Aaqoura (455 votes) and Jaj (452 votes). The second candidate, Walid El Khoury, won a high share of his votes from voters in Aamchit (1,233 votes, 49% of preferential votes). He only managed to win over 500 votes in the city of Jbeil (575 votes). Finally, Rabih Awad was the list's least successful candidate, but still won 184 votes in the municipality of Aalmat El-Jnoubiyeh and 90 votes in Aalmat El-Chamaliyeh—representing nearly one third of the votes he obtained among residents. He won 50 votes or more in Lassa (62 votes) and Hsoun (50 votes).

In contrast to the FPM list, the LF list was never able to obtain the majority of votes in Keserwan. The highest shares it won were in Nammoura (46%), Bourj El-Ftouh (42%), Bouar, Aachqout, and Ghazir (between 30% and 35%).

In terms of number of votes, LF candidate Chawki Daccache won over 500 votes in three cadasters only: Hrajel (622 votes), Aaqaibeh (577 votes), and Aachqout (534 votes). Daccache received a higher number of votes than Neemat Frem in both Aaqaibeh and Aachqout.

All the other candidates on the LF list won hardly any votes in the

district. Naaman Mourad (273 votes among residents) only won over 30 votes in two cadasters: Harharaya (38 votes), and Jdaidet Ghazir (31 votes). Rock-Antoine Mehanna won over half of his votes from a single cadaster: Out of the nearly 260 votes he won among residents, 133 came from Kfardebian. Patricia Elias barely won votes in any cadaster. She won over 10 votes in the larger cadasters of Jounieh Ghadir (29 votes) and Jounieh Sarba (10 votes). Finally, Ziad Khalife Hachem was also unsuccessful across all cadasters, winning over 10 votes only in Kfardebian (32 votes), Aaqaibeh (19 votes), and Jounieh Haret Sakhr (10 votes).

The LF list was significantly more successful in Jbeil, although it never won more than 60% of votes. The highest share the list obtained was 57% in Qattara and Janneh, followed by 56% in Saqi Rechmaiya, Kfoun, and Ramout, and 55% in Bentael and Laqlouq.

LF candidate Ziad Hawat won nearly all of the votes that went to the LF list in Jbeil, and 2,439 votes in the city of Jbeil where he ranked first (48%). He won over 500 votes in four other cadasters. Those were Aamchit (813 votes), Aaqoura (790 votes), Tartij (527 votes), and Blat Jbeil (500 votes). The second candidate, Mahmoud Awwad, won the majority of his votes from one cadaster only. A total of 442 votes came from voters in Aalmat (236 in Aalmat El-Chamaliyeh and 206 in Aalmat El-Jnoubiyeh) out of the 765 votes he won among residents. Similarly, Fadi Rouhana Sakr, the third candidate on the list, won the vast majority of his votes from one cadaster only. Out of the 461 votes he won among residents, 319 votes came from voters in Qartaba.

The list formed by Kataeb and independents did not win the majority of votes in any cadaster and only won over 40% of votes in two cadasters in Mount Lebanon 1. In Keserwan, the list won over 30% of votes in eight cadasters. The highest share of its votes was in Ghosta (43%), followed by Beqaatet Kanaan (39%), while it won between 30% and 35% in Hrajel, Jounieh Sarba, Raachine, Mayrouba, Qlaiaat, and Batha. Among the candidates, winner Farid El Khazen won over 500 votes in four cadasters: His highest number was in Hrajel (928 votes), followed by Ghosta (758 votes), Jounieh Sarba (645 votes) and Kfardebian (624 votes). Kataeb candidate Chaker Salameh managed to win over 100 votes in only three cadasters, all of which most candidates tended to get a high share of their votes from. Those were Aaqaibeh (170 votes), Hrajel (113 votes), and Kfardebian (103 votes). Aaqaibeh was the only one where he won a significantly higher share of votes than Farid El Khazen (who won 89 votes). The other candidates in the list received a high share of their votes from only one cadaster.

Over one quarter of the votes won by the list's third most successful candidate, Gilberte Zouein, came from voters in Yahchouch (139 of the 518 votes she obtained from residents). She won a higher number of

votes than both Farid El Khazen and Chaker Salameh in Yahchouch. Youssef Khalil won 170 votes among residents and received over one third of his votes from Mayrouba (65 votes). Finally, Yolanda Khoury won over half of her votes in Zouk Mkayel—37 out of the 73 votes she won among residents.

In Jbeil, the highest share of votes the Kataeb-independents list obtained was 41% in Saraaita. The list was also successful in Yanouh (38%) and Qartaba (37%), where it won a higher share of votes than all other lists.

The winner Mustafa El-Husseini won only 247 votes among residents and over 10 votes in only seven cadasters. The highest number he was able to obtain was in Mazraat El-Siyad (83 votes), while he also won between 21 and 26 votes in Souanet Jbeil, Bichtlida, and Lassa. Fares Souaid, who was significantly more successful than El-Husseini, won nearly one quarter of his votes from voters in Qartaba (1,229 out of the 5,503 votes he won among residents, representing 38% of preferential votes in Qartaba). He also managed to win over 500 votes in Aaqoura (527 votes, 21%). The final candidate in the list, Jean Hawat (225 votes among residents), won his highest number of votes in Qehmez (34 votes), the city of Jbeil (31 votes), and Halat (20 votes).

The Hezbollah and independents list was highly unsuccessful in Keserwan. It nevertheless won nearly all of the votes in Maaysra (90%), the majority in Hsayn (64%)—both of which are nearly fully Shia— and a high share in Zaitoun (46%), the cadaster with the third highest share of Shia registered voters. Most candidates in the list received a substantial share of their votes from voters in Maaysra. Carlos Abi Nader won the highest share of his votes in Maaysra (160 votes), representing a third of the votes he won among residents (464 votes in total). He also won over 100 votes in Zouk Mkayel (105 votes). The second candidate, Zeina Kallab, won one third of her votes from voters in Maaysra as well (110 out of the 305 votes she won among residents). Joseph Zayek, who ranked third, won 76 of his 255 votes among residents in Maaysra and only won more than 30 votes in Ghazir. Michel Keyrouz, in comparison, won his highest number of votes in Zaitoun (52 votes), followed by Dlebta (32 votes) out of the 220 votes he won among residents. Finally, Joseph Zgheib won 64 votes among residents, a third of which came from voters in Hrajel (26 votes).

In Jbeil, the Hezbollah and independents list was significantly more successful and the greater success was driven primarily by the performance of the Hezbollah candidate. The list won over 80% of votes in eight fully Shia cadasters, with the highest share being 90% in Afqa. It won over 80% in Frat, Aain El-Ghouaybeh, Bichtlida, Bezyoun, Hjoula, Qerqraiya, and Lassa. Hezbollah candidate Hussein Zeaiter won 9,369 votes among residents and obtained over 1,000 votes

in Lassa (1,770 votes) and Afqa (1,119 votes). He also won over 500 votes in Bichtlida, Hjoula, Ras Osta (where the list won 79% of votes), and Aalmat El-Chamaliyeh (where the list won 61%).

Jean Louis Cardahi won a considerable number of votes in Jbeil (1,191 among residents) and one third of these came from voters in the cadaster of Jbeil (391 votes). He was only able to win over 50 votes in Zebdine (58 votes). Finally, Bassam El Hachem won two-thirds of his votes from voters in Aaqoura (134 out of the 194 votes he won among residents).

What are the main drivers of votes for each list in Mount Lebanon 1?

The FPM list generally performed slightly better in cadasters with higher poverty rates. Looking at each of the minor districts, in Keserwan, the list tended to receive a higher share of votes in cadasters with lower levels of confessional homogeneity and those with higher levels of economic development. It was also generally more successful in homogeneous, compared to mixed, stations. In Jbeil, however, the list received significantly better results in more homogeneous cadasters. It was also slightly more successful in cadasters with higher poverty rates. Across voters' characteristics, women were more likely to vote for the list compared to men. Greek Catholic and Maronite voters were the most likely to vote for the list, while Sunnis and Shias were the least likely, to a high degree.

The LF list tended to receive significantly better results in more homogeneous cadasters. Similar to the FPM list, the LF list received a slightly higher share of votes in cadasters with higher poverty rates. It also tended to do better in cadasters with a lower ratio of refugees per Lebanese inhabitants. Across polling stations, voters registered in smaller stations and voters registered in homogeneous ones tended to vote significantly more for the list. Armenian Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for the LF list, while Greek Catholics and Shias were the least likely to do so.

The list formed by Kataeb and independent candidates generally received better results in cadasters with lower levels of economic development, and was also slightly more successful in those with lower poverty rates. Voters in cadasters with a higher ratio of refugees tended to vote more for this list. Across polling stations, the list tended to receive better results in larger polling stations. Men were significantly more likely to vote for the list compared to women, while Maronite, Sunni, and Greek Catholic voters were significantly more likely to vote for the list compared to others. Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to vote for the list.

The last party-affiliated list, formed by Hezbollah and independents, was much more successful in the cadasters that are less homogeneous,

more economically developed, and have lower poverty rates. Across polling stations, the list generally performed better in mixed polling stations. As expected, Shia voters were significantly more likely to vote for the list compared to others, and Maronite voters were the least likely to vote for it. All of these relationships were also present in Jbeil, where the list obtained most of its votes from Shia voters.

Figure 16   **Drivers of votes for the FPM list in Mount Lebanon 1**

Figure 17   **Drivers of votes for the LF list in Mount Lebanon 1**

Figure 18   **Drivers of votes for the Kataeb-independents list in Mount Lebanon 1**


Figure 19   **Drivers of votes for the Hezbollah-independents list in Mount Lebanon 1**

IV Do citizens cast preferential votes for candidates from their same confession?

In Jbeil, voters represented by a seat could vote for a co-confessional candidate or a candidate from a different confession, and 98% chose a candidate from their own confession.

Preferences for co-sectarian candidates varied across confessional groups

The percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates varied between Maronite and Shia voters: 99% of Maronite voters voted for a co-confessional candidate, while 95% of Shias did so. This variation

was statistically significant even when controlling for voters' gender and characteristics of the cadasters they were registered in, such as the level of confessional fragmentation and economic development.

Among other confessional groups, all voters gave a higher percentage of their votes to Maronite candidates than Shia ones. Almost all Armenian Orthodox and Greek Orthodox voters registered in their own polling stations voted for a Maronite candidate. While the majority of Sunni voters registered in their own stations voted for a Maronite candidate, this was driven by their support for Ziad Hawat (44%), and the second most-preferred candidate among Sunnis was Shia Hussein Zeaiter (30% of their vote). In mixed stations, although the majority of voters chose a Maronite candidate, Zeaiter ranked first (24%), closely followed by Hawat (23%).

The lower confessional bias among Shias compared to Maronites is partly driven by the lower number of Shia candidates (five compared to 10 Maronite candidates). The four most popular candidates among Shia voters were all Shia. However, the least successful candidate among his confessional community was winner Mustafa El-Husseini, who ranked sixth among this group, winning a slightly lower number of votes than Maronite candidate Walid El Khoury (eight less votes).

Table 5　**Votes for candidates from each confession by confessional group in Jbeil**

| | | Candidate's sect | |
		Maronite	Shia
Voters' sect	Maronite	99%	1%
	Shia	5%	95%
	Sunni	66%	34%
	Armenian Orthodox	98%	2%
	Greek Orthodox	100%	0%
	Mixed confession	71%	29%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

There were no large variations across genders, although Shia women had a slightly higher confessional bias than their male counterparts (1% more).

The higher share of votes for co-confessional candidates among Shia women was particularly driven by higher support for Hussein Zeaiter (4% more), although Shia women voted less for Mahmoud Awad (3% less). Among Maronite voters, the percentage did not significantly vary, but Maronite women voted less for Fares Souaid and Ziad Hawat (2% less each), and voted more for Walid El Khoury and Simon Abi Ramia (3% and 2% more, respectively).

Table 6   **Votes for co-sectarian candidates by confessional group and gender in Jbeil**

| | | Gender | | | |
		Men	Women	Mixed gender	Total
Confessional group	Maronite	98%	99%	99%	99%
	Shia	95%	96%	95%	95%
	Total	98%	98%	98%	98%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

There were no geographical variations in preferences for co-confessional candidates. In all cadasters in Jbeil, over 90% of voters who could vote for a co-confessional candidate did so.

However, the percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates seems to have been affected by the level of confessional homogeneity in a cadaster. In the most heterogeneous cadasters where Maronite and Shia voters were registered to vote, the average percentage of votes for co-sectarian candidates was 90%, while in the most homogeneous ones it was 95%. This relationship is statistically significant even when controlling for voters' confession, gender, and some characteristics of the cadasters they were registered in, such as level of economic development and poverty rates.

Figure 20   **Sectarian homogeneity by cadaster and percentage of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Jbeil**

V How did women candidates perform?

Six of the 38 candidates in Mount Lebanon 1 were women, and all lists but the FPM one included at least one woman. Altogether, they obtained slightly less than 2% of votes.

Five women ran in Keserwan, where they obtained 3% of preferential votes (1,818 votes). The candidates were: Josephine Zgheib (Kulluna Watani, 728 votes), Gilberte Zouein (independent running on the Kataeb- independents list, 521 votes), Zeina Kallab (independent running on the Hezbollah-independents list, 308 votes), Patricia Elias (independent running on the LF list, 183 votes), and Yolanda Khoury (independent running on the Kataeb-independents list, 78 votes). Only one woman ran in Jbeil, Rania Bassil (Kulluna Watani, 323 votes, 0.6%). Some of the women candidates enjoyed high support among the Lebanese diaspora. In Keserwan, Josephine Zgheib received 59 votes from emigrants (5% of their votes), and Patricia Elias 15 votes (1% of their votes). In Jbeil, Rania Bassil won 32 votes from emigrants (3%).

The performance of each woman candidate within their lists varied

In Kulluna Watani, Josephine Zgheib outperformed the two other candidates on her list in Keserwan by a significant margin—she won 728 out of the 1,167 preferential votes cast for the list (62%). Rania Bassil, however, ranked second in Jbeil and received 323 out of the 1,160 votes (or 28%).

On the Hezbollah-independents list, Zeina Kallab was also relatively successful, winning 308 out of the 1,327 preferential votes cast for candidates in her list in Keserwan, ranking second (23%).

Gilberte Zouein and Yolanda Khoury on the Kataeb-independents list, in comparison, were highly unsuccessful—driven partly by the high success of Farid El Khazen and Chaker Salameh. Nevertheless, Zouein ranked third, performing significantly better than the third male candidate on the list. Khoury, however, received the smallest share. The comparatively better performance of Gilberte Zouein may be due to the fact that she was the incumbent MP, having won a seat in both the 2005 and 2009 elections. In previous elections, however, she ran with the FPM. Patricia Elias on the LF list ranked fourth out of the five candidates in her list in Keserwan.

Women voted slightly more for women candidates

In Keserwan, women voters gave a slightly higher share of their votes to a woman candidate: 2.5% of male voters in Keserwan voted for a woman candidate (572 votes) while 3% of women voters did so (676 votes). The percentage was even higher in gender-mixed stations (484 votes, 3.6%). All women candidates except Gilberte Zouein received a higher number of votes from women voters. Josephine Zgheib was

particularly more successful among women voters (291 votes, compared to 221 votes from men), and although the differences in the votes obtained by Zeina Kallab, Patricia Elias, and Yolanda Khoury were smaller, all of these candidates won a comparatively higher number of their votes from women voters. For example, Yolanda Khoury, who won 73 votes from residents, received 30 of these from women-only polling stations (or 41% of her votes), compared to 19 from men-only stations (26% of her votes). In contrast to other women, Gilberte Zouein received higher support from men (202 votes) than women voters (168 votes).

The only woman candidate in Jbeil, Rania Bassil, received significantly higher support from women voters: 124 women voters chose her (0.7%), compared to 83 men (0.5%).

Table 7 **Number and percentage of votes for women candidates by gender in Mount Lebanon 1**

| | | Keserwan | | | | | Jbeil |
		Josephine Zgheib	Gilberte Zouein	Zeina Kallab	Patricia Elias	Yolanda Khoury	Rania Bassil
Number of votes	Men	221	202	76	54	19	83
	Women	291	168	112	75	30	124
	Mixed gender	156	148	117	39	24	81
Share of votes	Men	1.0%	0.9%	0.3%	0.2%	0.1%	0.5%
	Women	1.3%	0.7%	0.5%	0.3%	0.1%	0.7%
	Mixed gender	1.2%	1.1%	0.9%	0.3%	0.2%	0.5%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

In addition, among those who voted for each list, women voters tended to give a higher share of their preferential votes to women candidates, compared to male voters. In other words, regardless of how each woman candidate performed within her list, women voters who voted for their list chose them more often than male voters did. For example, 27% of women who voted for a candidate in the Hezbollah-independents list in Keserwan chose Zeina Kallab, compared to 17% of male voters who voted for the same list. The share was particularly higher among Kulluna Watani voters in Keserwan: 68% of women voters who voted for a Kulluna Watani candidate in Keserwan gave their preferential vote to Josephine Zgheib, while 51% of male voters did so. Even Gilberte Zouein, who received a higher number of votes among male voters, received an equal share of votes among those who voted for her list—4% of voters from each gender who voted for a candidate on the Kataeb-independents list chose her.

There were some variations in support for women across confessional groups

In Keserwan, Shia voters gave a much higher share of their votes for women candidates (26%) compared to other groups. However, given the lower number of Shia voters registered in the district, this share was equivalent to only 61 votes. Accordingly, most of the votes cast for women candidates came from Maronite voters and those in mixed stations. Women candidates obtained 869 votes from Maronites (2%) and 792 votes in mixed polling stations (4%).

Support for different women varied across confessional groups. Josephine Zgheib was the preferred woman among Maronite voters (384 votes, 1%), and ranked eighth among this group. She was also the most voted for woman in mixed-confession stations (277 votes, 1.3%), and was the most popular among the few Greek Catholic voters who voted for a woman candidate (six votes, 2%). Gilberte Zouein came in second among Maronite voters (298 votes, 0.8%) and voters in mixed stations (219 votes, 1%).

Zeina Kallab, who was the third woman candidate in Keserwan, received nearly all of the Shia votes cast for women candidates (59 votes, 25%), and was overall the second-ranking candidate among this group in Keserwan. Kallab was much less popular among Maronite voters (44 votes, 0.1%). In addition, while she received 23% of the total votes cast for candidates in the Hezbollah-independents list in Keserwan, half of the Shia voters who cast a preferential vote for a candidate in that list chose her. Most of the votes won by Kallab were cast in mixed stations (202 votes, 0.9%).

The fourth woman, Patricia Elias, received much higher support among Maronites than Kallab did (103 votes, 0.3%). The remainder of her votes came from voters in mixed-confession stations (65 votes, 0.3%). The fifth woman candidate in Keserwan, Yolanda Khoury, received the majority of her votes from Maronite voters (40 votes, 0.1%). Nearly all of her remaining votes came from mixed stations (29 votes, 0.1%).

In Jbeil, the only woman candidate Rania Bassil barely won any votes from non-Maronite voters: 169 of her votes came from voters in Maronite polling stations (0.6% of their preferential vote in Jbeil). Although there was a high share of Shia voters in the district, only eight voted for her (0.1%). Among the few minority groups, only six Sunni voters (0.8%) and four Greek Orthodox voters (5.5%) voted for her. Nearly all of the remainder of her votes therefore came from voters in mixed stations (101 votes, 0.7%).

Table 8 **Number and percentage of votes for women candidates by confessional group in Mount Lebanon 1**

| | | Keserwan | | | | | Jbeil |
		Josephine Zgheib	Gilberte Zouein	Zeina Kallab	Patricia Elias	Yolanda Khoury	Rania Bassil
Number of votes	Maronite	384	298	44	103	40	169
	Shia	1	1	59	0	0	8
	Greek Catholic	6	0	0	0	4	
	Sunni						6
	Armenian Orthodox						0
	Greek Orthodox						4
	Mixed confession	277	219	202	65	29	101
Share of votes	Maronite	1.0%	0.8%	0.1%	0.3%	0.1%	0.6%
	Shia	0.4%	0.4%	25.1%	0.0%	0.0%	0.1%
	Greek Catholic	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	1.5%	
	Sunni						0.8%
	Armenian Orthodox						0.0%
	Greek Orthodox						5.5%
	Mixed confession	1.3%	1.0%	0.9%	0.3%	0.1%	0.7%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Support for each woman candidate varied across geographical areas in the district

Across geographical areas, Josephine Zgheib was able to win over 20 votes in 11 cadasters. She obtained her highest number of votes in Jounieh Ghadir and Jounieh Sarba (55 votes in each). She also won a high number in Kfardebian (48 votes), the municipality in which she was a former council member.

Gilberte Zouein won a significantly high share of her votes in the cadaster of Yahchouch (139 votes, 10%), where she beat the two other main candidates in her list, Farid El Khazen and Chaker Salameh. She also obtained a high number in Ghazir, Hrajel (79 votes in each), and Adma (22 votes). On the same list as Zouein, Yolanda Khoury received half of her votes from voters in Zouk Mkayel (37 votes, out of the 73 she won from residents).

Zeina Kallab won the highest share of her votes from voters in a single cadaster: Maaysra (110 votes, 23%). She also won a high share in Hsayn (59 votes, 25%), where the single Shia polling station in Keserwan was located.

Finally, Patricia Elias was only able to win over 10 votes in two cadasters: Jounieh Ghadir (29 votes) and Jounieh Sarba (10 votes).

In Jbeil, Rania Bassil's highest number of votes was in the cadaster of Jbeil (44 votes), followed by Qartaba (31 votes).

What are the drivers of votes for women candidates in Mount Lebanon 1?

In Mount Lebanon 1, women candidates tended to perform better in cadasters with lower levels of economic development. They also tended to receive better results in mixed polling stations. Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholic voters were the most likely to vote for women candidates, while Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to do so. In Keserwan, however, Shia voters were significantly more likely to vote for women candidates compared to others. This was partially driven by their high support for Zeina Kallab. In Jbeil, Greek Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for the woman candidate, while Armenian Orthodox voters were the least likely to do so.

Figure 21   **Drivers of votes for women candidates in Mount Lebanon 1**

VI How did emerging political groups perform?

Kulluna Watani, the coalition between independent and emerging groups, won 2.2% of votes in Mount Lebanon 1 (2,526 votes). The list obtained 2% in each of the minor districts (1,277 votes in Keserwan and 1,249 votes in Jbeil). Similar to other districts, Kulluna Watani was significantly more successful among voters in the diaspora and received 5.4% of their vote (143 votes). The share was higher in Keserwan (78 votes, 6%) than it was in Jbeil (65 votes, 5%).

Kulluna Watani put forward six candidates in the district. The three candidates in Keserwan were Josephine Zgheib (728 votes), Youssef Salameh (327 votes), and Dory Daw (112 votes). Those in Jbeil were Nadim Souhaid (590 votes), Rania Bassil (323 votes), and Mohamad Mokdad (247 votes).

In Keserwan, there were minor variations in support for Kulluna Watani across confessional groups and genders

In Keserwan, Kulluna Watani received 2% of votes in Maronite, Greek Catholic, and mixed polling stations, while it only won 0.3% in the Shia polling station. Given the low number of non-Maronite voters, most of the votes received by the list came from Maronite voters (746 votes) and voters in mixed stations (441 votes), while only six Greek Catholic voters and one Shia voter cast their ballot for the list. Support did not vary across genders—both men and women voters gave 2% of their votes to Kulluna Watani (473 votes and 471 votes, respectively), with the share being similar in stations that had both men and women registered to vote (250 votes).

Table 9 **Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani by confessional group and gender in Keserwan**

		Number of votes	Share of votes
Confessional group	Maronite	746	2.0%
	Shia	1	0.3%
	Greek Catholic	6	2.2%
	Mixed confession	441	2.0%
Gender	Men	473	2.0%
	Women	471	2.0%
	Mixed gender	250	1.8%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Regarding support for specific candidates, Josephine Zgheib performed better than the other two candidates in her list across all confessional groups and genders. She won 1% of Maronite voters' preferential vote (384 votes) and 1% of votes in mixed stations (277 votes), and the six Greek Catholic voters and single Shia voter who voted for Kulluna Watani chose her. Across genders, although she outperformed the two other Kulluna Watani candidates among both men and women, Zgheib received much higher support from women: 291 women voters and 221 men cast their preferential vote for her. In addition, 68% of women who voted for a Kulluna Watani candidate in Keserwan chose her, compared to 51% of men.

The second candidate, Youssef Salameh, received all of his votes from Maronites (235 votes) and voters in mixed stations (78 votes). He was significantly more successful among men voters (165 votes) than he was among women (97 votes).

Finally, similar to Salameh, Dory Daw did not receive any vote from Shia and Greek Catholic polling stations. His highest share came from Maronite voters as wel (61 votes), while he received 47 votes in mixed stations. He also received higher support among male voters (50 votes) than he did among women (37 votes).

Table 10   **Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani candidates by confessional group and gender in Keserwan**

		Josephine Zgheib		Youssef Salameh		Dory Daw	
		Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes
Confessional group	Maronite	384	1.0%	235	0.6%	61	0.2%
	Shia	1	0.4%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Greek Catholic	6	2.2%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Mixed confession	277	1.3%	78	0.4%	47	0.2%
Gender	Men	221	1.0%	165	0.7%	50	0.2%
	Women	291	1.3%	97	0.4%	37	0.2%
	Mixed gender	156	1.2%	51	0.4%	21	0.2%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Similarly, in Jbeil, variations were minor, although Kulluna Watani voters showed a confessional bias

Across confessional groups in Jbeil, 2% of Maronites, Shias, and voters in mixed stations voted for Kulluna Watani. The share was higher among Greek Orthodox (5%) and Sunni voters (3%), and lowest among Armenian Orthodox (1%). However, similar to Keserwan, most of the votes received by the list came from Maronite voters (631 votes), followed by voters in mixed stations (352 votes), with a considerable share coming from Shias, who were one of the majority groups in the district (162 votes). Only 21 Sunni voters, four Greek Orthodox voters, and one Armenian Orthodox voter cast a ballot for the list. Across genders, support for the list was slightly higher among women voters (461 votes, 2.5%) than it was among men (371 votes, 2.1%). In gender-mixed stations, Kulluna Watani obtained 2.2% of the votes (339 votes). Women also voted more for each of the candidates in the list.

Table 11   **Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani by confessional group and gender in Jbeil**

		Number of votes	Share of votes
Confessional group	Maronite	631	2.2%
	Shia	162	2.4%
	Sunni	21	2.6%
	Armenian Orthodox	1	0.9%
	Greek Orthodox	4	5.3%
	Mixed confession	352	2.3%
Gender	Men	371	2.1%
	Women	461	2.5%
	Mixed gender	339	2.2%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Among the candidates, Nadim Souhaid, although he performed better than the other candidates in his list, was highly unsuccessful among Shia voters. Most of his votes came from Maronite voters (373 votes) and those in mixed stations (163 votes), while he only won 22 votes from voters in all other types of polling stations. He was slightly more successful among women voters, with 207 of them voting for him compared to 187 male voters.

Similar to Nadim Souhaid, Rania Bassil hardly received any votes from non-Maronite voters (18 votes). However, the four Greek Orthodox voters who voted for Kulluna Watani in Jbeil chose her. She won 169 votes from voters in Maronite polling stations and 101 from those in mixed ones. Across genders, similar to Josephine Zgheib in Keserwan, Bassil was much more successful among women voters: 124 women voted for her compared to 83 men.

Finally, Mohamad Mokdad, in contrast to the other candidates, received most of his support from Shia voters, showing that even Kulluna Watani voters in Jbeil had a confessional bias. Mokdad received 2% of the Shia preferential vote (136 votes), a much higher share than Shia winner Mustafa El-Husseini, who received 78 votes from Shia voters. He also won 39 votes from Maronite voters, 62 from voters in mixed stations, and only three from Sunni voters. Across genders, similar to the other candidates in the Kulluna Watani list, he was more successful among women, as 102 women and 75 men voted for him.

Table 12 **Number and percentage of votes for Kulluna Watani candidates by confessional group and gender in Jbeil**

		Nadim Souhaid		Rania Bassil		Mohamad Mokdad	
		Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes	Number of votes	Share of votes
Confessional group	Maronite	373	1.3%	169	0.6%	39	0.1%
	Shia	14	0.2%	8	0.1%	136	2.0%
	Sunni	7	0.9%	6	0.8%	3	0.4%
	Armenian Orthodox	1	0.9%	0	0.0%	0	0.0%
	Greek Orthodox	0	0.0%	4	5.5%	0	0.0%
	Mixed confession	163	1.1%	101	0.7%	62	0.4%
Gender	Men	187	1.1%	83	0.5%	75	0.4%
	Women	207	1.2%	124	0.7%	102	0.6%
	Mixed gender	164	1.1%	81	0.5%	63	0.4%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Support for Kulluna Watani and each candidate varied across the district

The list generally received more widespread support in Jbeil than it did in Keserwan.

In Keserwan, the list managed to win over 5% of votes in only two cadasters: Faraya (167 votes, 10%) and Dlebta (30 votes, 5%). Faraya was overall the only cadaster in Keserwan where Kulluna Watani was able to obtain over 100 votes.

In Jbeil, the list tended to be more successful across geographical areas. It won over 10% of votes in Edde (40 votes, 15%) and Ain Jrain (16 votes, 10%). It also managed to win over 5% of votes in Fatre (45 votes, 9%), and between 5% and 6% in Qartaba El-Jnoubiyeh (87 votes), Lassa (143 votes), Bekhaaz (only four votes), and Mchaneh (36 votes). Kulluna Watani also won a high number of its votes in the cadaster of Jbeil (112 votes).

Among the candidates, in Keserwan, over half of the votes Youssef Salameh received came from voters in Faraya (160 of the 313 votes he won among residents, 10% of preferential votes in Faraya). The two other candidates in the list did not win a high share of their votes from one specific area. Josephine Zgheib obtained over 40 votes only in Jounieh Ghadir, Jounieh Sarba (55 votes in each), and Kfardebian (48 votes). Finally, Dory Daw, who came in last in the list, was only able to win over 10 votes in Aaqaibeh (18 votes) and Jounieh Sarba (13 votes). Zgheib performed better with the Lebanese diaspora than the other candidates in her list: She obtained 59 votes from emigrants (5%), while Salameh received 10 votes (0.8%) and Daw received four votes (0.3%).

In Jbeil, a high number of Nadim Souhaid's votes came from voters in Qartaba (101 votes out of the 558 he won among residents, 3%). The second highest number of votes he won came from the cadaster of Jbeil (51 votes). Mohamad Mokdad received over half of his votes from Lassa (140 votes out of the 240 he received from residents, 6%). In fact, in Lassa, he performed better than all candidates except Hussein Zeaiter. In contrast to Souhaid and Mokdad, Rania Bassil did not win a high share of her votes from one specific area in Jbeil, only winning over 30 votes in the cadasters of Jbeil (44 votes) and Qartaba (31 votes). She obtained some support from the Lebanese diaspora: 32 emigrants voted for her (3%), while 25 voted for Souhaid (2%) and four for Mokdad (0.3%).

## What are the drivers of votes for Kulluna Watani?

In Mount Lebanon 1, overall, higher turnouts significantly harmed Kulluna Watani. The list tended to receive a significantly lower share of votes in polling stations that had higher turnouts, pointing at its failure to mobilize voters. This was particularly the case in Keserwan.

In Keserwan, voters in larger polling stations tended to vote

significantly more for the list, which could point at parties' higher interest in mobilizing voters in smaller stations, where monitoring their behavior may be easier. Across confessional groups, Maronite and Greek Catholic voters were significantly more likely to vote for the list compared to Shia voters.

In Jbeil, voters in cadasters with lower levels of economic development voted slightly more for the list. Across confessional groups, Greek Orthodox voters were more likely to vote for the list compared to others, although they represented a very low number of voters overall. Armenian Orthodox voters were less likely to vote for Kulluna Watani and there were no significant variations among other groups. However, given the very low number of non-Maronite voters in Keserwan, and non-Maronite and Shia voters in Jbeil, barely any of the votes received by Kulluna Watani in each of the districts came from other confessional groups.

Figure 22   **Drivers of votes for Kulluna Watani in Mount Lebanon 1**

VII Were there any signs of irregularities?

Irregularities can occur during the election process, through ballot stuffing that either increases the total number of votes or adds votes for one party at the expense of another. Fraud can also occur during the vote aggregation process when there is collusion between certain candidates, usually the well-connected ones, and election officials. Voter rigging—pressuring voters to cast ballots in a certain manner—tends to occur more in small polling stations, where it is easier to monitor voters' behavior. Therefore, testing whether turnout was abnormally higher in smaller voting centers can help approximate

whether there was voter rigging or not. Another method of detecting signs of election fraud is examining the distribution of turnout and vote numbers, and testing whether they have a 'normal' shape. For example, an abnormally high number of voting centers with close to 100% turnout could suggest either voter or vote rigging at any stage of the election process. Other lines of research focus on statistical tests that examine the random nature of numbers to test whether numbers were manipulated in a non-random manner.

There are some irregular patterns in turnout

Turnout usually has a normal shape, with the majority of electoral centers having turnouts close to the average and a small number of centers having a very high or very low turnout rate.

Turnouts by polling station in Mount Lebanon 1 diverged from the normal distribution. There was a higher number of polling stations with very low turnouts, as well as a higher number of polling stations with very high turnouts than expected (below 30% and above 90%, respectively). Variations from the normal distribution were present in both minor districts, but particularly more in Jbeil. When comparing the actual distribution with a normal bell-curve, the differences are statistically significant. This may provide some initial evidence of fraud in Mount Lebanon 1.

Figure 23 **Distribution of turnout rates by polling stations in Mount Lebanon 1**

95% confidence interval

There are signs of voter rigging that benefited LF and FPM

Voter rigging entails political parties pressuring or coercing voters with the intended aim of affecting turnout. The literature on election irregularities distinguishes vote rigging from voter rigging, as coercion is not apparent in the latter case. However, there are some ways to detect potential instances of voter rigging through statistical tests. One way to test for it is by examining the correlation between turnouts and the size of a polling station. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive among politicians buying votes or exerting some kind of pressure on voters because smaller groups of voters facilitate aggregate monitoring of whether voters cast their ballots, and for whom.[21] High turnouts in polling stations with fewer voters may therefore point at fraud in those stations.

There was no clear relationship between the size of the polling station and turnout rates in Mount Lebanon 1, even when looking at each of the minor districts.

[21]
Rueda, M. R. 2016. 'Small Aggregates, Big Manipulation: Vote Buying Enforcement and Collective Monitoring.' *American Journal of Political Science,* 61(1): 163-177.

Figure 24 **Polling station size and turnout rate in Mount Lebanon 1**

We can, however, see whether one list benefited from smaller stations—i.e. whether its share of votes tended to decrease as the size of the polling station increased. Observing such a relationship would suggest voter rigging.

Both the FPM and LF lists benefited from smaller stations in Jbeil, and the LF list also performed better in some small polling stations in Keserwan.

Looking at the results in each of the districts shows that in Jbeil, the share of votes obtained by the FPM list averaged 50% in the smallest polling stations, and decreased until reaching 35% in the biggest ones. Regarding the LF list, there was a clearer correlation between the percentage of votes received by the party and the size of the polling station. In Keserwan, the LF list received an average of 25% of votes in the smallest polling stations, while its share of votes decreased until reaching less than 15% in the biggest polling stations. In Jbeil, the list received 35% of votes in the smallest stations, while its share of votes decreased to 20% in the largest stations.

There were no such relationships in the votes received by the Hezbollah-independents and Kataeb-independents lists in either of the two minor districts.

Figure 25 **Polling stations size and percentage of votes for the FPM list in Jbeil**


Figure 26 **Polling station size and percentage of votes for the LF list in Keserwan**

Figure 27 **Polling station size and percentage of votes for the LF list in Jbeil**

Beyond the size of the polling station, we can look at whether one list or party benefited from very high turnouts by polling station, which could point toward pressure to vote for this list.

There is some further evidence of fraud pointing particularly at LF and FPM in Jbeil

Apart from the votes received by each list across polling station size, another way to test for voter rigging would be to look at the relationship between turnout by polling station and the share of votes for a list. Normally, if there was a lack of pressure on voters, votes for each list or party should be more or less similar in polling stations regardless of turnouts.[22]

In order to take into consideration the differences in turnouts and votes for each list across confessional groups, we create standardized variables of turnout rates and percentage of votes for lists. For any polling station, the standardized turnout rate would be the turnout rate in the specific polling station minus the average turnout rate of all polling stations in its district with registered voters from the same sect, all divided by the variability (standard deviation) of the turnout rates in those centers. This measures how abnormally low or high the turnout in a polling station is compared to all other centers within the same sect. The standardized measures of the share of votes for lists follow the same procedure. As previous studies have found, no clear relation should be observed between turnouts and votes for a list or party in 'clean' elections.[23] Accounting for the differences in votes for each list and turnouts among each confessional group shows significant

22
Myagkov, M., P.C. Ordeshook, and D. Shakin. 2009. 'The Forensics of Election Fraud.' Cambridge University Press.

23
Ibid.

variations in the percentage of votes obtained by each list between polling stations that had abnormally low (1 standard deviation below the mean turnout rate), normal, and abnormally high turnouts (1 standard deviation above the mean turnout) in each of the two districts.[24]

In Keserwan, both the LF and Kataeb-independents lists benefited slightly from very high turnouts, which, in contrast, tended to harm the FPM list. Compared to the average share of votes the LF list obtained in polling stations that had normal turnout rates (17%), its share of votes in stations that had very high turnouts was 4% higher (21%). Similarly, the Kataeb-independents list's share of votes in very high turnout stations was 3% higher (22% compared to 19% in normal turnout stations). The FPM list's results were clearly harmed by higher turnouts in Keserwan, with its share of votes in polling stations with very high turnouts being 7% lower than its share in stations with normal turnouts (51% compared to 58%).

Figure 28 **Percentage of votes for lists and standardized turnout rate in Keserwan**

■ Very low   ■ Normal   ■ Very high

This provides potential evidence of voter rigging on the part of the LF and Kataeb-independents lists in Keserwan, although these results could simply be due to their more successful mobilization of voters.

In Jbeil, however, both the FPM and LF lists significantly benefited from very high turnouts, which harmed the Hezbollah-independents list's results.

The FPM list's share of votes in polling stations with very high turnouts was 8% higher than its share in stations with normal turnout rates (43% compared to 35%); while the LF list's share of votes in polling stations that had very high turnouts was 5% higher than it

was in stations with normal turnouts (34% compared to 29%). In comparison, very high turnouts significantly harmed the Hezbollah-independents list, as its share of votes in very high turnout stations was 13% lower than it was in stations that had normal turnouts (9% compared to 22%).

Figure 29 **Percentage of votes for lists and standardized turnout rate in Jbeil**

■ **Very low**　■ **Normal**　■ **Very high**

These findings, overall, may suggest occurrences of fraud on the part of the LF list in both Keserwan and Jbeil, the FPM list in Jbeil and, to some extent, candidates on the Kataeb-independents list in Keserwan. The evidence is particularly strong for the two former lists, as the LF list also performed well in some of the smallest polling stations in each of the minor districts, and the FPM list in some of the smallest stations in Jbeil.

While the first test detects voter rigging, the one above could suggest either voter or vote rigging—i.e., ballot stuffing—as adding ballots for a list would increase both turnouts and votes for this list in a polling station.

There is some evidence of vote rigging on the part of LF and FPM in Jbeil
One method of testing for signs of ballot stuffing is determining how the percentage of null votes in a polling station correlates with the turnout, as well as the percentage of votes that a list or party obtained. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots, they tend to forget to include a similar proportion of invalid votes.[25] Potential irregular behaviors can be identified by observing the correlation between the percentage of null votes, turnouts, and votes for a list or

25
Friesen, P. 2019. 'Strategic Ballot Removal: An Unexplored Form of Electoral Manipulation in Hybrid Regimes.' *Democratization,* 26(4): 709-729.

party. A lower percentage of invalid votes in a polling station associated with a higher turnout and a higher percentage of votes for a list or party would suggest manipulations in the vote count. However, a negative correlation is not enough to suggest ballot stuffing—as null votes could rather be 'protest' votes. Stronger evidence of ballot stuffing would be apparent in cases where the increase in the share of null votes is smaller than the decrease in the percentage of votes for a list or party.

The correlation between turnout rates and the percentage of null votes in Mount Lebanon 1 does not point toward ballot stuffing overall, even when focusing on each of the minor districts.

Figure 30 **Turnout and percentage of null votes by polling station in Mount Lebanon 1**

We can however see whether one list or party received a significantly higher share of votes in polling stations that had a very low share of null votes.

Focusing on each of the districts reveals some signs of ballot stuffing in Jbeil that benefited the FPM and LF lists. There was no evidence of ballot stuffing in Keserwan. In Jbeil, both FPM and LF's share of votes significantly decreased as the share of null votes in a polling station increased. There was no significant relationship in the votes for the Kataeb-independents list, while a higher share of null votes in a polling station was associated with a much higher share of votes for the Hezbollah-independents list.

The share of votes obtained by the FPM list in Jbeil steadily decreased from over 35% in polling stations where 2% of votes or less were null, to nearly 15% in polling stations where over 8% of votes were null. In other words, an 8% increase in the share of null votes was associated with a 20% decrease in the share of votes for the FPM list—a significant difference. Regarding the LF list, its share of votes

decreased from 28% to 17% as the percentage of null votes in a polling station increased from 0% to 8%. In this case, an 8% increase in the share of null votes was associated with an 11% decrease in the share of votes obtained by the LF list. This points toward ballot stuffing, albeit to a lesser extent than the FPM list.

No correlation was observed in votes for the Kataeb-independents list, while the Hezbollah-independents list performed better in polling stations that had a higher share of null votes. As seen above, the Hezbollah-independents list also performed significantly worse in polling stations that had very high turnouts in Jbeil. It seems, therefore, that if there were any incidents of fraud, the Hezbollah-independents list was on the losing end, while the FPM and LF lists benefited from them.

Figure 31　**Votes for the FPM list percentage of null votes by polling station in Jbeil**

Figure 32　**Votes for the LF list percentage of null votes by polling station in Jbeil**

Another form of vote rigging would entail parties 'cooking' the numbers, i.e. parties manipulating the vote count either by adding or subtracting votes for a list, or 're-shuffling' votes within their list from one candidate to another. One way of detecting manipulations in the vote counting process is to look at the distribution of the last digits in votes for a list or party.[26] The last-digits test is based on the hypothesis that humans tend to be poor at making up numbers, which would result in an abnormal distribution of numbers at the aggregate level. In 'clean' elections, last digits in votes for a party should be uniformly distributed, with an equal chance of every number (from 0 to 9) to appear (10% chance).

In Mount Lebanon 1 and each of its minor districts, there was no evidence that the last digits in the number of valid votes or votes for each list deviated from the uniform line.

Overall, in Mount Lebanon 1, there is some evidence of fraud that benefited LF and FPM

First, in Jbeil, the percentage of votes received by the LF and FPM lists tended to decrease as the size of the polling stations increased, and this relationship was also present in votes for LF in Keserwan. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive for politicians buying votes as the smaller number of registered voters facilitates aggregate monitoring of their behavior. This relationship could therefore suggest that LF and FPM representatives exerted pressure on voters to vote for them, through vote buying, intimidation, or monitoring of their behavior.

Another method of testing for voter rigging is to look at the relationship between turnout by polling station and the share of votes obtained by each party regardless of the size of the polling station. In regular elections, the share of votes for a party should not significantly vary across turnouts by polling stations. The results in Jbeil show that both the FPM and LF lists significantly benefited from higher turnouts, while in Keserwan, LF also benefited from higher turnouts. Conversely, candidates on the Hezbollah-independents list clearly performed worse in polling stations that had very high turnouts in Jbeil. This provides some further suggestive evidence of fraud on the part of both the FPM and LF lists in Jbeil, and the LF list in Keserwan.

While very high turnouts benefiting a certain list could suggest voter rigging, it could also be a sign of ballot stuffing, as adding ballots for a list would increase both turnouts and votes for this list in a polling station. One way to detect signs of ballot stuffing is to examine the correlation between the percentage of null votes and votes for a list in a polling station. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots, they tend to forget to include a similar share of invalid

26
Beber, B. and A. Scacco. 2012. 'What the Numbers Say: A Digit-Based Test for Election Fraud.' *Political Analysis,* 20(2): 211-234.

votes. Seeing a significant decrease in votes for a list associated with an increase in the share of null votes in a polling station would provide some evidence of ballot stuffing. In Jbeil, both FPM and LF's share of votes tended to decrease as the share of null votes in a polling station increased. This was particularly the case for FPM. In comparison, a higher share of null votes in a polling station was associated with a much higher share of votes for the Hezbollah-independents list, suggesting that the list tended to be on the losing end when fraud occurred.

Overall, these tests provide some evidence of both voter and vote rigging on the part of the LF list in Keserwan and Jbeil and the FPM list in Jbeil.