LCPS

المركز اللبناني للدراسات
The Lebanese Center
for Policy Studies

The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections:
What Do the Numbers Say?

Beirut 2 Electoral District

Georgia Dagher

Beirut 2

The 2018 Lebanese Parliamentary Elections:
What Do the Numbers Say?

Beirut 2 Electoral District

Georgia Dagher

Georgia Dagher is a researcher at the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies. Her research focuses on parliamentary representation, namely electoral behavior and electoral reform. She has also previously contributed to LCPS's work on international donors conferences and reform programs. She holds a degree in Politics and Quantitative Methods from the University of Edinburgh.

Executive Summary

In the Lebanese parliamentary elections of 2018, the electoral district of Beirut 2 saw one of the lowest participation rates across the country. Nevertheless, there were significant variations across confessional groups: Muslim communities were significantly more likely to vote compared to their Christian counterparts. Sectarian parties were successful in mobilizing their target constituents. The majority of Sunni voters chose the Future Movement, with Al-Ahbash and the National Dialogue Party—who each won a Sunni seat—receiving most of the remaining of the Sunni vote. The majority of Shia voters voted for Hezbollah, followed by Amal, and the majority of Druze voters cast their ballot for the Progressive Socialist Party. Among Christian groups, the candidate from the Free Patriotic Movement received a high share of votes; however, their votes were highly fragmented between Christian candidates from other affiliations. In line with this, an overwhelming majority of voters in Beirut 2 cast their preferential vote for a candidate from their same sect. Even those who voted for independent candidates running on the Kelna Beirut and 'Independent Beirutis' lists showed a confessional bias. Beirut 2 was the district with the highest number of women candidates, with all electoral lists except one having at least one woman candidate. While most women received very few votes, women candidates tended to perform best among their sectarian communities. Moreover, women voters were significantly more likely to vote for women candidates, with nearly all these candidates receiving a higher number of votes from women than men.

Introduction

After passing a new electoral law in 2017, the Lebanese parliament finally agreed to hold elections in 2018—nine years after the previous ones, and two mandate extensions later. The new electoral law established a proportional representation system for the first time in the country's history, paving the way for increased competition. This new system, however, led to little changes in political representation, with voters in 2018 reiterating their support for the main established political parties. Nevertheless, these results must not be taken at face value and require a closer analysis, as voting patterns across and within electoral districts, as well as across voters' demographic characteristics, still showed variations.

As part of a larger study on the 2018 elections, LCPS has analyzed voter behavior at the national and electoral district levels. Using the official elections results at the polling station level, published by the Ministry of Interior,[1] the analysis unpacks the results and examines differing patterns in voting behavior across demographic characteristics and geographical areas. The results at the polling

station level were merged with a series of potential explanatory factors at the individual and cadastral levels. First, based on the ministry's list of registered voters by confession and gender in every polling station,[2] we identified the demographic characteristics of registered voters in those stations. The results at the polling station level were also merged with a series of factors that may have affected voters' choices at the cadastral level in each electoral district. These factors include: The level of economic development in a cadaster, approximated by the night-time light intensity;[3] the poverty rate in a cadaster, approximated by the ratio of beneficiaries of the National Poverty Targeting Program over the cadaster's overall population;[4] the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, constructed by LCPS and based on the distribution of voters by confession in each cadaster;[5] and, finally, the ratio of refugees to the number of registered voters in a cadaster.[6] Through the use of multivariate regression analyses, the explanatory significance of each of these factors on voters' behavior is identified.

Apart from voters' preferences, the study also examines incidents of electoral fraud. We seek to identify evidence of voter rigging—such as vote buying—and vote rigging—such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations.

This report unpacks the results of the electoral district of Beirut 2, which is allocated 11 parliamentary seats—six Sunni, two Shia, one Greek Orthodox, one Druze, and one Protestant seat. The report is divided into seven sections. The first section presents the demographic distribution of registered voters in Beirut 2. The second section analyzes voter turnout, which varied across confessional groups, genders, and geographical areas. The third section of this report delves into voters' preferences for political parties and candidates. Going beyond the results at the aggregate level, this report sheds light on the varying preferences for parties and candidates across voters' sect and gender and across geographical areas in Beirut 2, and how these preferences were affected by cadaster-level characteristics. The fourth section examines voters' sectarian behavior, namely their preferences for candidates of the same sectarian group. The fifth section looks at the performance of women candidates, while the sixth section looks at the performance of the two independent list that ran for elections in Beirut 2, Kelna Beirut and 'Independent Beirutis'. The seventh and final section of this report identifies incidents of electoral fraud. Using a number of statistical methods—which include analyzing the distribution of results at the polling station level, such as turnouts, votes for each list and party, and the share of invalid ballots—we test for voter and vote rigging, such as pressure to vote through vote buying, or manipulations in the vote counting process.

2
Note that some polling stations had voters from multiple confessional groups registered to vote. Similarly, some had both men and women registered to vote.

3
Obtained from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

4
Data on National Poverty Targeting Program beneficiaries was obtained from the Ministry of Social Affairs.

5
Based on electoral data on the sect of voters per polling station, we constructed an index of homogeneity (IH) = $\sum_{i=1}^{n} Sij^2$, where S_{ij}^2 is the sum of the square root of the share of each sectarian group in the total number of registered voters in a cadaster. The index ranges between 0 (when the cadaster is fully heterogeneous) and 1 (when the cadaster is fully homogeneous, or only one sectarian group is present).

6
Data on the refugee population is collected from UNHCR.

I   Who are the voters?

In the May 2018 Lebanese parliamentary elections, over 350,000 voters were registered to vote in the electoral district of Beirut 2. Eleven seats were contested in the district: Six Sunni, two Shia, and one Greek Orthodox, Druze, and Protestant, each. The Beirut 2 electoral district has a high degree of confessional fragmentation. Sunnis represent 63% of registered voters, Shias represent 20%, and Greek Orthodox 5%. Maronites and Christian minorities represent 3% of registered voters, each, while Druze, Greek Catholics, Armenian Orthodox, Catholics, Alawites, and Jewish voters represent less than 2% of voters, each (table 1).

Figure 1 **Registered voters and allocated seats by confessional group in Beirut 2**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Given the assigned quota of seats per confession, representation is not the same for every voter. Druze voters benefit significantly more from the quota than others, while Sunnis and Shias benefit significantly less. While less than 5,000 Druze voters are represented by their seat, about 35,000 Sunni and Shia voters are represented by each of their seats. Minority Christians also benefit significantly, with their seat representing about 11,000 voters, while the Greek Orthodox seat represents over 17,000 voters.

Table 1 **Confessional composition of Beirut 2 and allocated seats by confessional group**

	Number of voters	Percentage	Number of seats	Voters per seat
Sunni	219,235	63%	6	36,539
Shia	69,768	20%	2	34,884
Greek Orthodox	17,650	5%	1	17,650
Christian minorities	11,241	3%	1	11,241
Druze	4,539	1%	1	4,539
Maronite	9,966	3%		
Greek Catholic	6,390	2%		
Armenian Orthodox	5,946	2%		
Jewish	2,333	1%		
Armenian Catholic	1,632	0%		
Alawite	136	0%		
Total	348,836	100%	11	
Public employees	744			
Diaspora	7,815			
Total	357,395			

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Registered voters were generally divided into electoral centers depending on their gender and confession. The majority of voters in specific polling stations were Sunni (63%) with the second highest share being Shia (20%). The remaining polling stations were for Greek Orthodox voters (4%) and Christian minorities (2%), while less than 1% were reserved for each of the other confessional groups. Some polling stations hosted voters from multiple confessional groups, thus inhibiting the complete analysis of voter behavior by confessional group. Overall, 7% of voters in Beirut 2 were registered in these stations.

Figure 2 **Confessional composition of polling stations in Beirut 2**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Nearly 25,500 of voters were registered in mixed stations although the majority of each of the communities represented by a seat were registered in their own polling stations. Over 85% of Sunni, Shia, Greek Orthodox, and Druze voters were registered in their own polling stations, while 52% of Christian minorities were.[7] Moreover, among the 25,500 voters in mixed stations, the most significant share were Christian minorities and Maronite (around 20% each), followed by Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox voters (between 10% and 15% each). Most of the remaining voters were Armenian Catholic, Sunni, and Shia (between 4% and 6%), while 1% each were Druze, Jewish, and Alawite.[8] In total, about 70% of voters in mixed stations were Christian, and 20% were either Armenian Orthodox or Armenian Catholic.

II Who voted?

The turnout rate in Beirut 2 was the second-lowest across the country. Participation rates in the district stood at 41%, much lower than the country average of 49%. Among the 357,395 Lebanese registered in the district, 147,801 cast a vote while the remaining 209,594 did not.

Similar to other districts, constituents in the diaspora—who were given the opportunity to vote for the first time in 2018—had higher participation rates. Among the 7,815 Lebanese emigrants who registered to vote in Beirut 2, 54% headed to the polls, compared to 41% of Lebanese registered in the country (figure 3).

7
Regarding the groups not represented by a seat, between 38% and 45% of Maronite, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox voters were registered in their own polling stations, while 84% of Jewish voters were. All Armenian Catholic and Alawite voters were registered in mixed stations.

8
This is calculated by comparing the number of voters registered in single-confession stations with the total number of voters by confession.

Figure 3 **Turnout by residency in Beirut 2**

Muslim voters were much more mobilized than Christian voters

Turnout significantly varied across confessional groups, with Muslim and Druze constituents having much higher participation rates than Christian constituents (figure 4). Turnout was highest among Shia (46%) and Sunni voters (45%), followed by Druze voters (41%). Greek Orthodox and Christian minorities, although they are represented by a seat in the district, voted significantly less (25% and 12%, respectively). Non-represented confessional groups that had their own polling stations also had low turnout rates, varying from 19% among Maronites, to 15% among Greek Catholics, and only 9% among Armenian Orthodox. Only five Jewish voters, out of the nearly 2,000 who were registered in their own polling stations, voted (0.3%). Finally, polling stations hosting multiple confessional groups also had a low turnout (21%), which might be explained by the higher share of Christian voters registered in these stations. Variations in turnouts across confessional groups are statistically significant, even after controlling for voters' gender and characteristics of the cadasters and polling stations in which they were registered.

Figure 4 **Turnout by confessional group in Beirut 2**

There were no significant variations across genders, with men voting in slightly higher numbers than women (43%, compared to 42%).[9] In stations that had both men and women registered to vote, turnout rates were significantly lower (22%), likely explained as well by the much higher share of these that serviced Christian voters.

Figure 5 **Turnout by gender in Beirut 2**

Participation rates varied, depending on a cadaster's confessional composition

Among the eight cadasters in Beirut 2, Mazraa had the highest turnout (46%), while Minet el-Hosn had the lowest one (24%). Bachoura also had a high turnout (43%), while in all other cadasters, turnout rates varied between 35% and 40% (table 2).

Table 2 **Turnout by cadaster in Beirut 2**

Cadaster	Turnout
Mazraa	46%
Bachoura	43%
Moussaytbeh	40%
Ras Beirut	39%
Ain el-Mreisseh	38%
Zoukak el-Blatt	37%
Marfaa	35%
Minet el-Hosn	24%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

The much higher turnout in Mazraa was driven by the higher share of Sunni voters registered in this cadaster (nearly 90% of registered voters), while the lower turnout in Minet el-Hosn was driven by the much higher share of voters from other groups. In fact, 80% of registered voters in Minet el-Hosn were from non-Muslim groups—with around 30% being Maronite, 20% Jewish, and 10% Greek Orthodox.[10] Similarly, in Bachoura, the higher turnout was likely driven by the higher number of Shia (half of registered voters in that cadaster) and Sunni (40%) registered voters.

Sunni and Shia voters registered in their own polling stations were overall more mobilized than other confessional groups in all cadasters. However, there were geographical variations in participation rates among voters from the same confessional groups (table 3).

The highest participation rates among the Sunni community were in Mazraa, Bachoura, and Ras Beirut (48%), and the lowest were in Zoukak el-Blatt (33%) and Marfaa (35%). The opposite trend was observed among Shia voters, with Zoukak el-Blatt and Marfaa, in addition to Moussaytbeh, being the cadasters where Shias had their highest turnouts (between 46% and 48%). Their lowest turnout rates were observed in Mazraa, Ras Beirut, and Minet el-Hosn (between 42% and 43%). One potential explanation for the lower participation rates among Shias in these three latter cadasters could be that, among all cadasters in Beirut 2, those were the ones with the lowest share of Shia registered voters. Political parties may have therefore focused on mobilizing the Shia vote in areas where these voters constituted the largest share. Among the other confessional groups, both Greek Orthodox and Greek Catholics had their highest turnouts in Moussaytbeh (30% and 24%, respectively), and their lowest in Ras Beirut (16% and 11%, respectively). Moussaytbeh also generally saw comparatively higher turnouts among all Christian groups. There were no large geographical variations in turnouts among Druze voters, although among those registered in their own stations, turnout was highest in Ain el-Mreisseh (43%) and lowest in Moussaytbeh (40%). Christian minorities, who had their own polling stations in Moussaytbeh and Ras Beirut, had a similar turnout rate in both (12%). Among Maronite voters, participation rates were at their highest in Ain el-Mreisseh, Minet el-Hosn, and Moussaytbeh, and at their lowest in Bachoura. Bachoura was also the cadaster in which Armenian Orthodox voters had significantly lower turnouts than they did in other cadasters.

Table 3 **Turnout by confessional group and cadaster in Beirut 2**

	Mazraa	Bachoura	Moussaytbeh	Ras Beirut	Ain el-Mreisseh	Zoukak el-Blatt	Marfaa	Minet el-Hosn
Sunni	48%	48%	46%	48%	43%	33%	35%	43%
Shia	42%	45%	46%	43%	44%	47%	48%	43%
Druze			40%	42%	43%			
Greek Orthodox	28%		30%	16%				19%
Christian minorities			12%	12%				
Maronite		10%	23%	15%	24%			23%
Greek Catholic		16%	24%	11%				
Armenian Orthodox		7%	12%			9%		
Jewish								0.3%
Mixed confession	25%	21%	25%	16%	11%	17%	15%	22%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Beyond the prevalence of any specific confessional group in a cadaster and the variations in turnouts among each sectarian group, turnout rates may be affected by geographical or polling station characteristics.

What are the main drivers of turnout in Beirut 2?

A multivariate analysis highlights the impact of different individual and geographical characteristics on turnout rates. Across the few cadasters in Beirut 2, when controlling for voters' gender and sect, voters registered in cadasters with lower levels of economic development were significantly more likely to vote. As measured by the nighttime light intensity index, the cadaster considered to have the lowest level of economic development is Mazraa, while the cadaster with the highest level of economic development is Minet el-Hosn. Moreover, higher levels of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster were associated with higher turnout rates, and cadasters with a higher concentration of Syrian refugees also tended to see higher turnouts. All of these results are significant when controlling for voters' gender and sect.

Some relationships, however, were more significant than others when focusing on each confessional group. Sunni voters registered in cadasters with lower levels of economic development were significantly more likely to vote, while the opposite was true for Shia voters. Regarding the level of sectarian homogeneity in a cadaster, Christian voters registered in more homogeneous cadasters were significantly more likely to vote, while this factor had no significant effect on turnout rates for any other confessional group.

There were also variations across polling stations. Stations with fewer voters registered to vote generally saw significantly higher turnouts. Homogeneous stations also saw higher turnouts, which could suggest targeted mobilization of voters. Across confessional groups, Shia and Sunni voters were the most likely to vote, followed by Druze voters. Armenian Orthodox, Greek Catholic, and Christian minorities were the least likely to vote, while Maronite and Greek Orthodox voters stood in between.

Figure 6 **Drivers of turnout in Beirut 2**

III Who voted for whom?

Nine lists competed in Beirut 2, with a total number of 83 candidates—both the highest across all electoral districts. Forty-eight candidates competed for the six Sunni seats, 13 competed for the two Shia seats, eight for the Greek Orthodox seat, and seven for each of the Druze and Protestant seats.

The race in Beirut 2 was highly competitive, with three of the nine competing lists winning seats

The three winning lists were 'Future for Beirut', formed by the Future Movement (FM) and the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP); 'Beirut's Unity', formed by Al-Ahbash, the Free Patriotic Movement (FPM), Hezbollah, and Amal Movement; and 'Lebanon is Worthy', formed by the National Dialogue Party (NDP).

The 'Future for Beirut' list won the plurality of the votes (62,940 votes, 44%) and obtained six of the 11 seats. The list obtained four Sunni seats, the Greek Orthodox seat, and the Druze seat. The Sunni seats were won by Saad Hariri (FM, 20,741 votes), Tammam Salam (FM-affiliated, 9,599 votes), Rola Tabsh (FM, 6,637 votes), and Nohad Machnouk (FM, 6,411 votes). The Greek Orthodox seat was won by Nazih Najem (independent affiliated with FM, 2,351 votes), and the Druze seat by Faysal Sayegh (PSP, 1,902 votes). On the same list, previous MPs Ghazi Youssef (Shia, 1,759 votes) and Bassam Chab (Protestant, 735 votes), both from FM, ran again but failed to win a seat.

Three of the Sunni winners, Saad Hariri, Tammam Salam, and Nohad Machnouk, are important political figures. First, all of them were the incumbents and have served in various governments. Saad

Hariri comes from one of the most prominent Sunni political families in Lebanon: He is the son of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri who assumed office after the Lebanese civil war (1992), is the leader of his party the FM, has been an MP representing Beirut since 2005, and had been appointed as Prime Minister three times (2009, 2016, and 2020), and was therefore the PM at the time of the elections. Tammam Salam also comes from one of the most prominent Sunni families, being the son of former Prime Minister Saeb Salam. In addition to being the incumbent and a member of the 1996-2000 parliament, he was Prime Minister in 2014-2016, and was also the Minister of Culture between 2008 and 2009. Finally, Nohad Machnouk was the Minister of Interior and Municipalities in 2014, and was the serving minister at the time of the elections. As for Druze winner Faysal Sayegh from PSP, he is a former MP who represented Aley in the 2005-2009 parliament.

The 'Beirut's Unity' list came in second (47,087 votes, 33%) and won four seats. The list obtained one Sunni seat, which went to Adnan Traboulsi (Al-Ahbash, 13,018 votes), the two Shia seats, which went to Amin Chirri (Hezbollah, 22,961 votes) and Mohammad Khawaja (Amal, 7,834 votes), and the Protestant seat, obtained by Edgard Traboulsi (FPM, 1,919 votes). Chirri was a Beirut municipality member between 1998 and 2004, and both Traboulsi and him were former MPs. Traboulsi was a member of the 1992-1996 parliament, and Chirri a member of the 2005-2009 parliament.

Finally, the third winning list, 'Lebanon is Worthy', obtained the remaining Sunni seat with 11% of the votes (15,773 votes). The seat was won by NDP founder and leader, Fouad Makhzoumi (11,346 votes). Makhzoumi is a known figure by the wider public: He is a businessman and founder of the Makhzoumi Foundation, a charity organization that offers vocational trainings, healthcare services, and financial services.

Among the six other lists, only two managed to win over 1% of the votes. 'Beirut the Homeland', which included a candidate from Jama'a al-Islamiyah (the Islamic Group) and independents, obtained 5% of the votes (7,475 votes), and the independent list Kelna Beirut won 4% of the votes (6,174 votes). The other lists were 'People's Voice', which was backed by the People's Movement and the Independent Nasserite Movement (1,339 votes), 'Dignity of Beirut' (971 votes), 'Beirutis Opposition', which was backed by politician Ashraf Rifi (553 votes), and 'Independent Beirutis', an independent list (410 votes).

There was a slight change in power from the previous parliament, and the FM was the main loser of the new proportional representation electoral system. In the previous elections, the coalition backed by FM won nearly all seats under the majoritarian electoral system, whereas

in 2018, the proportional representation system allowed for new candidates to enter parliament. FM candidates and those backed by the party held on to four Sunni seats, down from five, with three of the winners being the former MPs (Saad Hariri, Tammam Salam, and Nohad Machnouk). The sixth Sunni seat in the previous parliament was held by Imad Hout, who ran again but failed to retain his seat. These two seats lost were won by Adnan Traboulsi (Al-Ahbash) and Fouad Makhzoumi (NDP). Regarding the Shia seats, Amal retained one, while the second one was switched from FM to Hezbollah. Although the FM Shia incumbent Ghazi Youssef ran again in 2018, he received a much lower share of votes than Hezbollah winner Amin Chirri. The Protestant seat was lost by FM and went to FPM instead. Similarly, incumbent Bassam Chab (FM) ran again and received a much lower share of votes than winner Edgard Traboulsi (FPM). There were no changes in the Greek Orthodox and Druze seats—the former was retained by FM and the latter by PSP.

Figure 7 **Percentage of votes for each list in Beirut 2**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

By party, FM had seven candidates and backed two others. All the other main parties—PSP, Al-Ahbash, Hezbollah, Amal, FPM, NDP, and Jama'a al-Islamiyah—had only one candidate each. All other candidates in their lists were independents. In each list, only a few candidates tended to receive the majority of the votes. Over one third of the votes received by the FM-PSP list went to Saad Hariri (15%). He was followed by Tammam Salam (7%), while Rola Tabsh, Nohad Machnouk, and Rabih Hassouna received between 4% and 5%

of preferential votes each. All other candidates on the list received less than 2% of preferential votes each: Greek Orthodox winner Nazih Najem won 1.7% and PSP Druze winner Faysal Sayegh only 1.4% of preferential votes. The other FM candidates in the list were Zaher Eido (1.8%), Ghazi Youssef (1.3%), and Bassem Chab (0.6%), and the last candidate in the list was independent Ali Chaer (1.8%).

In the list formed by Al-Ahbash, Hezbollah, Amal, and FPM, Amin Chirri (Hezbollah) received nearly half of the votes (17% of preferential votes in the district). Adnan Traboulsi and Mohammad Khawaja followed (9% and 6%, respectively), and the last winner, Edgard Traboulsi, only won 1% of preferential votes. Two other independents on the list ran, Omar Ghandour and Mohammad Baasiri, and only received 0.4%, combined.

Nearly all of the votes obtained by the third winning list, the NDP list, went to Fouad Makhzoumi (8% of preferential votes in Beirut 2). One other candidate, Khalil Broumana (independent) won 1%, while the eight other candidates in the list won a combined 2% of preferential votes.

The list formed by Jama'a al-Islamiyah was also popular and saw over half of its votes go to the party's candidate Imad Hout (3%), with the 10 other candidates only winning 2% of preferential votes, combined. The last candidate in Beirut 2 to win over 1% of preferential votes was Ibrahim Mneimneh from Kelna Beirut (1%). The seven other candidates in his list won a combined 3% of preferential votes.

In the other lists, all candidates on 'People's Voice' won a combined 1% of preferential votes. The list included two candidates from the People's Movement and one candidate from the Independent Nasserite Movement. Omar Wakim (People's Movement of Lebanon) received one third of the votes won by the list (476 votes, 0.3%), and the second candidate from the party, Ibrahim Halabi, came in second in the list (195 votes, 0.1%).

In 'Beirut's Dignity', the nine candidates received 0.7% of votes combined. Most of these were received by Mohammad Chatila (227 votes, 0.2%) and Raja Zuheiri (223 votes, 0.2%). 'Beirutis Opposition', a list backed by Ashraf Rifi, had its eight candidates winning 0.4% of votes combined. The list that ranked last in Beirut 2, 'Independent Beirutis', had 10 candidates who won 0.3% of votes combined.

Overall, out of all the 83 candidates in Beirut 2, only 18 managed to win over 1% of preferential votes: Thirteen of those were party members, two were backed by parties, one was running on a list backed by a party, and the last one ran on an independent list. In addition to these 18 candidates, two won over 1,000 votes: Zeina Majdalini and Hassan Sinno (around 1,200 votes each), who both ran with Kelna Beirut.

Support for lists and candidates varied across residencies

Support for 'Beirut's Unity', the Al-Ahbash, FPM, Hezbollah, and Amal list, was much higher among the Lebanese diaspora[11] (53% of their votes, compared to 32% of residents), while support for the 'Future for Beirut', the FM-PSP list, was lower (25% compared to 45%). Emigrants also voted more for Kelna Beirut (9% compared to 4% of residents), and slightly less for the NDP list 'Lebanon is Worthy' (7% compared to 11% of residents). These divergences were driven particularly by Lebanese emigrants' higher levels of support for Adnan Traboulsi and Amin Chirri (between 14% and 3% higher) and their lower levels of support for Saad Hariri, Tammam Salam, Nohad Machnouk, Rabih Hassouna, and Fouad Makhzoumi (between 3% and 6% lower). Overall, Adnan Traboulsi was by far the most successful candidate among the diaspora (24% of their preferential votes), while he ranked third among residents (9% of their vote).

Figure 8 **Percentage of votes for each list by residency in Beirut 2**

	FM-PSP	FPM-Hezbollah-Amal-Al-Ahbash	NDP-Independents
	Jama'a-Independents	Kelna Beirut	Others

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Preferences for lists did not significantly vary across genders

The largest variations across voters' gender were in votes for 'Future for Beirut', whose votes among women were higher by 2% than among men, and 'Beirut's Unity', whose votes among women were lower by 2%. When looking at the performance of each candidate, most of them received an equal share of both genders' votes (with less than a 1% difference). There were, however, some exceptions: Saad Hariri and Rola al Tabsh were particularly more successful among women voters (3% and 2% higher), and Zaher Eido was less successful (2% lower).

Variations were much larger in stations that had both men and women registered to vote. In particular, compared to voters in gender-specific stations, the few voters who voted in gender-mixed stations[12] voted much less for 'Future for Beirut' (15% less, on average), and more for Kelna Beirut (8% more) and the NDP list (5% more). Moreover, voters in gender-mixed stations voted much less for

Sunni candidates (39% lower, on average) and slightly less for Shia candidates (5% lower). Conversely, they voted significantly more for Greek Orthodox (17% more), Protestant (17% more), and Druze candidates (10% more). These variations may be explained by the confessional composition of gender-mixed stations: The majority of voters registered in gender-mixed stations were Christian.

Figure 9 **Percentage of votes for each list by gender in Beirut 2**

Men	44% · 33% · 11% · 6% · 4% · 2%	
Women	46% · 31% · 11% · 5% · 4% · 2%	
Mixed gender	30% · 34% · 16% · 4% · 12% · 4%	

■ FM-PSP   ■ FPM-Hezbollah-Amal-Al-Ahbash   ■ NDP-Independents
■ Jama'a-Independents   ■ Kelna Beirut   ■ Others

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

As the number of women and men voting was unequal, looking at which candidates obtained their highest support from shows large variations across genders. Taking the share of total preferential votes that were cast from each type of polling station into account shows that certain candidates received particularly higher support from one gender than the other.[13]

Focusing on the candidates who obtained at least 1% of preferential votes, Rola Tabsh, Saad Hariri, Tammam Salam, and Faysal Sayegh received a much higher share of their votes from women voters than they did from male voters. In particular, Hariri received over 2,800 more votes from women than he did from men, and Tabsh received over 1,500 more votes. For the other candidates, the differences were less than 1,000 votes. Conversely, Zaher Eido, Nazih Najem, Ali Chaer, Ghazi Youssef, Rabih Hassouna, and Imad Hout received higher support from male voters. However, the differences in numbers were less than 1,000 voters for each, with the highest being in votes for Zaher Eido (900 more votes from men) and Nazih Najem (about 500 more).

Although a very low number of preferential votes were cast in gender-mixed stations, some candidates received a significant share of their votes from these stations. In particular, Edgard Traboulsi (34%), Faysal Sayegh (20%), and Nazih Najem (10%) obtained a very high share of their votes from voters in gender-mixed stations. In comparison, Imad Hout, Rola Tabsh, Saad Hariri, Tammam

13
In total, nearly 47% of the total preferential votes cast came from male-only stations, 50% came from female-only stations, and 3% came from gender-mixed stations. A candidate receiving well above 47% of their votes from voters in male stations would show that the support they received from male voters was relatively higher than the one they received from female voters, regardless of the percentage of votes each gender gave to them. Similarly, a candidate receiving well above 3% of their votes from gender-mixed stations would show that the support they obtained from these voters was relatively higher than the support they obtained from single-gender stations.

Salam, Rabih Hassouna, Zaher Eido, and Adnan Traboulsi received a significantly lower share, with less than 1% of their votes coming from gender-mixed stations. As mentioned above, Sunni and Shia candidates were less successful in gender-mixed stations, while Christian and Druze candidates were more successful. This explains the higher reliance on voters in gender-mixed stations of the three former candidates (Edgard Traboulsi, Faysal Sayegh, and Nazih Najem).

There were also variations in votes for Kelna Beirut. The list, and all candidates in it, received the majority of their votes from women voters. The list obtained 50% of its votes from women, 41% from men, and 9% from voters in mixed stations. Hassan Sinno received a particularly higher share of his votes from polling stations with women voters, while Zeina Majdalini received particularly high support from voters in mixed stations.

There were large variations in support for political parties across confessional groups

There were large variations in voters' preferences for lists and parties across confessions, with the majority of constituents voting for their sectarian political party.

The majority of Sunni voters voted for the 'Future for Beirut' list (59%), and, among the total votes received by the list in the district, 90% were cast in Sunni polling stations. The majority of Druze voters also voted for the same list (71%). Shia voters voted mostly for 'Beirut's Unity' (85%), which was the list that relied most on the Shia vote—over half of the total votes it received came from Shia voters. Among Christian groups, the vote was generally fragmented between the 'Future for Beirut', 'Beirut's Unity', 'Lebanon is Worthy', and Kelna Beirut (figure 10).

Figure 10 **Percentage of votes for each list by confessional group in Beirut 2**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Within each list, voters tended to give their preferential votes to specific sectarian parties. Among the Sunni voters who voted for the 'Future for Beirut', 57% gave their preferential vote to a candidate from or affiliated with FM. The most successful was Saad Hariri (21%), followed by Tammam Salam (10%), Rola Tabsh, Nohad Machnouk, and Rabih Hassouna (between 6% and 7% each). Sunnis who voted for 'Beirut's Unity' (16%) chose mostly Al-Ahbash winner Adnan Traboulsi (12%), with the remaining choosing Amin Chirri (3%). The third list among Sunnis was 'Lebanon is Worthy' (12%), with NDP winner Fouad Makhzoumi receiving the Sunni preferential vote (10%). The last list which managed to win a significant share of the Sunni vote was 'Beirut the Homeland' (7%), with Jama'a al-Islamiyah candidate Imad Hout winning most of the votes (4%).

Similar to Sunnis, Druze voters gave the majority of their votes to the 'Future for Beirut' (71%). PSP winner Faysal Sayegh received most of their preferential vote (65%). 'Beirut the Homeland' and 'Lebanon is Worthy' won the remaining Druze vote (10% and 8%, respectively). Nearly all Druze voters who voted for the former list cast their preferential vote for Said Halabi (independent Druze candidate, 10%), and the majority of those who voted for the latter chose Zeina Mounzer (independent Druze candidate, 5%).

Nearly all the Shia vote went to 'Beirut's Unity', most of which was cast for Hezbollah winner Amin Chirri (62%) and Amal winner Mohammad Khawaja (21%). The only other list that won over 5% of the Shia vote was 'Lebanon is Worthy' (7%), driven by the support for Fouad Makhzoumi, who received 6% of the Shia preferential vote.

Greek Orthodox, Christian minorities, Maronite, and Greek Catholic voters tended to vote for the same lists and candidates. The most successful list among Greek Orthodox voters was 'Future for Beirut' (34%), driven by support for Greek Orthodox winner Nazih Najem (27%), with no other candidate in the list winning over 3% of the Greek Orthodox preferential vote. The second list among Greek Orthodox voters was 'Lebanon is Worthy' (25%), whose success was also driven by support for one candidate, Khalil Broumana (independent Greek Orthodox candidate, 20%). The remainder of the Greek Orthodox vote was split between 'Beirut's Unity' and Kelna Beirut (17% each). The majority of Greek Orthodox voters who voted for 'Beirut's Unity' cast their preferential vote for FPM winner Edgard Traboulsi (14%), whereas those who voted for Kelna Beirut cast their preferential vote for Zeina Majdalani (11%). Among Christian minorities, 'Future for Beirut' and 'Beirut's Unity' received similar levels of support (about 28% each). Just as with Greek Orthodox, nearly all Christian minorities voters cast their ballot for Nazih Najem (16%) and Edgard Traboulsi (28%). 'Lebanon is Worthy' was the third list among Christian minorities (22%), with Khalil Broumana being the most successful candidate, followed by Makhzoumi (10% and 7%). Kelna Beirut also received support from this group (12% of their vote).

Among groups not represented by a seat, Maronite voters gave the highest share of their vote to 'Beirut's Unity' with Edgard Traboulsi being the most successful candidate (26% of their preferential vote). Kelna Beirut and the 'Future for Beirut' received an equal share of the Maronite vote (22% each), with Zeina Majdalani winning 13%, and Saad Hariri and Nazih Najem winning 8% each. Most of the remaining Maronite votes were received by 'Lebanon is Worthy' (18%), divided between Khalil Broumana (11%) and Fouad Makhzoumi (6%).

Greek Catholic voters were the ones to give the highest share of their votes to Kelna Beirut (27%). Their preferred candidates in the list were Zeina Majdalani (12%) and Nouhad Yazbek (8%). All of the three other main lists received an equal share of the Greek Catholic vote (between 20% and 22%). Similar to other Christians, Greek Catholics who voted for 'Beirut's Unity' mainly chose Edgard Traboulsi (19%). Among those who voted for 'Lebanon is Worthy', most chose Khalil Broumana and Fouad Makhzoumi. Finally, the Greek Catholic vote for the 'Future for Beirut' was fragmented between different candidates, with Nazih Najem and Saad Hariri being more successful than others (5% each).

Finally, Armenian Orthodox voters voted in majority for the 'Future for Beirut' (46%), with most votes going to Nohad Machnouk (34%). The list that ranked second was Kelna Beirut (17%), with Zeina Majdalani and Nouhad Yazbek receiving the highest share of preferential votes (9% and 5%). 'Lebanon is Worthy' and 'Beirut's Unity' were also successful, with Armenian Orthodox voters' support for these lists being driven by their support for Fouad Makhzoumi (12%) and Edgard Traboulsi (7%).

Overall, only a few candidates managed to win over 5% of any confessional group's votes.

Out of the 83 candidates in Beirut 2, only seven won over 5% of Sunni voters' preferential votes. All of them were Sunnis: Saad Hariri, Tammam Salam, Rola Tabsh, Nohad Machnouk, Rabih Hassouna, Adnan Traboulsi, and Fouad Makhzoumi. In total, these seven candidates won 73% of Sunni voters' preferential votes. Among Shias, only three candidates won over 5%: Amin Chirri, Mohammad Khawaja, and Fouad Makhzoumi, who received a combined 89% of their vote. Similarly, only three candidates managed to win over 5% of the Druze preferential vote: Faysal Sayegh, Said Halabi, and Zeina Mounzer— winning 80% of their votes combined. Three candidates obtained the majority of Greek Orthodox and Christian minorities' votes: Nazih Najem, Khalil Broumana, and Edgard Traboulsi. In total, the three candidates received 61% of the Greek Orthodox and 54% of Christian minorities' votes.

Figure 11 **Percentage of votes for each party by confessional group in Beirut 2**

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Given the unequal share of voters from each confession, as well as the unequal share of those registered in their own stations, it can be shown which confessional group each candidate obtained their support from. As the majority of votes were cast in Sunni polling stations, the majority of votes received by most candidates tended to come from Sunnis. However, looking at the distribution of votes received by each candidate from each type of stations, and accounting for the number of votes cast in each type of station, can demonstrate whether a candidate relied on a specific group's votes.[14] Sunni candidates tended to receive a much higher share of their votes from Sunnis, Shia candidates from Shias, Druze candidates from Druze, and Greek Orthodox and Protestant candidates from Christian voters.

The 'Future for Beirut' list received 90% of its votes from Sunni polling stations, and some of the candidates in the list—all Sunni—received nearly all of their votes from Sunni voters. Over 95% of the total preferential votes garnered by Rola Tabsh, Saad Hariri, Tammam Salam, Rabih Hassouna, and Zaher Eido were cast in Sunni polling stations. The Greek Orthodox candidate on the list Nazih Najem received the highest share of his votes from Greek Orthodox polling stations (about 40% of his total votes), with a share coming from polling stations that had Christian minorities registered to vote (5%). The majority of the votes received by Druze candidate Faysal Sayegh came from Druze voters (nearly 60% of the votes Sayegh won in total).

'Beirut's Unity' won the majority of its votes from Shia voters (nearly 60%), with the remainder coming from Sunnis (35%). Most candidates in the list relied on their sectarian communities. Sunni winner Adnan Traboulsi received almost all of his votes from Sunni voters (95%), Amin Chirri and Mohammad Khawaja from Shia voters (85% each), and Edgard Traboulsi from Christian voters (30% from Greek Orthodox polling stations, and 10% from Christian minorities and Maronite stations, each).

The third winning list, 'Lebanon is Worthy', won the majority of its votes from Sunnis (70%) and received a relatively high share of its votes from Greek Orthodox voters (6% of its total votes). Among the main candidates in the list, NDP winner Fouad Makhzoumi received most of his votes from Sunni voters (80%), and Greek Orthodox candidate Khalil Broumana won the majority of his votes from Greek Orthodox voters (nearly 60%) and a high share from other Christian communities (15% combined).

Among the two other lists that won a considerable amount of votes in Beirut 2, 'Beirut the Homeland' relied on the Sunni vote, with 90% of the total votes it obtained coming from Sunni voters. The main candidate in the list, Imad Hout, won nearly all of his votes from Sunnis. Kelna Beirut had the most diverse constituency: Around 60%

14
Among the represented groups, 68% of the preferential votes were cast in Sunni stations, 23% were cast in Shia ones, 3% in Greek Orthodox ones, 1% in Druze ones, and 0.5% in stations that had Christian minorities registered to vote.

of the total votes it received came from Sunnis, and around 10% came from Greek Orthodox and Shias, each. Similar to other lists, however, each candidate generally received the highest share of their votes from voters of their own confession.

The performance of each list varied across cadasters

There were some geographical variations in the success of each list across cadasters, although in all cadasters, the 'Future for Beirut' and 'Beirut's Unity' lists ranked first or second. 'Future for Beirut' received the majority of votes in Mazraa (57%), Ras Beirut (55%), and Ain el-Mreisseh (53%). It also ranked first in Moussaytbeh (49%) and Minet el-Hosn (41%). In comparison, 'Beirut's Unity' received the majority of votes in Zoukak el-Blatt (57%) and Bachoura (54%), and the highest share in Marfaa (43%). No other list managed to win more than 15% of votes in any cadaster. 'Lebanon is Worthy' won its highest number in Marfaa (15%), 'Beirut the Homeland' in Ras Beirut (10%), and Kelna Beirut in Minet el-Hosn (12%). Each of the four remaining lists won less than 2% of votes in all cadasters.

Candidates also had their own cadastral strongholds. Saad Hariri outperformed all other candidates, by a significant margin, in Ras Beirut (33% of preferential votes) and Mazraa (22%). These two cadasters are also those with the highest share of Sunni registered voters, and are those that saw the highest turnouts among this group, which may suggest more effective mobilization by Hariri. On the same list, Tammam Salam received a significantly higher share of votes than all other candidates in Ain el-Mreisseh (21%) and also ranked first in Moussaytbeh (13%). Nohad Machnouk was able to beat all other candidates in Minet el-Hosn (14%), although Amin Chirri from Hezbollah won a similar share. Most other candidates in the list won less than 10% of preferential votes in all cadasters. The highest share of votes Rola Tabsh won was in Mazraa (8%)—where she also received the majority of her votes from. Rabih Hassouna was successful in Marfaa (15%), while Zaher Eido's highest share was in Bachoura (5%). Regarding the two remaining winners in the list, Greek Orthodox candidate Nazih Najem's highest share of preferential votes was in Moussaytbeh (3%) and Druze PSP candidate Faysal Sayegh was more successful in Ain el-Mreisseh (9%) than he was in other cadasters. The last candidates in the lists were two Shia candidates: The highest share of votes Ali Chaer won was in Zoukak el-Blatt (5%) and Ghazi Youssef's highest share was in Minet el-Hosn (2%).

In 'Beirut's Unity', Amin Chirri won over one third of preferential votes in Zoukak el-Blatt and Bachoura (36% and 34%), and the highest share in Marfaa (27%). Chirri's success in these cadasters was likely driven by the high share of Shia voters registered there. The

second Shia winner Mohammad Khawaja obtained his highest level of support in Bachoura (13%). The Sunni winner from the list Adnan Traboulsi was more successful in Mazraa (13%) and Protestant winner Edgard Traboulsi obtained higher support in Minet el-Hosn (6%).

The third list, 'Lebanon is Worthy', won between 9% and 15% of votes in all cadasters. Fouad Makhzoumi enjoyed higher support in Marfaa than he did in other cadasters (13% of preferential votes), and Khalil Broumana, the other main candidate on the list, was most successful in Minet el-Hosn (4% of votes).

Regarding the main candidate in 'Beirut the Homeland', Imad Hout's highest share of preferential votes was in Ras Beirut (7% of preferential votes). Finally, in Kelna Beirut, all of the three main candidates were most successful in Minet el-Hosn, where Zeina Majdalani received 6% of preferential votes—nearly as much as Protestant winner Edgard Traboulsi—and both Ibrahim Mneimneh and Hassan Sinno received 2%.

Apart from the performance of specific candidates across cadasters, Sunni candidates, on average, performed much better in Mazraa (86% of votes) and Ras Beirut (78%). Conversely, Shia candidates performed much better in Zoukak el-Blatt (54%) and Bachoura (49%). Druze candidates were most successful in Ain el-Mreisseh (12%). Both Greek Orthodox and Protestant candidates were more successful in Minet el-Hosn (14% and 10%) than they were in other cadasters (less than 12% of votes combined). These variations are likely driven by the distribution of registered voters by cadaster. Mazraa and Ras Beirut were the two cadasters with the highest share of Sunni registered voters, Bachoura and Zoukak el-Blatt had the highest share of Shia voters, Ain el-Mreisseh had the highest share of Druze voters, and Minet el-Hosn had the highest share of Christian voters.

What are the drivers of votes for each party in Beirut 2?
A multivariate analysis highlights the relevant impact of certain characteristics of the cadasters, polling stations, and individual voters on the performance of political parties.

In Beirut 2, among the parties in the 'Future for Beirut' list, FM and its affiliated candidates generally performed better in more homogeneous cadasters. Across polling stations, voters in smaller and single-sect polling stations were significantly more likely to vote for the party. Regarding the characteristics of individual voters, women voters, compared to men, were more likely to cast their ballot for the party. Across confessional groups, Sunni voters were the most likely to vote for FM, highlighting the party's effective mobilization of its main constituents. Shia and Druze voters were significantly less likely to vote for the party than any other confessional group.

Regarding PSP, the party's candidate Faysal Sayegh tended to perform better in polling stations that had higher turnout rates. He was also more successful in larger polling stations, as well in mixed stations. Across Beirut 2, voters in cadasters with lower levels of sectarian homogeneity, and those in cadasters with lower levels of economic development, were more likely to vote for Sayegh. By gender, women were less likely to cast their preferential vote for the candidate than men. Lastly, Druze voters were significantly more likely than any other group to vote for him, while Shias were the least likely to do so.

Figure 12 **Drivers of votes for FM and its affiliated candidates**


Figure 13 **Drivers of votes for PSP**

In the 'Beirut's Unity' list, different factors had similar effects on the success of Hezbollah winner Amin Chirri and Amal winner Mohammad Khawaja. Both winners were significantly more successful

in cadasters with lower levels of sectarian homogeneity. Voters in larger polling stations, as well as those in mixed stations, were significantly more likely to vote for each of these candidates. Khawaja also benefited from higher turnouts, which were associated with a higher share of votes for him. Regarding the characteristics of voters, women were slightly more likely than men to vote for Chirri, while there were no significant variations across genders in support for Khawaja. Shia voters were the most likely to vote for each of the two candidates by a significant level—a result that holds even after controlling for cadaster and polling station characteristics. Regarding other sectarian groups, Maronite, Christian minorities, and Druze voters were the least likely to vote for Chirri, whereas Greek Catholic voters were the least likely to cast a ballot for Khawaja.

Figure 14 **Drivers of votes for Hezbollah**

Figure 15 **Drivers of votes for Amal**

Al-Ahbash winner Adnan Traboulsi tended to receive better results
in more homogeneous cadasters—similar to the main Sunni party,
the FM. Voters in homogeneous stations were significantly more likely
to vote for him. Higher turnouts in a polling station were associated
with a lower share of votes for the candidate, which could suggest
his failure to mobilize voters as effectively as the other parties.
Across sectarian groups, Sunnis were significantly more likely to
vote for Traboulsi, while Greek Catholic and Christian minorities were
significantly less likely to do so.

Figure 16 **Drivers of votes for Al-Ahbash**

FPM winner Edgard Traboulsi also generally received worse results in
polling stations that had higher turnout rates, highlighting the party's
weak mobilization of voters. Voters in mixed polling stations were
significantly more likely to vote for the Edgard Traboulsi, potentially
due to the higher share of Christians in these stations. Across
confessional groups, all Christian groups were more likely to vote for
the candidate, with Maronite and Christian minorities being the most
likely, while Sunni and Shia voters were the least likely to do so.

Figure 17 **Drivers of votes for FPM**

As for the third winning list 'Lebanon is Worthy', NDP winner Fouad Makhzoumi tended to receive a significantly higher share of votes in single-sect polling stations—similar to the other Sunni parties FM and Al-Ahbash. Across sectarian groups, Sunni, Armenian Orthodox, and Greek Catholic voters were the most likely to vote for Makhzoumi, while Druze voters were significantly less likely to do so. No other factor appears to have significantly affected his performance.

Figure 18 **Drivers of votes for NDP**

The last of the main parties in Beirut 2, Jama'a al-Islamiyah, whose candidate Imad Hout did not win, tended to receive better results in larger and homogeneous polling stations, as well as those with higher turnouts. In addition, voters in cadasters with lower levels of sectarian homogeneity and those in cadasters with lower levels of economic

development were significantly more likely to vote for Hout. Across sectarian groups, Sunni voters were the most likely to vote for him, while Christian minorities, Armenian Orthodox, and Greek Catholic voters were the least likely to do so.

Figure 19 **Drivers of votes for Jama'a al-Islamiyah**

IV Do citizens cast preferential votes for candidates from their same confession?

In Beirut 2, 97% of voters cast a preferential vote for a candidate in their selected list. Among those represented by a seat, 87% chose a candidate from their same confession.

Sectarian biases varied across confessional groups but not across genders

The highest percentage of votes for co-confessional candidates was observed among Sunni voters (89%), followed by Shia (86%) and Druze voters (84%) (table 4). The share was lower among Greek Orthodox voters, although the majority still cast their preferential vote for a Greek Orthodox candidate (63%), while less than half of Christian minorities voted for a Protestant candidate (40%). However, when combining the votes for all Christian candidates, the confessional bias among Greek Orthodox and Christian minorities was much higher (81% and 73%, respectively). These variations across confessional groups are statistically significant even after controlling for voters' gender and characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered. Other Christian groups in Beirut 2 also showed a strong bias toward Christian candidates, with the majority of Maronite and Greek Catholic voters casting their preferential vote for a

Christian candidate (69% and 66%, respectively). Armenian Orthodox voters voted mostly for Sunni candidates (60%).

Table 4 **Percentage of votes for candidates from each confession by confessional group in Beirut 2**

		Sunni	Shia	Druze	Greek Orthodox	Protestant	All Christian candidates
Represented groups	Sunni	89%	8%	1%	2%	1%	3%
	Shia	12%	86%	0%	1%	0%	1%
	Druze	11%	3%	84%	2%	1%	3%
	Greek Orthodox	15%	3%	1%	63%	19%	81%
	Christian minorities	21%	4%	2%	33%	40%	73%
Non-represented groups	Maronite	26%	5%	37%	31%	0%	69%
	Greek Catholic	27%	4%	31%	35%	2%	66%
	Armenian Orthodox	60%	7%	17%	15%	2%	32%
	Mixed confession	33%	19%	20%	19%	8%	39%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Candidates also relied on their sectarian community's votes as most received a significant share of their total votes from their co-sectarian voters.[15] In total, Sunni candidates obtained 92% of their votes from Sunni voters, Shia candidates 76% from Shia voters, Druze candidates 51% from Druze voters, Greek Orthodox candidates 40% from Greek Orthodox voters, and lastly Protestant candidates 8% from Christian minorities.[16] In addition, Greek Orthodox candidates received 10% of their votes from other Christian groups, and Protestant candidates 19% of their votes from Greek Orthodox voters and 11% from other Christian groups.

There were no variations in preferences for co-confessional candidates across genders (87% each). However, voters in stations that had both genders registered to vote voted less for co-confessional candidates (84%).[17] When looking at variations across both confessional groups and genders, Shia and Christian minorities women were slightly less sectarian than their male counterparts (with the confessional vote among them being 2% lower than that among male voters). Shia and Druze voters in gender-mixed stations had a higher confessional bias, while Greek Orthodox had a lower one. However, only a few voters were registered in these stations.

15
In total, about 68% of preferential votes were cast in Sunni stations, 23% were cast in Shia stations, 3% in Greek Orthodox stations, 1% in Druze ones, 0.5% in stations that Christian minorities registered, and less than 1% in total in all other Christian stations. Almost 4% also came from mixed stations. A candidate receiving well over 68% of their votes from Sunni stations would therefore show that they significantly relied on the Sunni vote, regardless of the Sunni preferential vote they obtained. For example, Edgard Traboulsi won nearly 19% of the Greek Catholic preferential vote, but only 14% of the Greek Orthodox one. However, given the higher number of preferential votes cast in Greek Orthodox stations, Traboulsi received a much higher share of his votes from these stations (28%, compared to 4% from Greek Catholics). The candidate still received significantly high support from Greek Catholics, as only 0.3% of total preferential votes were cast in these stations.

16
The share of votes obtained by Protestant candidates that came from Christian minorities is high, considering that only 0.5% of the total preferential votes in Beirut 2 were cast in polling stations that had Christian minorities registered to vote.

17
Note that only 820 voters in gender-mixed stations represented by a seat cast a preferential vote.

Table 5 **Percentage of votes for co-sectarian candidates by confessional group and gender in Beirut 2**

		Voters' gender		
		Men	Women	Mixed gender
Voters' confession	Sunni	89%	89%	
	Shia	87%	85%	89%
	Druze	83%	83%	91%
	Greek Orthodox	63%	63%	60%
	Christian minorities	41%	39%	
	Total	87%	87%	84%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

The most successful candidates among each confessional group were most often co-confessional ones. The seven candidates who managed to win over 5% of the Sunni preferential vote were Sunni, and the three candidates who managed to win over 5% of the Druze vote were Druze. Among Shias, three candidates won 5% of preferential votes, two Shia and one Sunni, Fouad Makhzoumi—although he followed the two Shia candidates by a large margin. Among the four candidates who managed to win over 5% of the Greek Orthodox vote, three were Greek Orthodox, and the fourth was Protestant. Similarly, among the four candidates who won over 5% of Christian minorities' vote, one was Protestant, two were Greek Orthodox, while the last one was Sunni (Fouad Makhzoumi).

Some geographical variations in sectarian biases were present

While there were no large variations in the total share of votes cast for co-sectarian candidates across cadasters, geographical variations within voters from the same sectarian groups were observed. Overall, the cadaster that saw the highest percentage of votes go to co-sectarian candidates was Mazraa (91%), while the one that saw the lowest was Zoukak el-Blatt (81%). In all other cadasters, the percentage ranged between 85% and 88%.

Among each confessional group, Sunni voters had a much higher confessional bias in Mazraa (92%) than they did in other cadasters, while the share of votes they gave to co-sectarian candidates was much lower in Zoukak el-Blatt (73%). Among Shia voters, the confessional bias was highest in Minet el-Hosn (95%), and lowest in Mazraa (70%). Druze voters, who only had their own polling stations in Ain el-Mreisseh, Ras Beirut, and Moussaytbeh, had a higher confessional bias in Moussaytbeh (88%) and a lower one in Ras Beirut (80%). Greek Orthodox voters in Mazraa and Moussaytbeh gave their highest share of votes for Greek Orthodox candidates (67% and 66%), while those in Ras Beirut and Minet el-Hosn gave their lowest (47%).

Finally, Christian minorities, who had their own polling stations only in Ras Beirut and Moussaytbeh, had a much higher sectarian bias in the former (64%) than they did in the latter (35%).

What are the drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates?

In Beirut 2, polling stations that recorded higher turnouts saw a higher share of votes go to co-sectarian candidates. This was the most significant factor, and the result also holds when focusing on each sectarian group. Sunni polling stations that saw higher turnouts also saw a higher share of votes go to Sunni candidates. The same was true for Greek Orthodox, Druze, and Shia polling stations. The exception was among Christian minorities stations, where turnout rates had no significant effect. This highlights candidates' targeted mobilization of voters. Similarly, voters in more homogeneous cadasters were more likely to cast a confessional vote, which may further suggest that candidates may have mobilized voters in specific areas with a higher prevalence of their targeted group.

Across confessional groups, when controlling for cadaster and polling station characteristics, Sunni and Druze voters, closely followed by Shia voters, were the most likely to vote for a co-sectarian candidate, while Christian minorities were the least likely to do so.

Figure 20 **Drivers of votes for co-sectarian candidates in Beirut 2**

V How did women candidates perform?

Beirut 2 was the electoral district with the highest number of women candidates: Out of the 83 candidates in Beirut 2, 19 were women. Altogether, the 19 candidates obtained 8% of votes (10,528 votes), and Rola Tabsh (FM) won a Sunni seat with 5% of preferential votes (6,637 votes).

All lists except 'Beirut's Unity' put forward at least one woman candidate. The lists with the highest number of women candidates were 'People's Voice' and Kelna Beirut (four each). 'Beirutis Opposition' fielded three women candidates, 'Lebanon is Worthy', 'Beirut the Homeland', and 'Dignity of Beirut' each included two women, while 'Future for Beirut' and 'Independent Beirutis' included one woman each (table 6). Ten women competed for the six Sunni seats, three competed for the two Shia seats, three competed for the Druze seat, one for the Greek Orthodox seat, and two for the Protestant seat.

Table 6 **Women candidates in Beirut 2**

List	Name	Number of votes	Confession
Future for Beirut	Rola Tabsh	6,637	Sunni
Lebanon is Worthy	Zeina Mounzer	237	Druze
	Rana El Chemaitelly	169	Sunni
Beirut the Homeland	Dalal Rahbani	71	Protestant
	Salwa Khalil	31	Shia
Kelna Beirut	Zeina Majdalani	1,218	Greek Orthodox
	Nouhad Yazbek	633	Protestant
	Nadine Itani	612	Sunni
	Fatme Mouchref	433	Sunni
People's Voice	Neamat Bader Al Deen	153	Shia
	Hanan Osman	57	Sunni
	Rola Houry	54	Sunni
	Faten Zein	30	Sunni
Beirutis Opposition	Lina Hamdan	58	Shia
	Zeina Mansour	15	Druze
	Safiya Zaza	7	Sunni
Dignity of Beirut	Hanan Shaar	52	Sunni
	Kholoud Wattar	24	Sunni
Independent Beirutis	Andera Zouheiry	37	Druze

Women voters were more likely to vote for women candidates

Women voters gave a much higher percentage of their votes to women candidates—9% compared to 6% of male voters (table 7). This is equivalent to 5,874 women voters and 3,808 male voters who cast their preferential vote for a woman candidate. In gender-mixed polling stations, 12% voted for a woman candidate (507 votes). Variations across genders are statistically significant even after controlling for voters' confession and characteristics of the cadasters they were registered in.

Table 7 **Number and percentage of votes for women candidates by gender in Beirut 2**

	Number of votes	Share of preferential votes
Men	3,808	6%
Women	5,874	9%
Mixed gender	507	12%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

All women candidates obtained a higher number of votes from women voters—with the exception of Safiya Zaza, who won one additional vote from male voters, and Faten Zein, whose number of votes were equal across voters' gender (table 8). The variations were particularly large in the votes for Rola Tabsh, who received slightly less than 2,500 preferential votes among men (4% of their preferential votes), but slightly over 4,000 among women (6%). Zeina Mounzer's number of votes were twice as high among women voters (127 votes, compared to 63 men who voted for her), and Zeina Majdalani and Nouhad Yazbek were also much more popular among women voters (nearly 520 and 330 votes among women, compared to nearly 390 and 190 among men, respectively). In gender-mixed stations, half of those who chose a woman cast their preferential vote for Zeina Majdalani, explained by the higher share of Christian voters in these stations.

Table 8 **Number of votes for each woman candidate by gender in Beirut 2**

List		Men	Women	Mixed gender
Future for Beirut	Rola Tabsh	2,469	4,013	12
Lebanon is Worthy	Zeina Mounzer	63	127	46
	Rana El Chemaitelly	62	93	4
Beirut the Homeland	Dalal Rahbani	25	26	18
	Salwa Khalil	9	21	0
Kelna Beirut	Zeina Majdalani	389	516	259
	Nouhad Yazbek	191	329	87
	Nadine Itani	228	314	17
	Fatme Mouchref	189	199	30
People's Voice	Neamat Bader Al Deen	67	69	5
	Hanan Osman	22	30	2
	Rola Houry	18	32	0
	Faten Zein	14	14	0
Beirutis Opposition	Lina Hamdan	14	20	19
	Zeina Mansour	6	7	1
	Safiya Zaza	4	3	0
Dignity of Beirut	Hanan Shaar	21	28	0
	Kholoud Wattar	6	16	2
Independent Beirutis	Andera Zouheiry	11	17	5

Support for women candidates varied across confessional groups, and they generally performed best among their own communities

Across confessional groups, Christian voters gave a much higher share of their votes for women candidates: Over 10% of each Christian group cast their preferential vote for a woman candidate (table 9). The percentage was highest among Greek Catholics (23%), Maronites (20%), and Armenian Orthodox (20%). Conversely, only 1% of Shia voters voted for a woman, while Sunnis and Druze gave an equal share (9%). Given the unequal number of voters by confessional group, the vast majority of votes received by women came from Sunni voters (almost 8,200 votes). They were followed by Greek Orthodox voters (550 votes), Shia voters (almost 380 votes), and Druze and Maronite voters (149 and 140 votes). A high share also came from mixed stations (nearly 600 votes). Slightly over 200 of the votes received by women candidates were cast in polling stations that serviced Christian minorities, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox voters.

Table 9 **Number and percentage of votes for women candidates by confessional group in Beirut 2**[18]

	Number of votes	Share of preferential votes
Sunni	8,165	9%
Shia	379	1%
Druze	149	9%
Greek Orthodox	550	16%
Christian minorities	76	11%
Maronite	140	20%
Greek Catholic	87	23%
Armenian Orthodox	47	20%
Mixed confession	595	12%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Apart from these variations in the votes cast for all women candidates, voters who chose a woman candidate still demonstrated a sectarian bias: Among those who voted for a woman candidate, 92% of Sunni voters, 68% of Druze voters, 70% of Greek Orthodox voters, and 43% of Christian minorities cast their preferential vote for a co-sectarian woman. Although that share was 25% among Shia voters, the candidate who ranked first among the group was a co-sectarian one. Moreover, most women tended to perform better among their sectarian communities, in that the highest share of their total votes were often cast in polling stations servicing their co-sectarian voters (table 10).

Among the 8,165 Sunni voters who cast their preferential vote for a woman candidate, nearly 80% chose Rola Tabsh (6,435 voters), who received 99% of her total votes from Sunnis. Among the 379 Shias who voted for a woman candidate, 76 voted for Neamat Bader Al Deen (Shia), who also received the majority of her total votes from Shia voters. Among the Druze voters who voted for a woman, most chose Zeina Mounzer (Druze), who also received the highest share of her votes from this community (91 votes). Most Greek Orthodox, Christian minorities, Maronite, Greek Catholic, and Armenian Orthodox voters who voted for a woman cast their vote for Zeina Majdalani (Greek Orthodox), followed by Nouhad Yazbek (Protestant). Among the other women candidates, Dalal Rahbani (Protestant) was most successful among Christian minorities. Andera Zouheiry and Lina Hamdan (both Druze) were also more successful in capturing the Druze vote (although both received a very low number of votes). Sunni candidates Hanan Shaar, Kholoud Wattar, Hanan Osman, Rola Houry, Faten Zein, Safiya Zaza, Rana El Chemaitelly, Nadine Itani, and Fatme Mouchref all won the vast majority of their votes from Sunni voters.

Overall, only Nouhad Yazbek and Zeina Majdalani managed to capture a share of every confessional group's votes.

Table 10 **Number of votes for each woman candidate by confessional group in Beirut 2**

List	Future for Beirut	Lebanon is Worthy		Beirut the Homeland	
Candidate's name	Rola Tabsh	Zeina Mounzer	Rana El Chemaitelly	Dalal Rahbani	Salwa Khalil
Candidate's confession	Sunni	Druze	Sunni	Protestant	Shia
Sunni	6,435	86	138	10	16
Shia	25	15	10	6	12
Druze	1	91	0	0	0
Greek Orthodox	5	3	4	16	0
Christian minorities	0	3	1	6	0
Maronite	1	1	0	3	0
Greek Catholic	5	0	0	3	0
Armenian Orthodox	0	1	0	6	0
Mixed confession	22	36	6	19	2

List	Kelna Beirut			
Candidate's name	Zeina Majdalani*	Nouhad Yazbek	Nadine Itani	Fatme Mouchref
Candidate's confession	Greek Orthodox	Protestant	Sunni	Sunni
Sunni	216	274	460	285
Shia	56	50	45	53
Druze	12	9	12	6
Greek Orthodox	385	78	15	27
Christian minorities	29	27	4	1
Maronite	93	23	5	5
Greek Catholic	45	28	1	3
Armenian Orthodox	21	11	0	2
Mixed confession	306	107	17	36

Note **The Jewish voter who cast their preferential vote for a woman candidate chose Zeina Majdalani.**

List	People's Voice			
Candidate's name	Neamat Bader Al Deen	Hanan Osman	Rola Houry	Faten Zein
Candidate's confession	Shia	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni
Sunni	39	47	42	24
Shia	76	4	7	3
Druze	7	0	0	0
Greek Orthodox	7	0	0	0
Christian minorities	3	0	0	0
Maronite	2	0	0	0
Greek Catholic	1	0	0	0
Armenian Orthodox	0	0	0	0
Mixed confession	6	3	1	1

List	Beirutis Opposition			Dignity of Beirut		Independent Beirutis
Candidate's name	Lina Hamdan	Zeina Mansour	Safiya Zaza	Hanan Shaar	Kholoud Wattar	Andera Zouheiry
Candidate's confession	Shia	Druze	Sunni	Sunni	Sunni	Druze
Sunni	8	10	7	37	17	14
Shia	5	1	0	8	1	2
Druze	0	1	0	0	0	10
Greek Orthodox	6	0	0	1	2	1
Christian minorities	0	0	0	0	2	0
Maronite	7	0	0	0	0	0
Greek Catholic	1	0	0	0	0	0
Armenian Orthodox	5	1	0	0	0	0
Mixed confession	21	1	0	3	2	6

What are the drivers of votes for women candidates?

A few factors affected voters' preferences for women candidates. Voters in mixed polling stations, as well as those in smaller polling stations, were more likely to vote for a woman candidate. Those in more homogeneous cadasters and cadasters with higher levels of economic development were also more likely to vote for a woman candidate. As mentioned above, women, compared to men, were significantly more likely to cast their preferential vote for a woman candidate—a result that holds even after controlling for their confession. Across confessional groups, Christian voters were overall the most likely to choose a woman candidate, with Greek Catholics being slightly more likely than others. Shias were the least likely to vote for a woman candidate, and Sunnis and Druze stood in between.

Figure 21 **Drivers of votes for women candidates in Beirut 2**

VI How did emerging political groups perform?

Two of the nine lists in Beirut 2 were independent: Kelna Beirut and Independent Beirutis. Kelna Beirut won 6,174 votes, and Independent Beirutis only won 410 votes.

Kelna Beirut obtained a total of 4% of the votes in the district (6,174 votes) and was much more successful among the diaspora, receiving 9% of their vote (369 votes). Eight candidates ran on the list: Ibrahim Mneimneh (Sunni, 1,676 votes), Zeina Majdalani (Greek Orthodox, 1,218 votes), Hassan Sinno (Sunni, 1,174 votes), Nouhad Yazbek (Protestant, 633 votes), Nadine Itani (Sunni, 612 votes), Fatme Mouchref (Sunni, 433 votes), Marwan El Tibi (Sunni, 112 votes), and Naji Kodeih (Shia, 111 votes).

Women were more likely to vote for Kelna Beirut
Kelna Beirut received a higher share of votes from women voters (2,905 votes, 4.2%) than it did from men voters (2,346 votes, 3.7%) (table 11). These variations are statistically significant even after controlling for voters' confession, as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered. In polling stations that had both men and women registered to vote, the share of constituents voting for Kelna Beirut was much higher (533 votes, 12%). This higher share among voters in gender-mixed stations may be related to the high share of Christian voters—who voted more for the list—registered in these stations.

There were some variations in support for specific candidates. All candidates received a higher number of votes from polling stations

that had women voters registered, and women voted particularly more for Zeina Majdalani, Hassan Sinno, Nouhad Yazbek, and Nadine Itani. Differences were even larger in gender-mixed stations: Nearly half of voters in gender-mixed stations chose Zeina Majdalani, with Nouhad Yazbek coming in second. These variations were again related to the higher share of Christian voters in gender-mixed stations.

Table 11 **Number and share of votes for Kelna Beirut and its candidates by gender in Beirut 2**

	Number of votes			Share of votes		
	Men	Women	Mixed gender	Men	Women	Mixed gender
Kelna Beirut	2,346	2,905	533	3.7%	4.2%	12.3%
Ibrahim Mneimneh	707	731	80	1%	1%	2%
Zeina Majdalani	389	516	259	1%	1%	6%
Hassan Sinno	490	612	31	1%	1%	1%
Nouhad Yazbek	191	329	87	0.3%	0.5%	2%
Nadine Itani	228	314	17	0.4%	0.5%	0.4%
Fatme Mouchref	189	199	30	0.3%	0.3%	1%
Marwan El Tibi	41	47	15	0.1%	0.1%	0.4%
Naji Kodeih	45	54	1	0.1%	0.1%	0.0%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

Christian communities were the most likely to vote for Kelna Beirut, and even Kelna Beirut voters showed a confessional bias

Across confessional groups, the list was most successful among Christian voters, obtaining 27% of the Greek Catholic vote, 22% of the Maronite, 17% of the Greek Orthodox and Armenian Orthodox vote, and 12% of Christian minorities' vote (table 12). On the other hand, 5% of Druze voters, 4% of Sunnis, and less than 2% of Shias voted for the list. In stations that had voters from more than one confessional group registered, 13% of voters chose Kelna Beirut. All these variations are statistically significant even after controlling for voters' gender as well as characteristics of the cadasters in which they were registered. However, given the higher number of Sunni voters overall, most of the votes received by Kelna Beirut came from Sunnis (3,539 votes, 61% of its votes). The second largest share of votes received by the list came from Greek Orthodox voters (614 votes, 11%), followed by Shias (508 votes, 9%), as well as voters in mixed stations (660 votes, 13%). Nevertheless, compared to other lists, Kelna Beirut had a more confessionally diverse constituency.

Table 12 **Number and share of votes for Kelna Beirut by confessional group in Beirut 2**[19]

	Number of votes	Share of votes
Sunni	3,539	4%
Shia	508	2%
Druze	78	5%
Greek Orthodox	614	17%
Christian minorities	83	12%
Maronite	160	22%
Greek Catholic	100	27%
Armenian Orthodox	41	17%
Mixed confession	660	13%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

There were variations in preferences for certain candidates across confessional groups. Ibrahim Mneimneh was the preferred Kelna Beirut candidate among Sunni, Shia, and Druze voters. Among each of these groups who voted for the list, over one third chose Mneimneh (1,120 Sunni, 173 Shia, and 26 Druze voters). Zeina Majdalani was by far the preferred candidate among Christian voters, in particular Greek Orthodox and Maronite ones, with over 60% of Greek Orthodox and Maronite voters who voted for a Kelna Beirut candidate choosing her (385 Greek Orthodox and 93 Maronite). Nouhad Yazbek ranked second among all Christian groups, and was more successful among Christian minorities (27 votes), receiving an almost equal share as Majdalani. In general, Christian Kelna Beirut voters seem to have had a high confessional bias.

Among Sunni voters, Hassan Sinno was the second preferred candidate (988 votes), whereas the Druze and Shia votes were fragmented between different candidates—the Druze vote was mostly split between Nadine Itani and Zeina Majdalani, and the Shia one between all candidates but Marwan El Tibi, who was unsuccessful among all confessional groups. Similar to Christian voters, Sunnis and Shias who could vote for a co-confessional candidate in the list had a confessional bias. Among Sunni voters, the four most voted for candidates were Sunni. The fifth Sunni candidate on the list, Marwan El Tibi, was the only exception. While Shia voters voted significantly more for Ibrahim Mneimneh (Sunni), and had an otherwise highly fragmented vote, the Shia candidate on the list, Naji Kodeih, received half of his votes from Shia voters (50 votes).

Overall, although some of the candidates had diverse constituents, Sunni candidates obtained the majority of their votes from Sunni voters, the Shia candidate from Shia voters, and the Greek Orthodox candidate from Greek Orthodox voters. As for the Protestant candidate, although a small share of the votes she received came

from her co-sectarian voters, she was the only candidate—other than Greek Orthodox Zeina Majdalani—to obtain over 1% of her votes from Christian minorities.

Table 13 **Number of votes for each Kelna Beirut candidate by confessional group in Beirut 2**

	Ibrahim Mneimneh	Zeina Majdalani	Hassan Sinno	Nouhad Yazbek	Nadine Itani	Fatme Mouchref	Marwan El Tibi	Naji Kodeih
Sunni	1,120	216	988	274	460	285	54	33
Shia	173	56	51	50	45	53	11	50
Druze	26	12	1	9	12	6	0	4
Greek Orthodox	60	385	19	78	15	27	12	7
Christian minorities	12	29	4	27	4	1	0	0
Maronite	8	93	17	23	5	5	5	0
Greek Catholic	11	45	6	28	1	3	3	0
Armenian Orthodox	6	21	0	11	0	2	0	1
Mixed confession	102	306	47	107	17	36	18	5

Ibrahim Mneimneh was able to obtain over 1% of every confessional group's vote, except the Shia one. Hassan Sinno only won over 1% of the Sunni, Maronite, and Greek Catholic vote. Both Nouhad Yazbek and Zeina Majdalani won over 1% of every Christian group's vote, with Majdalani being significantly more successful than Yazbek, winning over 10% of the Greek Orthodox, Maronite, and Greek Catholic vote. Other candidates on the list did not manage to win over 1% of any group's vote.

Table 14 **Percentage of votes for each Kelna Beirut candidate by confessional group in Beirut 2**

|	Ibrahim Mneimneh	Zeina Majdalani	Hassan Sinno	Nouhad Yazbek	Nadine Itani	Fatme Mouchref	Marwan El Tibi	Naji Kodeih
Sunni	1.2%	0.2%	1.1%	0.3%	0.5%	0.3%	0.1%	0.0%
Shia	0.6%	0.2%	0.2%	0.2%	0.1%	0.2%	0.0%	0.2%
Druze	1.6%	0.7%	0.1%	0.5%	0.7%	0.4%	0.0%	0.2%
Greek Orthodox	1.7%	10.9%	0.5%	2.2%	0.4%	0.8%	0.3%	0.2%
Christian minorities	1.8%	4.3%	0.6%	4.0%	0.6%	0.1%	0.0%	0.0%
Maronite	1.2%	13.4%	2.4%	3.3%	0.7%	0.7%	0.7%	0.0%
Greek Catholic	3.0%	12.1%	1.6%	7.5%	0.3%	0.8%	0.8%	0.0%
Armenian Orthodox	2.5%	8.8%	0.0%	4.6%	0.0%	0.8%	0.0%	0.4%
Mixed confession	2.0%	6.1%	0.9%	2.1%	0.3%	0.7%	0.4%	0.1%

Note **Percentages have been rounded up.**

What are the drivers of votes for Kelna Beirut?

Polling stations that saw higher turnouts, as well as those that had a higher number of registered voters, generally saw a lower percentage of votes go to Kelna Beirut. The former result could be due to the list's failure to mobilize voters. In comparison, voters in mixed stations were more likely to vote for the list. Among the few cadasters in Beirut 2, voters in cadasters with higher levels of economic development generally voted in larger numbers for Kelna Beirut.

By gender, women voters were significantly more likely to vote for Kelna Beirut. By confession, Greek Catholic, Greek Orthodox, and Maronite voters were the most likely to vote for the list, while Shias were the least likely to do so.

Figure 22 **Drivers of votes for Kelna Beirut in Beirut 2**

How did Independent Beirutis perform, and who were the list's constituents?

The Independent Beirutis list won 410 votes in the elections (0.3%), with 27 of these coming from voters in the diaspora (0.7% of their vote). Ten candidates ran on the list: Khaled Momtaz (Sunni, 108 votes), Abdelkarim Itani (Sunni, 87 votes), Walid Chatila (Sunni, 44 votes), Andera Zouheiry (Druze, 37 votes), Leon Sioufi (Greek Orthodox, 29 votes), Abdel Rahman Ghalayini (Sunni, 20 votes), Jihad Ali Hammoud (Shia, 19 votes), Khaled Hankeer (Sunni, 16 votes), Fadi Zarazir (Protestant, 12 votes), and Wissam Akkouche (Shia, nine votes).

Independent Beirutis voters also showed a confessional bias

There were minor variations in support for the list across genders, with men voting slightly more for the list (195 votes) compared to women (152 votes). Among specific candidates, there were no significant variations, with the exception of support for Abdelkarim Itani, who received twice as many votes from men (57 votes, compared to 26 votes from women).

Even though the list's candidates were highly unsuccessful, each received support from their confessional community. All Sunni candidates in the list ranked first among Sunni voters, with the most successful being Abdelkarim Itani (79 votes from Sunnis). Most Shia voters who voted for the list chose Shia candidate Jihad Ali Hammoud (17 out of the 31 Shia voters who voted for a candidate in the list). All Druze voters, but one, voted for the Druze candidate Andera Zouheiry. Among Greek Orthodox voters, however, Sunni candidate Khaled Momtaz was the most successful, although the candidate who ranked second was the Greek Orthodox one, Leon Sioufi.

Table 15 **Number of votes for Independent Beirutis and its candidates by gender and confessional group in Beirut 2**

		Independent Beirutis	Khaled Momtaz	Abdelkarim Itani	Walid Chatila	Andera Zouheiry	Leon Sioufi
Voters' gender	Men	195	48	57	23	11	8
	Women	152	44	26	17	17	6
	Mixed gender	34	5	2	1	5	11
Voters' confession	Sunni	267	67	79	37	14	9
	Shia	33	1	1	3	2	2
	Druze	11	1	0	0	10	0
	Greek Orthodox	20	11	0	0	1	6
	Christian minorities	1	0	0	0	0	0
	Maronite	8	8	0	0	0	0
	Greek Catholic	2	2	0	0	0	0
	Armenian Orthodox	5	0	2	0	0	2
	Mixed confession	34	7	3	1	6	6

		Abdel Rahman Ghalayini	Jihad Ali Hammoud	Khaled Hankeer	Fadi Zarazir	Wissam Akkouche
Voters' gender	Men	8	13	10	2	2
	Women	10	6	6	4	6
	Mixed gender	1	0	0	6	0
Voters' confession	Sunni	16	2	16	3	3
	Shia	2	17	0	0	3
	Druze	0	0	0	0	0
	Greek Orthodox	0	0	0	1	1
	Christian minorities	0	0	0	1	0
	Maronite	0	0	0	0	0
	Greek Catholic	0	0	0	0	0
	Armenian Orthodox	0	0	0	0	0
	Mixed confession	1	0	0	7	1

Independent Beirutis received the lowest number of votes in Beirut 2, however, some factors seem to have affected its performance. The list tended to receive better results in mixed polling stations, as well as in cadasters with lower levels of sectarian homogeneity. Across genders, women were significantly less likely to vote for the list compared to men. There were minor variations across confessional groups. Maronite and Armenian Orthodox voters were the most likely to vote for the list, while Shia voters were the least likely to do so.

Figure 23 **Drivers of votes for Independent Beirutis in Beirut 2**

VII Were there any signs of irregularities?

Irregularities can occur during the election process, through ballot stuffing that either increases the total number of votes or adds votes for one party at the expense of another. Fraud can also occur during the vote aggregation process when there is collusion between certain candidates—usually the more politically connected ones—and election officials. Voter rigging, or pressuring voters to cast ballots in a certain manner, tends to occur more in small polling stations, where it is easier to monitor voters' behavior. Testing whether turnout was abnormally high in smaller voting centers can help approximate whether there were incidents of voter rigging. Another method of detecting signs of election fraud is examining the distribution of turnout and vote numbers, and testing whether they have a 'normal' shape. For example, an abnormally high number of voting centers with close to 100% turnout could suggest either voter or vote rigging at any stage of the election process. Other lines of research focus on statistical tests that examine the random nature of numbers to test whether numbers were manipulated in a non-random manner.

There are some irregular patterns in turnout

The distribution of turnout by polling station usually has a normal shape, with the majority of electoral stations having turnouts close to the middle (average) and with few stations in the extreme ends.

The average turnout across the 572 polling stations in Beirut 2 was 40%, ranging from 6% to 100%.[20] Compared to a normal distribution, turnout per polling stations significantly diverged from expected turnout rates. There was a significantly higher number of very low, as well as mid-turnout centers, than expected. Conversely, there was a lower number of mid-low and mid-high turnout centers than expected. Moreover, two centers saw 100% turnouts. All these differences are statistically significant and may provide initial evidence of voter or vote rigging.

20
Here we exclude polling stations in which public employees were registered to vote, as well as Jewish stations, and those outside of the country.

Figure 24 **Distribution of turnout rates by polling stations in Beirut 2**

95% confidence interval

Smaller polling stations had higher turnouts, however, there is no
evidence of voter rigging by any specific party

Voter rigging entails political parties pressuring or coercing voters
with the intended aim of affecting turnout. The literature on election
irregularities distinguishes vote rigging from vote buying, as coercion
is not apparent in the latter case. There are, however, some ways to
detect potential instances of voter rigging through statistical tests.

One way to test for voter rigging is by examining the correlation between turnouts and the size of a polling station. Previous evidence shows that polling stations with fewer voters are more attractive for politicians buying votes or exerting some kind of pressure on voters because smaller groups of voters facilitate aggregate monitoring of whether voters cast their ballots, and for whom.[21] High turnouts in polling stations with fewer voters may therefore point toward fraud in those stations.

While there were only a few small polling stations in Beirut 2 (six stations with less than 400 registered voters),[22] these saw significantly higher turnouts, with two of them having a 100% turnout, and the remaining four having turnouts above 79%. All of these small polling stations were the only ones to see turnouts above 62%. Moreover, turnout in small polling stations, or those with a size of one standard deviation below the mean, was on average 7% higher than turnout in non-small polling stations (48% compared to 41%). All of these results suggest that politicians may have exerted pressure on voters to vote, or mobilized them through vote buying, focusing on these stations where votes tend to be easier to monitor.

a   Figure 25 **Polling station size and turnout rates in Beirut 2**

**Correlation between the size of a polling station and turnouts**

b   **Turnout in small polling stations compared to non-small ones**[23]

However, although among the small polling stations, FM candidates were more successful in the Sunni ones, and Hezbollah and Amal candidates in the Shia ones, there is no clear evidence suggesting who benefited the most from small stations.

In addition, turnouts were significantly higher in mixed polling stations, compared to homogeneous ones. Homogeneous stations might be more attractive for politicians buying votes, as registered voters in these are easily identifiable. However, the vast majority of voters in mixed stations were from minority groups, who overall had lower turnouts. In homogeneous stations reserved for groups other than Shias, Sunnis, and Druze, turnout was 19%. And among homogeneous stations reserved for Greek Orthodox and Christian minorities, turnout was 21%, compared to the 22% seen in mixed stations overall. This could suggest that Christians, overall, were less mobilized.

Figure 26 **Turnout in homogeneous versus mixed polling stations**

No list benefited from high turnout, providing no evidence of fraud

Besides the size of the polling stations, it can also be shown whether one list or party benefited from abnormally high or low turnout rates. Normally, if there was a lack of pressure on voters to vote, votes for a specific party or list should not significantly vary between polling stations with abnormally high, normal, or abnormally low turnouts (1 standard deviation below/above the norm).[24] A higher share of votes for a party in centers with abnormally high turnout rates could be due to its higher success in mobilizing its supporters. However, it might also provide some suggestive evidence of voter rigging.

No list seems to have benefited from significantly high turnouts. In very low turnout stations, the FPM-Hezbollah-Amal-Al-Ahbash list performed worse, while Kelna Beirut performed better. Votes received by the FPM-Hezbollah-Amal-Al-Ahbash list were 7% lower in very low turnout stations than they were in normal turnout stations (25% compared to 32%). Those for Kelna Beirut, on the other hand, were 3% higher in very low turnout centers than they were in centers with normal turnouts (9% compared to 6%). The latter result may suggest that, when voters were not targeted by the main political parties, they tended to vote more for Kelna Beirut. It also highlights Kelna Beirut's failure to mobilize voters.

24
Myagkov, M., P.C. Ordeshook, and D. Shakin. 2009. 'The Forensics of Election Fraud.' Cambridge University Press.

Figure 27 **Percentage of votes for each list and standardized turnout rate in Beirut 2**

■ **Very low (1 standard deviation)**   ■ **Normal**   ■ **Very high (1 standard deviation)**

No evidence of vote rigging

Another type of election irregularities would be votes rigging, such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations. One way to detect signs ballot stuffing is look at the correlation between the percentage of null votes and both turnouts and votes for a specific party in a polling station. Previous evidence shows that when political parties add ballots, they tend to forget to include a similar proportion of invalid votes.[25] Potential irregular behaviors can be identified by looking at the correlation between the percentage of

25
Friesen, P. 2019. 'Strategic Ballot Removal: An Unexplored Form of Electoral Manipulation in Hybrid Regimes.' *Democratization*, 26(4): 709-729.

null votes, turnouts, and votes for a list or party. A lower percentage of invalid votes in a polling station, associated with a higher turnout and a higher percentage of votes for a list or party would suggest manipulations in the vote count. However, a negative correlation is not enough to suggest ballot stuffing—as null votes could be 'protest' votes. Stronger evidence of ballot stuffing would be apparent in cases where the increase in the share of null votes is smaller than the decrease in the percentage of votes for a list or party.

In Beirut 2, although a negative relationship between turnout and the share of null votes by polling station was observed, it was not strong enough to provide evidence of vote rigging. Turnout rates decreased from 40% in polling stations where 2% or less of votes were null, to 30% in polling stations that had the highest share of null votes (15%).

Similarly, looking at the relationship between the share of null votes in a polling station and votes for each party does not point toward ballot stuffing.

Figure 28 **Turnout and percentage of null votes by polling station in Beirut 2**

Another form of vote rigging would entail parties manipulating the vote count either by adding or subtracting votes for a list, or 're-shuffling' votes within their list from one candidate to another—also known as 'cooking' the numbers. One way of detecting manipulations in the vote counting process is to look at the distribution of the last digits in votes for a party.[26] The last-digits test is based on the hypothesis that humans tend to be poor at making up numbers which would result in an abnormal distribution of numbers at the aggregate

26
Beber, B. and A. Scacco. 2012.
'What the Numbers Say: A
Digit-Based Test for Election
Fraud.' *Political Analysis*,
20(2): 211-234.

level. In 'clean' elections, last digits in votes for a party should be uniformly distributed, with an equal chance of every number (from 0 to 9) to appear (10% chance).

In Beirut 2, the distribution of last digits in the number of valid votes, as well as the distribution of last digits in the number of votes for each party, did not deviate from the uniform line. There is therefore no evidence of vote rigging in Beirut 2.

No evidence of irregularities in Beirut 2

There is no evidence of vote rigging in Beirut 2, such as ballot stuffing and vote counting manipulations. Regarding incidents of voter rigging, smaller polling stations tended to see higher turnouts. However, since no single list or party seems to have benefited from these higher turnouts in the smaller polling stations, there is no evidence of vote buying from a specific party.